What an interesting idea! If F. is marxist, then what about his refusal of
a narrative in history? His emphasis on rupture more than continuity in
history? his "subject" theory? His "les mots et les choses" where the first
does not refer to the second? His rejection of universal intellectual? and
his idea about the fact that "the bourgeois and proletarian conflict is
nothing but ripples on the surface " (or something like that !!!!) Not all
dialectician are marxist, may be in this sense Hegel and plato "were"
dialectician but were they materialist?
Now, I do not mean that he doesn't "barrow" ideas here and there from
marxists specially maoism!
More voices on this would be great!
Atefeh
At 03:14 AM 8/19/96 +0100, Benjamin Joerissen wrote:
>Dear Mbayiha,
>
>if I understood right, due to your 'looser' definition F. is a Marxist, not
>because he does a critique of political economy (3), nor because he practiced
>dialectic methods (2), BUT for he had a materialist conception of history.
>
>Let me ask one question at this point: if we take the definition from your
>quotation (M's materialist conception of history as a (quasi?)-theory of
>social evolution which is to be rendered by historical analysis of a
>particular social formation), this *seems* quite near to what F did. But - did
>he really, in philosophical means, analyse *social* formation, not rather
>formations which are constitutive for what we call social? I mean, if the
>'subject' (human) is in F's theory an *effect* produced by multiple
>power/knowledge-structures, can we say (from a dialectic, - i.e. marxist's ;-)
>point of view) that *social* effects constitute the subject? Isn't 'social'
>(read: objectivity) a concept that already requires the concept of
>'subjectivity' (the society and it's human, or v.v.)? This is why I'm not
>shure that F's historical analysis is compatible to M's. I'd like to hear some
>other voices on this, but I'm afraid they're all on holiday.
>
>The more serious problem I see is that your definition is too loose, even
>though I liked the idea that Plato and Hegel where marxists because of
>point (2). :-)
>
>By the way, I think what you call nexus is an effect of dialectics
>itself - the connection of microanalysis, spotting the smallest parts you
>find, and conceptualisation, which means letting this smallest parts
>communicate with their concepts. This would show the problems a) of dividing
>the three departments (connecting them with logical AND) and b) of
>transforming this logical AND to a logical OR. The last process (b) executes
>what the first (a) just intended - dividing a whole without putting it
>together again. IMHO it's never a good idea to do an undialectical analysis of
>dialectical thoughts. Anyway, Foucault-List is the wrong place to discuss
>dialectical implications, I guess.
>
>Benjamin
>___________________________
> Netzadresse:
>joeriben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
a narrative in history? His emphasis on rupture more than continuity in
history? his "subject" theory? His "les mots et les choses" where the first
does not refer to the second? His rejection of universal intellectual? and
his idea about the fact that "the bourgeois and proletarian conflict is
nothing but ripples on the surface " (or something like that !!!!) Not all
dialectician are marxist, may be in this sense Hegel and plato "were"
dialectician but were they materialist?
Now, I do not mean that he doesn't "barrow" ideas here and there from
marxists specially maoism!
More voices on this would be great!
Atefeh
At 03:14 AM 8/19/96 +0100, Benjamin Joerissen wrote:
>Dear Mbayiha,
>
>if I understood right, due to your 'looser' definition F. is a Marxist, not
>because he does a critique of political economy (3), nor because he practiced
>dialectic methods (2), BUT for he had a materialist conception of history.
>
>Let me ask one question at this point: if we take the definition from your
>quotation (M's materialist conception of history as a (quasi?)-theory of
>social evolution which is to be rendered by historical analysis of a
>particular social formation), this *seems* quite near to what F did. But - did
>he really, in philosophical means, analyse *social* formation, not rather
>formations which are constitutive for what we call social? I mean, if the
>'subject' (human) is in F's theory an *effect* produced by multiple
>power/knowledge-structures, can we say (from a dialectic, - i.e. marxist's ;-)
>point of view) that *social* effects constitute the subject? Isn't 'social'
>(read: objectivity) a concept that already requires the concept of
>'subjectivity' (the society and it's human, or v.v.)? This is why I'm not
>shure that F's historical analysis is compatible to M's. I'd like to hear some
>other voices on this, but I'm afraid they're all on holiday.
>
>The more serious problem I see is that your definition is too loose, even
>though I liked the idea that Plato and Hegel where marxists because of
>point (2). :-)
>
>By the way, I think what you call nexus is an effect of dialectics
>itself - the connection of microanalysis, spotting the smallest parts you
>find, and conceptualisation, which means letting this smallest parts
>communicate with their concepts. This would show the problems a) of dividing
>the three departments (connecting them with logical AND) and b) of
>transforming this logical AND to a logical OR. The last process (b) executes
>what the first (a) just intended - dividing a whole without putting it
>together again. IMHO it's never a good idea to do an undialectical analysis of
>dialectical thoughts. Anyway, Foucault-List is the wrong place to discuss
>dialectical implications, I guess.
>
>Benjamin
>___________________________
> Netzadresse:
>joeriben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
>