Blaine wrote:
> I doubt that Foucault thinks it makes sense to consider what humans are
> or are not, essentially, vis-a-vis morality. I don't think it's correct
> to say that Foucault simply eschewed all talk of essentialism, but in
> terms of moral essentialism, I think he wouldn't entertain any such
> notions.
I wouldn't defend my very dubious formulation about Foucault believing human
beings were essentially "good"; but one reason why I left it in is that
I think it is useful to distinguish between these kinds of beliefs and
"essentialism". For example, a person's initial attitude towards others
might be to assume that they have certain moral qualities. Now this does
not mean that the person would support an effort to define the term "human",
an inclusion in it of the possession of these qualitities, or a declaration
that those who don't possess these qualities are somehow less human. What
however is characteristic of the kind of belief I was referring to is that it
is basically unfalsifiable -- that is, unaffected by disappointments.
It is not really a "notion" that one "entertains"; rather, it is as if the
attitude was part of the very fabric of one's being (and I speak very, very
loosely here). And, lest somebody twist what I am saying to mean that,
by ascribing to Foucault the "goodness" belief, I am pointing to
an "inconsistency" or a "hypocrisy" in Foucault: nope. A refusal to engage
in essentialism is not a denial that there are certain underlying attitudes
to the way one conducts one's life; nor is it a denial that there may
be a shared set of such attitudes; it is simply a refusal to engage in
essentialism.
-m
> I doubt that Foucault thinks it makes sense to consider what humans are
> or are not, essentially, vis-a-vis morality. I don't think it's correct
> to say that Foucault simply eschewed all talk of essentialism, but in
> terms of moral essentialism, I think he wouldn't entertain any such
> notions.
I wouldn't defend my very dubious formulation about Foucault believing human
beings were essentially "good"; but one reason why I left it in is that
I think it is useful to distinguish between these kinds of beliefs and
"essentialism". For example, a person's initial attitude towards others
might be to assume that they have certain moral qualities. Now this does
not mean that the person would support an effort to define the term "human",
an inclusion in it of the possession of these qualitities, or a declaration
that those who don't possess these qualities are somehow less human. What
however is characteristic of the kind of belief I was referring to is that it
is basically unfalsifiable -- that is, unaffected by disappointments.
It is not really a "notion" that one "entertains"; rather, it is as if the
attitude was part of the very fabric of one's being (and I speak very, very
loosely here). And, lest somebody twist what I am saying to mean that,
by ascribing to Foucault the "goodness" belief, I am pointing to
an "inconsistency" or a "hypocrisy" in Foucault: nope. A refusal to engage
in essentialism is not a denial that there are certain underlying attitudes
to the way one conducts one's life; nor is it a denial that there may
be a shared set of such attitudes; it is simply a refusal to engage in
essentialism.
-m