Malgosia writes:
> I have the feeling that Foucault shares with classical anarchism a belief
> that the human being, when left to its own freedom, is essentially "good".
> Or maybe a better way of putting it is this: he shares with classical
> anarchism an aesthetic abhorrence of institutionalized, authoritarian,
> imposed ethics which far exceeds the fear of the potential ramifications
> of not having such a thing.
>
> Is this true?
>
> -m
Hmmmm. I think this is an interesting question. However, my answer would
be, no, it's not true. Well, not *exactly* true. :)
I doubt that Foucault thinks it makes sense to consider what humans are
or are not, essentially, vis-a-vis morality. I don't think it's correct
to say that Foucault simply eschewed all talk of essentialism, but in
terms of moral essentialism, I think he wouldn't entertain any such
notions.
The second way you phrase the question is interesting also, since of
course Foucault was called, inter alia, an anarchist. He rejected the
moniker, although he pretty much rejected any attempts by others to
characterize him. Sure, he shared some commonalities with "traditional"
anarchists. But I think he wouldn't agree that institutionalized
and/or authoritarian imposed ethics generally is more aesthetically
abhorrent than something like the state of nature (in the contractarian
sense).
At least this is my understanding of Foucault's work. After all, wasn't
he precisely trying to undermine such a view with his anti-repressive
hypothesis of power?
Recall that many conceptions of power (and, I think anarchist
conceptions in general could be lumped in here) posit an original
(essential? natural?) core of subjectivity (possibly pure rationality,
possibly the innocence of childhood, etc.) that is equated (by way
of the naturalistic fallacy) with a positive (good/right/real)
evaluation.
But Foucault's entire conception of power was meant to challenge this
view. He rejected such theories of power precisely because he thought it
made no sense to posit *anything* like that. His point wasn't that there
is *badness* lurking at the core of humanity, so we shouldn't think
*this* was the point of his critique of the repressive hypothesis.
Rather, he rejected all talk of there being *anything* evaluable in the
moral sense that precedes these (albeit mysterious) relations of power.
So, I suggest that if and when Foucault displayed some of the
characteristics of anarchists, it was because he was similarly worried
about the effects of the institutions of power that he and they found
within society. However, that is not to say thay he, like the
anarchists, thought the problem could be solved by jettisoning arche
(order?).
In fact, one might suppose Foucault was distinguishing himself from just
such a view when he spoke his famous line: "My point is not that
everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous."
Peace,
Blaine Rehkopf
Philosophy
York University
CANADA
--
> I have the feeling that Foucault shares with classical anarchism a belief
> that the human being, when left to its own freedom, is essentially "good".
> Or maybe a better way of putting it is this: he shares with classical
> anarchism an aesthetic abhorrence of institutionalized, authoritarian,
> imposed ethics which far exceeds the fear of the potential ramifications
> of not having such a thing.
>
> Is this true?
>
> -m
Hmmmm. I think this is an interesting question. However, my answer would
be, no, it's not true. Well, not *exactly* true. :)
I doubt that Foucault thinks it makes sense to consider what humans are
or are not, essentially, vis-a-vis morality. I don't think it's correct
to say that Foucault simply eschewed all talk of essentialism, but in
terms of moral essentialism, I think he wouldn't entertain any such
notions.
The second way you phrase the question is interesting also, since of
course Foucault was called, inter alia, an anarchist. He rejected the
moniker, although he pretty much rejected any attempts by others to
characterize him. Sure, he shared some commonalities with "traditional"
anarchists. But I think he wouldn't agree that institutionalized
and/or authoritarian imposed ethics generally is more aesthetically
abhorrent than something like the state of nature (in the contractarian
sense).
At least this is my understanding of Foucault's work. After all, wasn't
he precisely trying to undermine such a view with his anti-repressive
hypothesis of power?
Recall that many conceptions of power (and, I think anarchist
conceptions in general could be lumped in here) posit an original
(essential? natural?) core of subjectivity (possibly pure rationality,
possibly the innocence of childhood, etc.) that is equated (by way
of the naturalistic fallacy) with a positive (good/right/real)
evaluation.
But Foucault's entire conception of power was meant to challenge this
view. He rejected such theories of power precisely because he thought it
made no sense to posit *anything* like that. His point wasn't that there
is *badness* lurking at the core of humanity, so we shouldn't think
*this* was the point of his critique of the repressive hypothesis.
Rather, he rejected all talk of there being *anything* evaluable in the
moral sense that precedes these (albeit mysterious) relations of power.
So, I suggest that if and when Foucault displayed some of the
characteristics of anarchists, it was because he was similarly worried
about the effects of the institutions of power that he and they found
within society. However, that is not to say thay he, like the
anarchists, thought the problem could be solved by jettisoning arche
(order?).
In fact, one might suppose Foucault was distinguishing himself from just
such a view when he spoke his famous line: "My point is not that
everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous."
Peace,
Blaine Rehkopf
Philosophy
York University
CANADA
--