Benjamin -
You bring up an excellent point here regarding what might be called the
"co-constitution" of the subject (agent) and the object (structure).
"But - did he really, in philosophical means, analyse *social* formation,
not rather formations which are constitutive for what we call social? I
mean, if the
'subject' (human)(AGENT) is in F's theory an *effect* produced by multiple
power/knowledge-(STRUCTURES), can we say (from a dialectic, - i.e. marxist's ;-)
point of view) that *social* (STRUCTURAL) effects constitute the subject
(AGENT)? Isn't 'social' (read: objectivity(STRUCTURAL)) a concept that
already requires the concept of 'subjectivity' (AGENCY) (the society and
it's human, or v.v.)?"
My view is that the ontological "weight" of agency versus structure is
privileged according to the epistemological, and perhaps more importantly,
methodological position or approach one chooses. From the point of the
individual, the social structure is already there, but indeed the agency of
the individual constitutes the social structure.
What interests me is the foundation of the social product of the
co-constituting exchange between agents and structure--is it not language,
and more specifically, is it not the agreement upon the rules that compose
the structural means of communication, and in turn social interaction?
Social effects do constitute the subject, but in its agency the subject
constitutes the social structure, through the language based exchange of
rule-following, rule-reinforcing, rule-creating, rule-defining and
re-defining behavior it practices; through all deeds including speech acts
(which constantly re-constitute language).
My point is that it is impossible to privilege the ontological status of the
agent over the structure, or the structure over the agent because the
grounds of "society" are based in general agreement on the use of social
rules as co-constituted by the agent and the structure.
My question: Should rules be given an ontological status?
Tom
You bring up an excellent point here regarding what might be called the
"co-constitution" of the subject (agent) and the object (structure).
"But - did he really, in philosophical means, analyse *social* formation,
not rather formations which are constitutive for what we call social? I
mean, if the
'subject' (human)(AGENT) is in F's theory an *effect* produced by multiple
power/knowledge-(STRUCTURES), can we say (from a dialectic, - i.e. marxist's ;-)
point of view) that *social* (STRUCTURAL) effects constitute the subject
(AGENT)? Isn't 'social' (read: objectivity(STRUCTURAL)) a concept that
already requires the concept of 'subjectivity' (AGENCY) (the society and
it's human, or v.v.)?"
My view is that the ontological "weight" of agency versus structure is
privileged according to the epistemological, and perhaps more importantly,
methodological position or approach one chooses. From the point of the
individual, the social structure is already there, but indeed the agency of
the individual constitutes the social structure.
What interests me is the foundation of the social product of the
co-constituting exchange between agents and structure--is it not language,
and more specifically, is it not the agreement upon the rules that compose
the structural means of communication, and in turn social interaction?
Social effects do constitute the subject, but in its agency the subject
constitutes the social structure, through the language based exchange of
rule-following, rule-reinforcing, rule-creating, rule-defining and
re-defining behavior it practices; through all deeds including speech acts
(which constantly re-constitute language).
My point is that it is impossible to privilege the ontological status of the
agent over the structure, or the structure over the agent because the
grounds of "society" are based in general agreement on the use of social
rules as co-constituted by the agent and the structure.
My question: Should rules be given an ontological status?
Tom