Re[2]: Events and historical change

Does one have to have a theory to speak of historical
change? If one describes historical shifts, as Foucault
does, in boith discourse, disciplinary techniques, 'regimes
of truth' etc., etc., than one also has to encounter the
probolem of how these shifts were brought about. In "Truht
and Power" (P/K, 114) Foucautl says:
One can agree that structuralsim formed that most systematic
effort to evacuate the concept of teh event, not only from
ethnology but from a whole series of other sciences and in
hte extreme case from history. In that sense, I don't know
who could be more of an anti-strucutralist thatn
myself...It's not a matter of locating everything one one
level, that of the event, but of realising that there are
actually a whole order of levels of different types of
events differing in amplitude, chronological breadth, and
capacity to produce effects.

If "events" aren't causes for FOucault, then what the hell
are they?

There are two choices: Hegel or Marx. If one claims that
discourse shifts, then one cann either claim that shifts are
internal to discourse (Hegel) - in which case we should all
be logicians, or we can claim that "events" cause shifts
(Marx), and spell out, EMPIRICALLY, the conditions whcih
give rise to these events - in whcih case we have to include
"non-discursive" (social, insitutional, etc.) factors. Why
be mystical about it? Real events brought about the French
Revolution, the Russian revolution, and the Vietnam War.
Can't we desribe the factors which led to these (larger)
events? Isn't an historical "rupture," to use Althusser's
language, a "fusion" of an accumulation of events, whcih
form into a ruptural unity? Isn't Foucault's "conception"
(however we should say it) of historical change similar?

Maybe I should say this another way: isn't there a period in
Foucault's writing (esp. the mid-70s) where he is Marxian -
where his concerns are consistent with a Marxian coneption
of events, of hsitory, and of change? A period where
Foucault deploys history in a CRITICAL manner? Isn't there a
period where he isn't that interested in a [personal]
transformation, a Nietzschean self-transformation, or
Balnchot's "limit experience" or any of that existentialist
garbage, where Foucault is actually revolutionary? If not,
I agree with Baudrillard, FORGET FOUCAULT.



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