In your message of 19:56 Apr 8 1997, you write:
> Hello,
> Foucault,as also(other) postmodernists,is against metatheories
> and meta-narratives as these tend to be opressive and terroristic.
> .....
> Or would a
> Foucauldian rather believe that an overarching principle,no matter how
> well constructed,can only be oppressive and therefore never of any
> avail? Ammar.
I would say that the choice doesn't lend itself to an easy dichotomy
here, and that makes the question a difficult one.
I suppose one thing to remember is Lyotard's definition of postmodernity
as one of an attitude of "incredulity towards meta-narratives." So in a
sense the attitude toward meta-narratives is epistemological more than
normative. That is, postmoderns don't necessarily begin with a sense
that meta-narratives are necessarily oppressive or terroristic (W?) so
much as they simply are incredulous -- i.e., they are skeptical that
meta-narratives can be what they claim to be.
I don't think that Foucault thought that meta-narratives were
*necessarily* oppressive (recall, once again, his suggestion that
everything isn't bad, but rather dangerous). He understood, I take it,
that meta-narratives of sorts are largely unavoidable; so rather than
think that they are all bad and to be jettisoned, he chose to see them
as dangerous -- a reason to remain hyper-vigilant.
Peace,
Blaine Rehkopf
Philosophy
York University
CANADA
--
> Hello,
> Foucault,as also(other) postmodernists,is against metatheories
> and meta-narratives as these tend to be opressive and terroristic.
> .....
> Or would a
> Foucauldian rather believe that an overarching principle,no matter how
> well constructed,can only be oppressive and therefore never of any
> avail? Ammar.
I would say that the choice doesn't lend itself to an easy dichotomy
here, and that makes the question a difficult one.
I suppose one thing to remember is Lyotard's definition of postmodernity
as one of an attitude of "incredulity towards meta-narratives." So in a
sense the attitude toward meta-narratives is epistemological more than
normative. That is, postmoderns don't necessarily begin with a sense
that meta-narratives are necessarily oppressive or terroristic (W?) so
much as they simply are incredulous -- i.e., they are skeptical that
meta-narratives can be what they claim to be.
I don't think that Foucault thought that meta-narratives were
*necessarily* oppressive (recall, once again, his suggestion that
everything isn't bad, but rather dangerous). He understood, I take it,
that meta-narratives of sorts are largely unavoidable; so rather than
think that they are all bad and to be jettisoned, he chose to see them
as dangerous -- a reason to remain hyper-vigilant.
Peace,
Blaine Rehkopf
Philosophy
York University
CANADA
--