Doug wrote:
> The question I'm trying to ask, and apparently not doing it well, is how
> one chooses what boundaries are worth transgressing (e.g., various
> restrictive sexual moralities, rules I'm happy to see broken) and those
> which aren't (e.g. random enucleation).
Doug, this is a good and worthwhile question, I think. There are a
number of ways to respond, none of which will be be embraced by
everyone.
Here's the way that grabs me right now. It seems to me that part of what
F was saying concerning what was admirable about the ethical systems of
the ancients was that they didn't begin with an assumption that the harm
principle summed up what was good (or at least acceptable) behaviour and
what was bad (or unacceptable) behaviour.
A particularly modernist moral theme is this harm principle: any
behaviour that doesn't harm another person - some would include harm to
oneself here - is good, or at least acceptable.
The ancient morality, though, seemed to focus on something like the
crafting of oneself, as I'm sure you're aware.
One could suggest that the modernist ethics highlights what it is right
to *do*, whereas the ancient ethics highlights what it is good to *be*.
In this sense, the ancient forms of ethics stress becoming the sort of
person from whom some forms of behaviour emanate, and to whom some forms
of behaviour are anathema. I think there is a difference between doing X
because you think X is the right thing to do, and doing X because you'd
feel incomplete or inauthentic (or what have you) if you *didn't* do X.
Having said that, for me personally, it's not so much that I choose to
transgress certain boundaries and to remain within other boundaries, but
that - hope this isn't too Twilight Zoney! - in some sense
those (non)transgressions are simply necessary (they choose *me*) if I
am to remain the (sort of) person I am.
It is in *this* sense that there is a distinction between transgressing,
say, sexual-moral boundaries on the one hand, and performing random
enucleations, on the other hand. I - along with you, I take it - would
transgress these sexual-moral boundaries; indeed, being a gay man, I
*need* to transgress them to be the sort of person that I am. (That's not
to say that I transgress *all* of these sexual-moral boundaries, to be
sure; gad, I'd never get any work done!)
However, I have to think that I would become quite a different sort of
person were I to transgress and perform a random enucleation. To me, my
authenticity is at stake; the person that I have come to construct
myself into and, yes, to *respect* for what I/t has become and what may
be in its future.
Now many people might not distinguish this form of an ethical approach
>from what is usually called relativistic morality. But it's worth noting
a couple points.
First, the way "relativism" is bandied about, one is left with the
impression that for any given individual, anything goes, and at little
cost to the individual. But I'm suggesting that this isn't the case. You
or I cannot simply do anything of moral importance, particularly in
those boundary regions of transgression, for which we are not exacting
some price for whom and what we are as individuals.
Second, it is worth noting that the notion of transgression, relying as
it does on a deeper concept of rules, requires other people. (For an
appreciation of this, one might want to turn to Wittgenstein's work on
rule-following and the anti-private language argument.) Relativism seems
to suggest that *no* shared rules are at play, whereas the scheme I've
outlined above in fact *requires* such shared rules.
Granted, my explanation does not do the work of traditional normative
ethics; rather, it is closer to a descriptive than a prescriptive
scheme. That alone doesn't make it unacceptable, however. (Hume's work
turned out to be primarily descriptive, too, and he certainly counts as
a moral philosopher if anyone does.)
But, I take it that you have been allowing for some movement on this.
Certainly if you are saying that you'd like an external (to humans) set
of criteria for distinguishing between the morality of transgressing A
versus B, that isn't forthcoming. *Is* there room for movement on the
issue, from your point of view?
Hope some of this is clear; this is difficult terrain in which to
express oneself clearly!
Peace,
Blaine Rehkopf
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