>
> On Thu, 23 May 1996, Theodora Lightfoot <DLIGHT@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>writes:
>
> > What is all of this business about intentionality? I thoughtmost of us
> > had moved away from a sovereign model of power in which a few
> > individuals who posess power consciously oppress the rest who do not.
> > I strongly doubt that anyone makes economic policy with the conscious
> > intention of causing more poverty....
>
> We need to be careful to distinguish "intentional acts" in the sense of
> acts performed with an intended result and "intentionality" which to my
> eyes/ears carries a specifically phenomenological coloration/inflection.
>
> For Husserl, as for Brentano before him and and the younger generation
> of theorists after him (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, even de Man and the young
> Foucault), intentionality describes an essential structure of
> consciousness, in which all acts of consciousness are intentional, that
> is they intend something: consicousness is always consciousness *of*
> something.
>
> As such, intentionality certainly depends upon a subject as agent of
> consciousness, and to that extent may be a problematic notion vis-a-vis
> Butler or Foucault or any variety of poststructuralist thinkers; that is,
> it's hard to theorize intentionality if you're going to do away with a
> subject.
>
> Nevertheless, intentionality in its phenomenological sense is far and
> away a long way away from "authorial intent" in the sense of basing an
> interpretation of a text, or event for that matter, on the what the
> author or agent "intended" as the outcome or result of that text or
> event; it is not at all about the use of power for the conscious or
> intentional oppression of others (which is not to say that phenomenology
> itself might have ideological stakes--but this is another matter).
>
>
> Tom Orange
> tmorange@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
Forgive the spelling and grammar. I was in a hurry.>
You are quite right. There is a sharp distinction between an individual's
intention, and what effects the actions arising out of such intentions
result in (unintended consequences). Foucault radicalizes the notion of
unintended consequences quite prominately in D & P, where he, like Nietzsche
in 'The Genealogy of Morals, argues that the origin of the prison as
a means of punishment (the intentions behind such an origin arising out of
the monarchy, the capitalists and the penal reformers), have nothing
to do with the present functioning of the prison (as it mainly creates
recidivism). From Nietzsche, Foucualt accepts that there is no maxim
more important to an historian than the origin of something, its intentions,its
development and purposes through the course of history, has nothing
to do with its present functioning. The functioning of a complex social
product (its rationality if you will) is quite distinct from the
intentional acts, which have, through the course of history, produced it.
The sources of intention and action are too diverse, too multi-faceted, too
conflicting in purposes to create a complex whole that can, in any way,
be said to be the intentional product of human action. This is not to say
that Foucualt denies intention in individual actions. Foucualt states quite clearly that the penal reformers had the expressed intention of creating
a system of punishimnet that would more efficiently punish, in order to
transform criminals into good citizens. These intentions were put into
practice in the form of the myriad tactics of control, discipline and
surveillance located in the prison at its inception. Such tactics, along with
others through the course of history which developed for any number of reasons,
resulted in the production of a prison system whose main function
is the continual creation of delinquency (nobody intended this says Foucualt)
The prison has a distinctive rationality that is the unintentional product
of intentionally acting subjects. For Foucualt to remain consistent with his theory of power and subjectivity, he would have to argue that such subjects, as de-centered subjects,
still act with intention, it is, however, not the free intention of
the constituent subject, it is the de-centered intention of a de-centered
subject (even de-centered subjects intend things in their actions). Such
intentions derive from a subjectivity that is entirely the product of power.
But, perhaps it is not necessary to take the argument to this extreme.
Foucualt's depiction of delinquency vis a vis the intentions of the penal
reformers was designed as a critique of the ability which liberal place
upon reason as a means of controlling nature, including human action.
If Foucualt's purpose was to illustrate the oppression connected with
an egregious use of reason to control human beings, and also reason's
inherent inability to succeed in such a grand task (human beings, as
social products, are not as simple as utilitiarians believe us to be),
then, perhaps, it is not necessary to argue that human beings are
entirely products of social construction.
