To Tom and Jeff:
I was just laying out some of the basic problems central to
Wittgenstein's "skeptical paradox," which actually Hume
first encountered. Jeff, I don't have the treatise with me,
but I have the first Inquiry, so I'll use that. In ch. IV,
he raises "skeptical doubts cocnerning the operations of he
understanding." Here he divides "reasonings" into two kinds
- "concerning relations of ideas" (mathematics/logic) and
"moral or probablistic" reasoning, which concerns "matters
of fact and existence." what he is essentially doing here
is arguing that cause and effect reasoning is experiential,
matter of fact reasoning, and dewbunking the claim that
cause and effect reasoning proceeds from "demonstrative
reason," which the metaphysicians claim. The core of the
argument is from Berkeley - namely, it's an accepted
principle of he metaphysiscians that what is cocneivable is
possible. It is cocneivable that "all the trees will
flourish in December and decay in June," so our associations
of flora with springtime and decay with winter cannot have
proceeded a priori, but they fall into matter-of fact, or
probablistic reasoning (i.e. synthetic rather than analytic
reasoning).
All matter of fact reasoning is 'experiential,' but we still
make matter of fact causal inferences. We infer, for
example, that in wintertime the trees will be bare. HOWEVER,
we can coneptualize a state of affairs where the weather is
cold in December, and hte trees are flourishing. Thus there
is ALWAYS room for doubt concenring matter of fact
inferences. When we think about it (Hume shows htis in BOOK
I of het Treatise), even some of our "operations of reason"
leave room for doubt, for example when adding a long list of
numbers, becaue more thatn simple axi0omatic deductions are
involved - we also have to carry numebrs over, etc. and
"borrow" from other faculties beside reason.
If we hold, as the metaphysicians (as Hume calls them - or
those who hold a privileged sanctuary for Reason _ i.e.
Locke and Descartes) do, that causal inferences proceed from
"demonstrations of reason" - than we will end up in a
perpetual state of doubt. Some commentators call this state
TOAD - "Total objective assessment from a detached
perspective" or something of eh sort. From sucha
persepctive, I can always doubt a causal inference, becaue
there is no necessary connection in ideas between causes and
effects where matters of fact are concerned.
What is the solution? Hume gives it in the next chapter,
where he speaks of a "skeptical solution of these doubts."
This is opposed to a "straight solution," because it locates
matter of fact reasoning in the workings of hte imagination
rather than in reason. This is where the storyof
assocaitionism comes into play: "the sentiment of belief is
nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what
attends the mere fictions of hte imagination, and that this
manner of coneption arises from a customary conjunction of
hte object with something present tot eh memory or senses."
Now to Wittgenstein: His skeptical paradox, according to
Kripke (Kripkenstein), can be seen in a basic additon
problem, say 38+57=95. The question is slight different
from Hume's, but analogous: How can I be certain of what a
'+' sign means? It could be that I am disposed to think of
+ as 'plus' - but i can doubt that too - I may be wrongly
disposed. Kripke's "solution" is the old communitarian one;
I can't be sure I'm doing the correct operation in reference
to teh content in my head, or in reference to a disposition,
but I can be sure in realtion to a community of rule
followers (and then we talk about Wittgenstein's arguemtn
agains the possibility of a pirvate language, and his vague
references in PI to "froms of life," "customs," etc.)
Now to Foucault: True can only take place in reference to a
set of norms, which require a certain "disciplinary regime"
to be established at a social level.
NOTE: I have to go, but perhaps this is a starting point for
linking Foucault to Witt. (another starting point is linking
"geneology" to "family resemblances" ---- and if we want a
festival, link the hwole business to Nietzsche's link
between the will-to-truth and morality in light of recentr
remarks made by our politicians reagrding "family values"...
Joe C.
TMC
I was just laying out some of the basic problems central to
Wittgenstein's "skeptical paradox," which actually Hume
first encountered. Jeff, I don't have the treatise with me,
but I have the first Inquiry, so I'll use that. In ch. IV,
he raises "skeptical doubts cocnerning the operations of he
understanding." Here he divides "reasonings" into two kinds
- "concerning relations of ideas" (mathematics/logic) and
"moral or probablistic" reasoning, which concerns "matters
of fact and existence." what he is essentially doing here
is arguing that cause and effect reasoning is experiential,
matter of fact reasoning, and dewbunking the claim that
cause and effect reasoning proceeds from "demonstrative
reason," which the metaphysicians claim. The core of the
argument is from Berkeley - namely, it's an accepted
principle of he metaphysiscians that what is cocneivable is
possible. It is cocneivable that "all the trees will
flourish in December and decay in June," so our associations
of flora with springtime and decay with winter cannot have
proceeded a priori, but they fall into matter-of fact, or
probablistic reasoning (i.e. synthetic rather than analytic
reasoning).
All matter of fact reasoning is 'experiential,' but we still
make matter of fact causal inferences. We infer, for
example, that in wintertime the trees will be bare. HOWEVER,
we can coneptualize a state of affairs where the weather is
cold in December, and hte trees are flourishing. Thus there
is ALWAYS room for doubt concenring matter of fact
inferences. When we think about it (Hume shows htis in BOOK
I of het Treatise), even some of our "operations of reason"
leave room for doubt, for example when adding a long list of
numbers, becaue more thatn simple axi0omatic deductions are
involved - we also have to carry numebrs over, etc. and
"borrow" from other faculties beside reason.
If we hold, as the metaphysicians (as Hume calls them - or
those who hold a privileged sanctuary for Reason _ i.e.
Locke and Descartes) do, that causal inferences proceed from
"demonstrations of reason" - than we will end up in a
perpetual state of doubt. Some commentators call this state
TOAD - "Total objective assessment from a detached
perspective" or something of eh sort. From sucha
persepctive, I can always doubt a causal inference, becaue
there is no necessary connection in ideas between causes and
effects where matters of fact are concerned.
What is the solution? Hume gives it in the next chapter,
where he speaks of a "skeptical solution of these doubts."
This is opposed to a "straight solution," because it locates
matter of fact reasoning in the workings of hte imagination
rather than in reason. This is where the storyof
assocaitionism comes into play: "the sentiment of belief is
nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what
attends the mere fictions of hte imagination, and that this
manner of coneption arises from a customary conjunction of
hte object with something present tot eh memory or senses."
Now to Wittgenstein: His skeptical paradox, according to
Kripke (Kripkenstein), can be seen in a basic additon
problem, say 38+57=95. The question is slight different
from Hume's, but analogous: How can I be certain of what a
'+' sign means? It could be that I am disposed to think of
+ as 'plus' - but i can doubt that too - I may be wrongly
disposed. Kripke's "solution" is the old communitarian one;
I can't be sure I'm doing the correct operation in reference
to teh content in my head, or in reference to a disposition,
but I can be sure in realtion to a community of rule
followers (and then we talk about Wittgenstein's arguemtn
agains the possibility of a pirvate language, and his vague
references in PI to "froms of life," "customs," etc.)
Now to Foucault: True can only take place in reference to a
set of norms, which require a certain "disciplinary regime"
to be established at a social level.
NOTE: I have to go, but perhaps this is a starting point for
linking Foucault to Witt. (another starting point is linking
"geneology" to "family resemblances" ---- and if we want a
festival, link the hwole business to Nietzsche's link
between the will-to-truth and morality in light of recentr
remarks made by our politicians reagrding "family values"...
Joe C.
TMC