>Here is the core of our disagreement. Although poverty and environmental
>degradation occur _due_to_ intentional acts, those acts did not have the
>intention of causing them.
But sometimes they do. Do you really believe that some forms of poverty,
even in Britain today, are not the result of intentional acts, that those
who formulated the policies were totally unaware of some of the potential
outcomes of their actions? Since 1979 Britain has been run on a cost-benefit
basis, as has arguably much of the developed world. Likewise environmental
degradation. Do you really expect me to believe that these poor unfortunate
souls, transnational corporations, for example, 'know not what they do', to
quote Zizek?
They are (usually unwanted) side-effects. For
>example, if I go and buy a house I do not do it with the intention of
>driving up the price of property, but because I want to live somewhere.
>All the same, my intentional action has that effect.
This is beautiful, you have identified a structural constraint and
unintended outcome of house-buying, yet feel free to absolve yourself of
responsibility, presumably because you did not consciously make these
structural conditions come about.
>Clitoridectomy, on the other hand, is a practice as opposed to an
>unintended side-effect.
Well it might be possible to argue that it is a side effect of a particular
form of belief. Thus locating the possibility that it does not fufil the
function that it is believed it does. Hence making possible its critique.
Hence destroying the other side of Hume's fork: that is facts can become
values.
> But don't claim that Quetzil is causing a practice
>about which he knows little and which he is not involved in.
I didn't claim that he was 'causing' it, but that by his inaction was
acting. Much the same that if i fail to stop my partner killing one of our,
the only one actually, children, I have let it happen. Using a
cultural/nationalist/statist card does not get anyone off the hook.
>If you mean moral responsibility, then I'm not in a position to argue
>because I cannot formulate a coherent notion of it. If
>you mean causal responsibility, and treat humans (e.g. Quetzil) as free
>(uncaused) agents, then I can see no other possibility than an individualistic
>notion of responsibility.
The notion of uncaused agents is certainly incoherent and rests on a false
dichotomy between free-will and determinism. But free-will no more rests on
the escape from cauality and/or natural necessity than I can be said to be
free by walking off the top of a cliff, ignorant of the knowledge that
gravity will contribute to the possibilty of my death.
>To return to clitoridectomy and adult-child sex, perhaps if you wish
>Quetzil to fight against either or both of these practices you should
>formulate convincing arguments that they are fundamentally morally wrong
>according to his code of ethics.
If I had an clue as to what they were I might give it a go (and I don't want
to suggest that the position advocated is lacking in one, but that it is not
yet stated, at least not explcitly).
If someone claims insufficient knowledge
>to act, it is more useful to try to provide that knowledge than to
>castigate her for moral laziness.
I agree with the latter sentiment, but wonder on Quetzil's reading what
could possibly count as that 'knowledge'.
Also, Dave can you explain your qoute about alfie to me?
Thanks,
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"All those who say truth does not exist for me are simple minded" (Foucault)
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
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