I am re-posting this here because it may be of interest in the context of
the transgression thread.
-malgosia
------------------------------------------------
Date: Sun, 27 Apr 1997 20:44:18 +0800
To: bataille@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From: dorothyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Gwendolyn Nettlefold)
Subject: hegel, bataille, lacan...???
Hmm, hegel,bataille,lacan....???
Like Lacan, Bataille studied Hegel via Kojeve.
Kojeve states that for Hegel man is self-conscious; a 'knowing subject'
who, in the utterance of "I", knows he is superior to nature. Hence, the
Hegelian subject can separate himself from objects, contemplate them and
speak of them: 'The object, and not the subject, is what shows itself to
him in and by - or better, as - the act of knowing'(1969: 3). This
'Desire' to know is an 'emptiness' to be filled in order to become a
rational 'subject', overcoming the 'biological reality' of animal life.
The knowing subject is transcendent, 'he' transcends the immanence of
immediate experience and biological reality.
Kojeve argues that one's self consciousness emerges in the utterance of
'I', and that desire is the vital factor in the Hegelian dialectic. It is
the acknowledgement of his own desire, as something separate from the
desired object, that is the key to consciousness. This is depicted as a
forward movement, towards distinction between subject and object and
subsequent recognition of the desired object as separate from himself.
Desire represents an emptiness, a wanting for something other, "not-I".
The desire then, represents an inadequacy in this schema; the desire
represents an emptiness with regard to the object of desire so long as the
subject and object are not differentiated, in which case there is no "I".
It is this 'emptiness' which needs to be 'negated' through recognition of
the "non-I" by the "I": the subject ("I") is then conceived as separate
from the object ("non-I").
The dialectical movements depicted above represent an initial "affirmation"
in immediate experience, followed by a sense of inadequacy, so that the
second step requires a "negation" of the experience of subject/object
fusion. The third and final step in Hegel's dialectic is an awareness of
the subject's 'knowing itself to be knowing', thus realising its own role
in constituting the object for itself. This is the process of "synthesis",
enabling a deeper view of the process and hence a 'higher' movement, a
transcendence. Each cycle of affirmation-negation-synthesis of the subject
is called 'mediation', the mediation of immediate experience, or
subject/object fusion, into knowledge (Muller & Richardson 1982: 362).
Bataille reinstates value to the immediacy of experience; that which needs
to be 'negated' in the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel's dialectic of knowledge
assumes that once we have the ability to separate subject and object in
knowledge, all experience can be known in objective knowledge. Bataille's
theory of inner experience contests Hegel's position that immediate
experience must always be transcended in order to have meaning for someone.
Rather, for Bataille, inner experience retains meaning in and of itself,
but it is not the valued status of meaning that is given to objective
knowledge.
Bataille contests the notion of Absolute knowledge, arguing that Hegel's
system had omitted an essential aspect of life: 'The open wound that is my
life, the erotic desire for the other, the tears or laughter that distance
us'(Besnier 1995: 20). These immanent experiences are the 'excess' which
Bataille writes about.
Lacan applies psychoanalytic theory to Hegel's transcendent speaking
subject. Like Bataille, Lacan was influenced by Kojeve's lectures on Hegel
so that Lacan too conceived the 'true' self to be an unnameable 'other'.
=46or Lacan, all subjects are "castrated" representing the 'lack' or 'manqu=
=E9
a etre' of desire which can never be articulated. For Lacan all subjects
are decentred so that the 'I'/'je' who speaks is never the same as the
'me'/'moi' of experience.
Nevertheless, in his account of the 'speaking subject', I think Lacan's
schema adheres more closely to Hegel's dialectic of transcendence. In this
process both Hegel and Lacan depict an initial 'affirmation' in immediate
experience, followed by inadequacy, which is negation, and then a
reconciliation of two previous movements into a deeper view of the process
and hence a 'higher' movement. Each cycle of
affirmation-negation-synthesis of the subject is a 'mediation', the
mediation of immediate experience into knowledge, (Muller & Richardson
1982: 362), or the transcendence of immanence. Lacanian psychoanalysis
investigates the transition from the immanence of merged existence ('not
I') through a process of negation and affirmation, transcending immanence
to formulate the speaking subject ('I').
But isn't the difference between Lacan and Bataille that Lacan speaks of
the inarticulable 'moi' (which is more aligned to the mirror stage) and
Bataille is concerned with merged existence (prior to the mirror) where
there are *no* objects or subjects???
Bataille is more concerned with the immediacy of experience; the 'loss' of
subject/object relations. Central to Bataille's notion of inner experience
is the coalescence of the subject and object of experience. For Hegel this
state of immanence needs to be transcended in order that there could emerge
a knowing subject. For Lacan this subject/object merge is "castrated" or
permanently removed to constitute the lack. So I think Lacan adheres more
to any Hegelian notion of transcendence than Bataille.???
