I asked,
> > Isn't the political uselessness of archaeology partly the motivation
> > for moving on to genealogy, and isn't the ethical silence of genealogy
> > what necessitated the eventual thematization of ethics in the 80's?
And Murray replied:
>
> I am a bit surprised to hear you say this Stephen. I don't think I
> would really agree. for instance I think it is noteworthy that you
> don't mention Madness and Civilization, a work which was pivotal in
> creating a critical stance to the historiography of psychiatry. Ask
> psychiatrists whether they thought it was apolitical and I doubt if
> they'd say 'yes'.
This is certainly a good example. I concede that I put the point in
an oversimplified way, at least in my final formulation.
Nevertheless, is not M&C political in a manner strikingly different
>from D&P? I think the former is political in the same way that
Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind" is political: it tries to vindicate
certain experiences and aspirations that are more or less discredited
or discreditable in the dominant culture at a certain time. Romantic
culture generally is political, or even (under the right
circumstances) emancipatory, but it seems to me that it is political
in the sense of "cultural politics," by which I mean specifically a
politics that only requires the efforts, initiative and activities of
people who write books, paint, etc.
Discipline and Punish, on the other hand, is political in a different
way. Here there is an attempt to connect historical research to
concrete practical struggles. Foucault writes: "That punishment...and
the prison...belong to a political technology of the body is a lesson
that I have learnt...from the present. In recent years, prison
revolts have occurred throughout the world...." (D&P, p. 30).
I think that the same could be said about Hist. of Sex., I, (which
tries to encourage the sexual left to drop the idea of a repressed
original identity in favour of the idea of an unduly fettered
creativity of self-invention -- or something like that).
Genealogy was supposed to have import for real movements of collective
resistance. That is a different way of being political.
Nevertheless, I admit that Madness and Civilization is political to
some extent, in some way.
> As far as BOTC is concerned that's a little more
> difficult, perhaps the nature of the subject was just not conducive,
> though even here I would say that it is possible to see it as a critique
> of medical practice.
This I deny. At most he is criticizing what certain intellectuals
think about medical history or medical practice. But if that's all it
takes to be political, then of course there is nothing for us to
debate about, since all books and speech generally is political (which
is only true from a point of view that is not relevant here).
> OT I think clearly operates as a critique, F. is
> hailing the 'end of Man' precisely because he sees it as an ultimately
> oppressive project.
This is not my understanding of Order of Things. I admit, however,
thta I read it years ago, only understood parts of it, and forgot most
of it. But I did not get any sense that he thought "Man" was part of
an "oppressive project."
Could you specify what might be "oppressive" about "Man", from the
specific point of view of Foucault at that time. (One can no doubt
imagine other points of view from which that might be true).
> I would tend towards the view of the shift from
> archaeology (or rather towards genealogy which isn't exactly the
> abandonment of archaeology) as more borne out of the theoretical
> difficulties which archaeology was beginning to encounter, i.e. around
> its apparent lack of movement and diversity, etc. I've never read it as
> a political failure. I'd be interested to know what you base this on,
> but I don't think it is accurate to say that Foucault was not a
> political person during this period.
Again, I concede that I stated things in an oversimplified way. But I
do think that archaeology was a political failure, because it made it
easy to talk about power _embodied_ in discoursive rules etc., but it
made it difficult to talk about power _struggles_, either within
discourse or outside it. For example, archaeology is far less
effective than genealogy at accounting for the way in which American
slaves or descendants of slaves were able to have considerable success
at using a Christian discourse of meekness and other-worldly
redemption, imposed on them as a strategy for politically taming them,
as a vehicle for the articulation of emancipatory aspirations and
critical insights about their condition, and on this basis to use
churches as a sort of centre for political organizing, with religious
leaders functioning also as political leaders.
Some people think that, ultimately, genealogy itself would have
trouble accounting for this. Personally, I don't agree. But either
way, it is certainly of more use than archaeology and the idea of an
"episteme".
Steve D
Toronto
--------
> > > Moreover, it was written in 1963, when Foucault
> > > was not especially interested in political theory or practice.
>
> But F.'s private life suggests this not to be the case as does M&C as I
> have already suggested. I take it you mean that his politics was not
> 'apparent', but this I think is a tactical device on F.'s part, he tries
> to slip his critique in like a Trojan horse so that you will alter your
> perceptions without them ever having been 'challenged'. This is what I
> take to mean when he describes some of his works as 'experience books',
> i.e. that they will deprive certain taken for granted beliefs and
> practices of their self-evidence and thus undermine them without ever
> actually confronting them directly.
>
> Best wishes
>
> Murray
>
>
> =================================
>
> Murray K. Simpson,
> Department of Social Work,
> Frankland Building,
> The University of Dundee,
> Dundee DD1 4HN,
> United Kingdom.
