Joe -
First you wrote:
"Wittgenstein's 'skeptical paradox' has to do with
rule-following. It is similar to Hume's paradox of doing
mathematical deductions - that THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR
DOUBTING one's own abilities, even when applying formulas;"
(caps added)
Then you wrote:
"According to Hume, there really isn't any "room for
doubting""
I said nothing about you being guilty of, but I am now wondering if you are
clear about the idea of "doubt."
According to your reading of Hume, there is no doubt because:
"assocaitions are so automatic;"
Then you link this condition of "automatic association" to your reading of
Kripke, implying that the "skeptical solution" to uncertainty is to recognize:
"that certainty about one's own rule-following abilities
ultimately takes place in reference to a community of rule
followers."
Did you read what I wrote earlier? If not, here it is:
"Wittgenstein is getting at the notion of certainty, or rather, uncertainty.
But you have to understand that his ideas on certainty are presented in the
context of playing games, through language, in which we, as individuals, and
collectively, constitute the rules and structure of the very game(s) we play.
Now doubt and certainty can change with the sort of game we play, depending
on the various interpretations of the rules of structure at work and how we
contribute in space and time, and so on. So, scepticism, as much as it is a
quest for certainty, a certainty that can never be achieved absolutely, is
our perpetual state. Indeed it is the most profitable state we can assume
given our relative circumstances. Moreover, scepticism is actually a key to
community and social relations in general, as it prevents us from ever
BELIEVING that we are sure, with authority, about what we know.
Various examples in the history of war show the drastic consequences that
can arise when two communities violently oppose each other's convictions and
challange each one another's authority to be absolutely right."
At this point I would introduce the term "convention" as it relates to
Hume's work. I quote from Onuf's WORLD OF OUR MAKING: "Hume found
conventions to be the source of all the practices and institutions that make
up society and thereby assure human survival. Through trial and error,
imitation and adjustment, people coordinate activities and by so doing
accrue the benefits prompting them to continue the process until it becomes
standard and predictable."
I hope you see the thread--if so, I am interested in discussing the manner
in which LANGUAGE helps RULES ground SOCIETY through CONVENTIONS. Any
thoughts?
As for your statement that:
"there is only room for doubt if one supposes that reason is
infallible, or that "demonstrations of reason" are conducted
through an infallible faculty"
Yes, I am unfamiliar. But if we can bring Foucault in here, we should do so.
Tom
First you wrote:
"Wittgenstein's 'skeptical paradox' has to do with
rule-following. It is similar to Hume's paradox of doing
mathematical deductions - that THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR
DOUBTING one's own abilities, even when applying formulas;"
(caps added)
Then you wrote:
"According to Hume, there really isn't any "room for
doubting""
I said nothing about you being guilty of, but I am now wondering if you are
clear about the idea of "doubt."
According to your reading of Hume, there is no doubt because:
"assocaitions are so automatic;"
Then you link this condition of "automatic association" to your reading of
Kripke, implying that the "skeptical solution" to uncertainty is to recognize:
"that certainty about one's own rule-following abilities
ultimately takes place in reference to a community of rule
followers."
Did you read what I wrote earlier? If not, here it is:
"Wittgenstein is getting at the notion of certainty, or rather, uncertainty.
But you have to understand that his ideas on certainty are presented in the
context of playing games, through language, in which we, as individuals, and
collectively, constitute the rules and structure of the very game(s) we play.
Now doubt and certainty can change with the sort of game we play, depending
on the various interpretations of the rules of structure at work and how we
contribute in space and time, and so on. So, scepticism, as much as it is a
quest for certainty, a certainty that can never be achieved absolutely, is
our perpetual state. Indeed it is the most profitable state we can assume
given our relative circumstances. Moreover, scepticism is actually a key to
community and social relations in general, as it prevents us from ever
BELIEVING that we are sure, with authority, about what we know.
Various examples in the history of war show the drastic consequences that
can arise when two communities violently oppose each other's convictions and
challange each one another's authority to be absolutely right."
At this point I would introduce the term "convention" as it relates to
Hume's work. I quote from Onuf's WORLD OF OUR MAKING: "Hume found
conventions to be the source of all the practices and institutions that make
up society and thereby assure human survival. Through trial and error,
imitation and adjustment, people coordinate activities and by so doing
accrue the benefits prompting them to continue the process until it becomes
standard and predictable."
I hope you see the thread--if so, I am interested in discussing the manner
in which LANGUAGE helps RULES ground SOCIETY through CONVENTIONS. Any
thoughts?
As for your statement that:
"there is only room for doubt if one supposes that reason is
infallible, or that "demonstrations of reason" are conducted
through an infallible faculty"
Yes, I am unfamiliar. But if we can bring Foucault in here, we should do so.
Tom