On Tue, 8 Apr 1997, Ammar wrote:
> Hello,
> Foucault,as also(other) postmodernists,is against metatheories
> and meta-narratives as these tend to be opressive and terroristic.
> But,while accepting that there may not be such a thing as human nature,
> and that a subject is fashioned by the operation of power through
> various institutions affecting him is there any frame-of-reference
> whereby we could adjudge between say,a person who doesn't want to kill
> another because he doesn't like the sight of blood and one who avoids
> killing because he puts faith in the Kantian law of Respect for
> Persons? Ofcourse one might deny any need for such a judgement.HOWEVER
> wouldn't this world be a better place if even though through the
> influence of a metatheory like that of Kantian ethics ,categories
> develop in individuals ,over a period of time,that create in them
> an urge say, to treat others as ends and not mere means?Or would a
> Foucauldian rather believe that an overarching principle,no matter how
> well constructed,can only be oppressive and therefore never of any
> avail? Ammar.
>
In my lowly opinion, Foucault's claim is not that the main thing wrong
with Kantian ethics etc. is that they are oppressive and terroristic.
That's what Lyotard thinks, and I don't think F would agree with Lyotard.
On the contrary, it seems to me that F's claim is that Kantian ethics and
other ethical metanarratives d o n o t d o t h e j o b
a s s i g n e d t o t h e m.
For F, it's not that humanism/Kantianism etc. are terroristic. It's that
they're unreliable.
Put in the plainest words I can think of, they are too vague and
nonspecific. Here's a little bit from a 1983 interview with Foucault where
he makes this point:
Question: There is much talk in America these days comparing
your work to that of Jurgen Habermas. It has been suggested
that your work is more concerned with ethics and his with
politics. Habermas, for example, grew up reading Heidegger as
a politically disastrous heir of Nietzsche. He associates
Heidegger with German neo-conservatism. He thinks of these
people as the conservative heirs of Nietzsche and of you as
the anarchistic heir. You don't read the philosophical
tradition this way at all, do you?
M.F. That's right. When Habermas was in Paris, we talked at
some length, and in fact I was quite struck by his
observation of the extent to which the problem of Heidegger
and of the political implications of Heidegger's thought was
quite a pressing and important one for him. One thing he said
to me has left me musing, and it's something I'd like to mull
over further. After explaining how Heidegger's thought indeed
constituted a political disaster, he mentioned one of his
professors who was a great Kantian, very well-known in the
'30s, and he explained how astonished and disappointed he
had been when, while looking through card catalogues one
day, he found some texts from around 1934 by this illustrious
Kantian that were thoroughly Nazi in orientation.
I have recently had the same experience with Max Pohlenz,
who heralded the universal values of Stoicism all his life.
I came across a text of his from 1934 devoted to *Feuhrertum*
and Stoicism. You should reread the introductory page and the
book's closing remarks on the *Feuhrersideal* and on the true
humanism constituted by the Volk and under the inspiration
of the leader's direction--Heidegger never wrote anything more
disturbing. Nothing in this condemns Stoicism or Kantianism,
needless to say.
But I think that we must reckon with several facts:
there is a very tenuous "analytic" link between a philosophical
conception and the concrete political attitude of someone who
is appealing to it; the "best" theories do not constitute a
very effective protection against disastrous political choices;
certain great themes such as "humanism" can be used to any end
whatever--for example, to show with what gratitude Pohlenz
would have greeted Hitler. ("Politics and Ethics," in _The
Foucault Reader_, pp. 373-374)
--John
> Hello,
> Foucault,as also(other) postmodernists,is against metatheories
> and meta-narratives as these tend to be opressive and terroristic.
> But,while accepting that there may not be such a thing as human nature,
> and that a subject is fashioned by the operation of power through
> various institutions affecting him is there any frame-of-reference
> whereby we could adjudge between say,a person who doesn't want to kill
> another because he doesn't like the sight of blood and one who avoids
> killing because he puts faith in the Kantian law of Respect for
> Persons? Ofcourse one might deny any need for such a judgement.HOWEVER
> wouldn't this world be a better place if even though through the
> influence of a metatheory like that of Kantian ethics ,categories
> develop in individuals ,over a period of time,that create in them
> an urge say, to treat others as ends and not mere means?Or would a
> Foucauldian rather believe that an overarching principle,no matter how
> well constructed,can only be oppressive and therefore never of any
> avail? Ammar.
>
In my lowly opinion, Foucault's claim is not that the main thing wrong
with Kantian ethics etc. is that they are oppressive and terroristic.
That's what Lyotard thinks, and I don't think F would agree with Lyotard.
On the contrary, it seems to me that F's claim is that Kantian ethics and
other ethical metanarratives d o n o t d o t h e j o b
a s s i g n e d t o t h e m.
For F, it's not that humanism/Kantianism etc. are terroristic. It's that
they're unreliable.
Put in the plainest words I can think of, they are too vague and
nonspecific. Here's a little bit from a 1983 interview with Foucault where
he makes this point:
Question: There is much talk in America these days comparing
your work to that of Jurgen Habermas. It has been suggested
that your work is more concerned with ethics and his with
politics. Habermas, for example, grew up reading Heidegger as
a politically disastrous heir of Nietzsche. He associates
Heidegger with German neo-conservatism. He thinks of these
people as the conservative heirs of Nietzsche and of you as
the anarchistic heir. You don't read the philosophical
tradition this way at all, do you?
M.F. That's right. When Habermas was in Paris, we talked at
some length, and in fact I was quite struck by his
observation of the extent to which the problem of Heidegger
and of the political implications of Heidegger's thought was
quite a pressing and important one for him. One thing he said
to me has left me musing, and it's something I'd like to mull
over further. After explaining how Heidegger's thought indeed
constituted a political disaster, he mentioned one of his
professors who was a great Kantian, very well-known in the
'30s, and he explained how astonished and disappointed he
had been when, while looking through card catalogues one
day, he found some texts from around 1934 by this illustrious
Kantian that were thoroughly Nazi in orientation.
I have recently had the same experience with Max Pohlenz,
who heralded the universal values of Stoicism all his life.
I came across a text of his from 1934 devoted to *Feuhrertum*
and Stoicism. You should reread the introductory page and the
book's closing remarks on the *Feuhrersideal* and on the true
humanism constituted by the Volk and under the inspiration
of the leader's direction--Heidegger never wrote anything more
disturbing. Nothing in this condemns Stoicism or Kantianism,
needless to say.
But I think that we must reckon with several facts:
there is a very tenuous "analytic" link between a philosophical
conception and the concrete political attitude of someone who
is appealing to it; the "best" theories do not constitute a
very effective protection against disastrous political choices;
certain great themes such as "humanism" can be used to any end
whatever--for example, to show with what gratitude Pohlenz
would have greeted Hitler. ("Politics and Ethics," in _The
Foucault Reader_, pp. 373-374)
--John