>
> http://www.dundee.ac.uk/SocialWork/mainpage.htm
>
> tel. 01382 344948
> fax. 01382 221512
> e.mail m.k.simpson@xxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> > Isn't the political uselessness of archaeology partly the motivation
> > for moving on to genealogy, and isn't the ethical silence of genealogy
> > what necessitated the eventual thematization of ethics in the 80's?
And Murray replied:
>
> I am a bit surprised to hear you say this Stephen. I don't think I
> would really agree. for instance I think it is noteworthy that you
> don't mention Madness and Civilization, a work which was pivotal in
> creating a critical stance to the historiography of psychiatry. Ask
> psychiatrists whether they thought it was apolitical and I doubt if
> they'd say 'yes'.
This is certainly a good example. I concede that I put the point in
an oversimplified way, at least in my final formulation.
Nevertheless, is not M&C political in a manner strikingly different
>from D&P? I think the former is political in the same way that
Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind" is political: it tries to vindicate
certain experiences and aspirations that are more or less discredited
or discreditable in the dominant culture at a certain time. Romantic
culture generally is political, or even (under the right
circumstances) emancipatory, but it seems to me that it is political
in the sense of "cultural politics," by which I mean specifically a
politics that only requires the efforts, initiative and activities of
people who write books, paint, etc.
Discipline and Punish, on the other hand, is political in a different
way. Here there is an attempt to connect historical research to
concrete practical struggles. Foucault writes: "That punishment...and
the prison...belong to a political technology of the body is a lesson
that I have learnt...from the present. In recent years, prison
revolts have occurred throughout the world...." (D&P, p. 30).
I think that the same could be said about Hist. of Sex., I, (which
tries to encourage the sexual left to drop the idea of a repressed
original identity in favour of the idea of an unduly fettered
creativity of self-invention -- or something like that).
Genealogy was supposed to have import for real movements of collective
resistance. That is a different way of being political.
Nevertheless, I admit that Madness and Civilization is political to
some extent, in some way.
> As far as BOTC is concerned that's a little more
> difficult, perhaps the nature of the subject was just not conducive,
> though even here I would say that it is possible to see it as a critique
> of medical practice.
This I deny. At most he is criticizing what certain intellectuals
think about medical history or medical practice. But if that's all it
takes to be political, then of course there is nothing for us to
debate about, since all books and speech generally is political (which
is only true from a point of view that is not relevant here).
> OT I think clearly operates as a critique, F. is
> hailing the 'end of Man' precisely because he sees it as an ultimately
> oppressive project.
This is not my understanding of Order of Things. I admit, however,
thta I read it years ago, only understood parts of it, and forgot most
of it. But I did not get any sense that he thought "Man" was part of
an "oppressive project."
Could you specify what might be "oppressive" about "Man", from the
specific point of view of Foucault at that time. (One can no doubt
imagine other points of view from which that might be true).
> I would tend towards the view of the shift from
> archaeology (or rather towards genealogy which isn't exactly the
> abandonment of archaeology) as more borne out of the theoretical
> difficulties which archaeology was beginning to encounter, i.e. around
> its apparent lack of movement and diversity, etc. I've never read it as
> a political failure. I'd be interested to know what you base this on,
> but I don't think it is accurate to say that Foucault was not a
> political person during this period.
Again, I concede that I stated things in an oversimplified way. But I
do think that archaeology was a political failure, because it made it
easy to talk about power _embodied_ in discoursive rules etc., but it
made it difficult to talk about power _struggles_, either within
discourse or outside it. For example, archaeology is far less
effective than genealogy at accounting for the way in which American
slaves or descendants of slaves were able to have considerable success
at using a Christian discourse of meekness and other-worldly
redemption, imposed on them as a strategy for politically taming them,
as a vehicle for the articulation of emancipatory aspirations and
critical insights about their condition, and on this basis to use
churches as a sort of centre for political organizing, with religious
leaders functioning also as political leaders.
Some people think that, ultimately, genealogy itself would have
trouble accounting for this. Personally, I don't agree. But either
way, it is certainly of more use than archaeology and the idea of an
"episteme".
Steve D
Toronto
--------
> > > Moreover, it was written in 1963, when Foucault
> > > was not especially interested in political theory or practice.
>
> But F.'s private life suggests this not to be the case as does M&C as I
> have already suggested. I take it you mean that his politics was not
> 'apparent', but this I think is a tactical device on F.'s part, he tries
> to slip his critique in like a Trojan horse so that you will alter your
> perceptions without them ever having been 'challenged'. This is what I
> take to mean when he describes some of his works as 'experience books',
> i.e. that they will deprive certain taken for granted beliefs and
> practices of their self-evidence and thus undermine them without ever
> actually confronting them directly.
>
> Best wishes
>
> Murray
>
>
> =================================
>
> Murray K. Simpson,
> Department of Social Work,
> Frankland Building,
> The University of Dundee,
> Dundee DD1 4HN,
> United Kingdom.
>
> http://www.dundee.ac.uk/SocialWork/mainpage.htm
>
> tel. 01382 344948
> fax. 01382 221512
> e.mail m.k.simpson@xxxxxxxxxxxx
>