Wittgenstein's 'skeptical paradox' has to do with
rule-following. It is similar to Hume's paradox of doing
mathematical deductions - that there is always room for
doubting one's own abilities, even when applying formulas;
thus certainty, even mathematical certainty, involves
probabilistic reasoning about oneself. The solution to the
'skeptical paradox,' according to Kripke, is a 'skeptica;l
solution' - namely, that certainty about one's own
rule-following abilities ultimately takes place in reference
to a community of rule followers. The connection I see with
Foucault has to do with his notion of normativity; where
Foucault goes a satep further then these analytic
philsophers is in writing the history of disciplinary
communities - "truth regimes" which historically establish
truth realtions through power relations.
rule-following. It is similar to Hume's paradox of doing
mathematical deductions - that there is always room for
doubting one's own abilities, even when applying formulas;
thus certainty, even mathematical certainty, involves
probabilistic reasoning about oneself. The solution to the
'skeptical paradox,' according to Kripke, is a 'skeptica;l
solution' - namely, that certainty about one's own
rule-following abilities ultimately takes place in reference
to a community of rule followers. The connection I see with
Foucault has to do with his notion of normativity; where
Foucault goes a satep further then these analytic
philsophers is in writing the history of disciplinary
communities - "truth regimes" which historically establish
truth realtions through power relations.