Greg Coolidge
Univ., of Calif., Riverside
> On Thu, 23 May 1996, Theodora Lightfoot <DLIGHT@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>writes:
>
> > What is all of this business about intentionality? I thoughtmost of us
> > had moved away from a sovereign model of power in which a few
> > individuals who posess power consciously oppress the rest who do not.
> > I strongly doubt that anyone makes economic policy with the conscious
> > intention of causing more poverty....
>
> We need to be careful to distinguish "intentional acts" in the sense of
> acts performed with an intended result and "intentionality" which to my
> eyes/ears carries a specifically phenomenological coloration/inflection.
>
> For Husserl, as for Brentano before him and and the younger generation
> of theorists after him (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, even de Man and the young
> Foucault), intentionality describes an essential structure of
> consciousness, in which all acts of consciousness are intentional, that
> is they intend something: consicousness is always consciousness *of*
> something.
>
> As such, intentionality certainly depends upon a subject as agent of
> consciousness, and to that extent may be a problematic notion vis-a-vis
> Butler or Foucault or any variety of poststructuralist thinkers; that is,
> it's hard to theorize intentionality if you're going to do away with a
> subject.
>
> Nevertheless, intentionality in its phenomenological sense is far and
> away a long way away from "authorial intent" in the sense of basing an
> interpretation of a text, or event for that matter, on the what the
> author or agent "intended" as the outcome or result of that text or
> event; it is not at all about the use of power for the conscious or
> intentional oppression of others (which is not to say that phenomenology
> itself might have ideological stakes--but this is another matter).
>
>
> Tom Orange
> tmorange@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
Forgive the spelling and grammar. I was in a hurry.>
You are quite right. There is a sharp distinction between an individual's
intention, and what effects the actions arising out of such intentions
result in (unintended consequences). Foucault radicalizes the notion of
unintended consequences quite prominately in D & P, where he, like Nietzsche
in 'The Genealogy of Morals, argues that the origin of the prison as
a means of punishment (the intentions behind such an origin arising out of
the monarchy, the capitalists and the penal reformers), have nothing
to do with the present functioning of the prison (as it mainly creates
recidivism). From Nietzsche, Foucualt accepts that there is no maxim
more important to an historian than the origin of something, its intentions,its
development and purposes through the course of history, has nothing
to do with its present functioning. The functioning of a complex social
product (its rationality if you will) is quite distinct from the
intentional acts, which have, through the course of history, produced it.
The sources of intention and action are too diverse, too multi-faceted, too
conflicting in purposes to create a complex whole that can, in any way,
be said to be the intentional product of human action. This is not to say
that Foucualt denies intention in individual actions. Foucualt states quite clearly that the penal reformers had the expressed intention of creating
a system of punishimnet that would more efficiently punish, in order to
transform criminals into good citizens. These intentions were put into
practice in the form of the myriad tactics of control, discipline and
surveillance located in the prison at its inception. Such tactics, along with
others through the course of history which developed for any number of reasons,
resulted in the production of a prison system whose main function
is the continual creation of delinquency (nobody intended this says Foucualt)
The prison has a distinctive rationality that is the unintentional product
of intentionally acting subjects. For Foucualt to remain consistent with his theory of power and subjectivity, he would have to argue that such subjects, as de-centered subjects,
still act with intention, it is, however, not the free intention of
the constituent subject, it is the de-centered intention of a de-centered
subject (even de-centered subjects intend things in their actions). Such
intentions derive from a subjectivity that is entirely the product of power.
But, perhaps it is not necessary to take the argument to this extreme.
Foucualt's depiction of delinquency vis a vis the intentions of the penal
reformers was designed as a critique of the ability which liberal place
upon reason as a means of controlling nature, including human action.
If Foucualt's purpose was to illustrate the oppression connected with
an egregious use of reason to control human beings, and also reason's
inherent inability to succeed in such a grand task (human beings, as
social products, are not as simple as utilitiarians believe us to be),
then, perhaps, it is not necessary to argue that human beings are
entirely products of social construction.
Greg Coolidge
Univ., of Calif., Riverside