At this point of the discussion it is about time, i think, that we specify
to which marxism we're referring to in our disagreement. What if a
confusion between the totalitarian and the humanist version of Marxism was
at work in this conversation?
Foucault's social constructivism, in my own mind, can by no means be
associated with :
1) the Marxist orthodoxy, a scientistic tradition that can be traced to as
far back as Engels' (per)versions of Marx's thought;
2) the objectivism of Marxism-Leninism's CRUDE rewritings and, a fortiori,
absolutist practice. For instance, as part of a Leninist Bolshevik
political practice, the Soviet Union's psychiatric institutions were the
target of Foucault's attacks;
3) the doctrine of Diamat (dialectical materialism), an expression invented
by Plekhanov, even though its substance was created by Engels. Diamat
mechanistically totalizes and absolutizes nature and history. It offers a
reified picture of social and natural reality and as such is a form of
idealism [since dialectic is supposed here to be independent of humans]
evocative of Hegel's idealism and close to Feuerbach's materialism. At the
center of Diamat is ontological dialectics. Which is really a problem. To
wit: its law of <fusion of opposites> is not metaphysically valid at all,
unless restricted to logic (ex.: Benjamin contradicts Cyuma's assertions;
anti-ex.: a proton dialectically contradicts an electron, this attribution
places dialectic outside consciousness by sticking it onto nature ). We run
the risk of having a religion, a sense of <ine'luctable>. You know, the
kind of determinism (automatic dehumanized social&historical change) i was
quite afraid of in a previous posting.
Social Contradictions arise and are pushed towards a resolution because
humans' conflicts produce them. NOT independently of human agency. No such
thing as <objective> oppositions/fusions.
Marx would have resisted any attempt to produce a petrified ontological
version of the dialectic.
4) the idea that the <material in motion> dictates our consciousness and
that positivist & empiricist methodology are windows to truth.
Why then do i still suggest that Foucault's historicism belongs to the
tradition of marxist historical materialism?
Well, Marx should rather be regarded as a social constructivist. <Reality>
is the product of social relations. Anything known by humans is subjected
to a process of humanizing invention. History itself is made by humans. And
a social structuration results from this. It is because the social
structure so built, has a degree of influence that Marx stated that the
outcomes of human activity do not always coincide with their own
expectations.
Why then did he say <it is not consciousness that produces the being but
rather the being that determines consciousness>? i believe he referred to
the socialization of individuals (Castoriadis'<socialisation de la psyche>)
whose consciousness must coincide with their social context's frame: a
whole system of signs is instrumental in this process.
Here the dialectics amounts to saying that a (wo)man is at any time both
object and subject of social activity and creativity. Humans and history
are not independent.
Thus the idea that we are not an essence. No. We become. Not only do we
(the social/the self) change but we can alter our
not-to-be-reified-social-reality. Hence Marx's liberatory project.
Foucault's contextual/relational ways of analysis are convergent with
Marx's human centered dialectical interpretations of the social real whose
<continuateurs> are, amongst others, Merleau-Ponty, the Frankfurt School,
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gramcsi,...
Hope you'll buy this one.
cyuma
(yeah, my 1st name)
to which marxism we're referring to in our disagreement. What if a
confusion between the totalitarian and the humanist version of Marxism was
at work in this conversation?
Foucault's social constructivism, in my own mind, can by no means be
associated with :
1) the Marxist orthodoxy, a scientistic tradition that can be traced to as
far back as Engels' (per)versions of Marx's thought;
2) the objectivism of Marxism-Leninism's CRUDE rewritings and, a fortiori,
absolutist practice. For instance, as part of a Leninist Bolshevik
political practice, the Soviet Union's psychiatric institutions were the
target of Foucault's attacks;
3) the doctrine of Diamat (dialectical materialism), an expression invented
by Plekhanov, even though its substance was created by Engels. Diamat
mechanistically totalizes and absolutizes nature and history. It offers a
reified picture of social and natural reality and as such is a form of
idealism [since dialectic is supposed here to be independent of humans]
evocative of Hegel's idealism and close to Feuerbach's materialism. At the
center of Diamat is ontological dialectics. Which is really a problem. To
wit: its law of <fusion of opposites> is not metaphysically valid at all,
unless restricted to logic (ex.: Benjamin contradicts Cyuma's assertions;
anti-ex.: a proton dialectically contradicts an electron, this attribution
places dialectic outside consciousness by sticking it onto nature ). We run
the risk of having a religion, a sense of <ine'luctable>. You know, the
kind of determinism (automatic dehumanized social&historical change) i was
quite afraid of in a previous posting.
Social Contradictions arise and are pushed towards a resolution because
humans' conflicts produce them. NOT independently of human agency. No such
thing as <objective> oppositions/fusions.
Marx would have resisted any attempt to produce a petrified ontological
version of the dialectic.
4) the idea that the <material in motion> dictates our consciousness and
that positivist & empiricist methodology are windows to truth.
Why then do i still suggest that Foucault's historicism belongs to the
tradition of marxist historical materialism?
Well, Marx should rather be regarded as a social constructivist. <Reality>
is the product of social relations. Anything known by humans is subjected
to a process of humanizing invention. History itself is made by humans. And
a social structuration results from this. It is because the social
structure so built, has a degree of influence that Marx stated that the
outcomes of human activity do not always coincide with their own
expectations.
Why then did he say <it is not consciousness that produces the being but
rather the being that determines consciousness>? i believe he referred to
the socialization of individuals (Castoriadis'<socialisation de la psyche>)
whose consciousness must coincide with their social context's frame: a
whole system of signs is instrumental in this process.
Here the dialectics amounts to saying that a (wo)man is at any time both
object and subject of social activity and creativity. Humans and history
are not independent.
Thus the idea that we are not an essence. No. We become. Not only do we
(the social/the self) change but we can alter our
not-to-be-reified-social-reality. Hence Marx's liberatory project.
Foucault's contextual/relational ways of analysis are convergent with
Marx's human centered dialectical interpretations of the social real whose
<continuateurs> are, amongst others, Merleau-Ponty, the Frankfurt School,
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gramcsi,...
Hope you'll buy this one.
cyuma
(yeah, my 1st name)