At 10:04 AM 7/24/96 EST, you wrote:
> Wittgenstein's 'skeptical paradox' has to do with
> rule-following. It is similar to Hume's paradox of doing
> mathematical deductions - that there is always room for
> doubting one's own abilities, even when applying formulas;
> thus certainty, even mathematical certainty, involves
> probabilistic reasoning about oneself.
T: I am very concerned with your explanation. WHY is there always "room"
for doubting? I would say, there is an element of doubt, especially when
applying formulas, because formulas have a mythical quality about them: they
seem to "guarantee" truth. Anything that proposes to guarantee truth should
send off warning signs immediately. As far as mathematics and certainty,
there is a sort of certainty involved in mathematical proofs, but how do
these quantitative "pictures" say anything CERTAIN about the world? I also
am unclear as to your phrase "probabilistic reasoning about oneself." Is
there a solipsistic issue here?
The solution to the
> 'skeptical paradox,' according to Kripke, is a 'skeptica;l
> solution' - namely, that certainty about one's own
> rule-following abilities ultimately takes place in reference
> to a community of rule followers.
T: This is extremely important, and I believe much can yet be said about the
"solution" of community rule-following. W. had great concern with the
concept of community, and my reading of him suggests that "rules" are the
foundation "games" that binds us to the community through "language." This
whole PROCESS is a STRUCTURE. I have used this formulation to indicate that
argue that there is a "process of structure" whereby we (individually, and
as a community) "construct" our social conditions. this metatheory is
termed Constructivism, and I link it to Nick Onuf's writings, particularly
his book, WORLD OF OUR MAKING.
The connection I see with
> Foucault has to do with his notion of normativity; where
> Foucault goes a satep further then these analytic
> philsophers is in writing the history of disciplinary
> communities - "truth regimes" which historically establish
> truth realtions through power relations.
>
T: As for Foucault, I am just getting into his ideas. I have read some on
"truth regimes" and find the concept intriguing. What about the term
"disciplinary" as used with "communities?" Is this another version of "rules?"
Tom
> Wittgenstein's 'skeptical paradox' has to do with
> rule-following. It is similar to Hume's paradox of doing
> mathematical deductions - that there is always room for
> doubting one's own abilities, even when applying formulas;
> thus certainty, even mathematical certainty, involves
> probabilistic reasoning about oneself.
T: I am very concerned with your explanation. WHY is there always "room"
for doubting? I would say, there is an element of doubt, especially when
applying formulas, because formulas have a mythical quality about them: they
seem to "guarantee" truth. Anything that proposes to guarantee truth should
send off warning signs immediately. As far as mathematics and certainty,
there is a sort of certainty involved in mathematical proofs, but how do
these quantitative "pictures" say anything CERTAIN about the world? I also
am unclear as to your phrase "probabilistic reasoning about oneself." Is
there a solipsistic issue here?
The solution to the
> 'skeptical paradox,' according to Kripke, is a 'skeptica;l
> solution' - namely, that certainty about one's own
> rule-following abilities ultimately takes place in reference
> to a community of rule followers.
T: This is extremely important, and I believe much can yet be said about the
"solution" of community rule-following. W. had great concern with the
concept of community, and my reading of him suggests that "rules" are the
foundation "games" that binds us to the community through "language." This
whole PROCESS is a STRUCTURE. I have used this formulation to indicate that
argue that there is a "process of structure" whereby we (individually, and
as a community) "construct" our social conditions. this metatheory is
termed Constructivism, and I link it to Nick Onuf's writings, particularly
his book, WORLD OF OUR MAKING.
The connection I see with
> Foucault has to do with his notion of normativity; where
> Foucault goes a satep further then these analytic
> philsophers is in writing the history of disciplinary
> communities - "truth regimes" which historically establish
> truth realtions through power relations.
>
T: As for Foucault, I am just getting into his ideas. I have read some on
"truth regimes" and find the concept intriguing. What about the term
"disciplinary" as used with "communities?" Is this another version of "rules?"
Tom