"At a
particticular point in the text, Lacan says something like we need the 10
commandments so that we can spend our time breaking them. This has puzzled m=
e
for several days, and I wonder if there are those on the list who are more
familiar with this link to Bataille than I.
I will look at the text a bit closer to examine this problem if anyone is
interested in discussing this topic".
Is this referring to Bataille's notion of transgression. I guess that's
the important point that pulls Bataille's critique of a Hegelian dialectic
together. The immediate experience (which occurs in the recognition of
one's animality and a subsequent horror, leading to non-knowlege)
transgresses the limits of culture (the Oedipal limits of the
socio-symbolic contract?) to make up the 'totality'.
In other words the immanence (immediate experience/animality) is not a
'base' of "nature" that we transcend as we learn to speak and enter
culture. Rather, as John Lechte puts it, immmanence and transcendence
always form an axis to make up the totality. Transcendence can never fully
expel immanence. "Nature" is implicit in "culture" but it is heterogenous
or non-homogenous.
???
gwen
Gwen Nettlefold
Masters Candidate
The Department of Philosophy
The University of Tasmania
ph: (03) 6226 7848
the transgression thread.
-malgosia
------------------------------------------------
Date: Sun, 27 Apr 1997 20:44:18 +0800
To: bataille@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From: dorothyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Gwendolyn Nettlefold)
Subject: hegel, bataille, lacan...???
Hmm, hegel,bataille,lacan....???
Like Lacan, Bataille studied Hegel via Kojeve.
Kojeve states that for Hegel man is self-conscious; a 'knowing subject'
who, in the utterance of "I", knows he is superior to nature. Hence, the
Hegelian subject can separate himself from objects, contemplate them and
speak of them: 'The object, and not the subject, is what shows itself to
him in and by - or better, as - the act of knowing'(1969: 3). This
'Desire' to know is an 'emptiness' to be filled in order to become a
rational 'subject', overcoming the 'biological reality' of animal life.
The knowing subject is transcendent, 'he' transcends the immanence of
immediate experience and biological reality.
Kojeve argues that one's self consciousness emerges in the utterance of
'I', and that desire is the vital factor in the Hegelian dialectic. It is
the acknowledgement of his own desire, as something separate from the
desired object, that is the key to consciousness. This is depicted as a
forward movement, towards distinction between subject and object and
subsequent recognition of the desired object as separate from himself.
Desire represents an emptiness, a wanting for something other, "not-I".
The desire then, represents an inadequacy in this schema; the desire
represents an emptiness with regard to the object of desire so long as the
subject and object are not differentiated, in which case there is no "I".
It is this 'emptiness' which needs to be 'negated' through recognition of
the "non-I" by the "I": the subject ("I") is then conceived as separate
from the object ("non-I").
The dialectical movements depicted above represent an initial "affirmation"
in immediate experience, followed by a sense of inadequacy, so that the
second step requires a "negation" of the experience of subject/object
fusion. The third and final step in Hegel's dialectic is an awareness of
the subject's 'knowing itself to be knowing', thus realising its own role
in constituting the object for itself. This is the process of "synthesis",
enabling a deeper view of the process and hence a 'higher' movement, a
transcendence. Each cycle of affirmation-negation-synthesis of the subject
is called 'mediation', the mediation of immediate experience, or
subject/object fusion, into knowledge (Muller & Richardson 1982: 362).
Bataille reinstates value to the immediacy of experience; that which needs
to be 'negated' in the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel's dialectic of knowledge
assumes that once we have the ability to separate subject and object in
knowledge, all experience can be known in objective knowledge. Bataille's
theory of inner experience contests Hegel's position that immediate
experience must always be transcended in order to have meaning for someone.
Rather, for Bataille, inner experience retains meaning in and of itself,
but it is not the valued status of meaning that is given to objective
knowledge.
Bataille contests the notion of Absolute knowledge, arguing that Hegel's
system had omitted an essential aspect of life: 'The open wound that is my
life, the erotic desire for the other, the tears or laughter that distance
us'(Besnier 1995: 20). These immanent experiences are the 'excess' which
Bataille writes about.
Lacan applies psychoanalytic theory to Hegel's transcendent speaking
subject. Like Bataille, Lacan was influenced by Kojeve's lectures on Hegel
so that Lacan too conceived the 'true' self to be an unnameable 'other'.
=46or Lacan, all subjects are "castrated" representing the 'lack' or 'manqu=
=E9
a etre' of desire which can never be articulated. For Lacan all subjects
are decentred so that the 'I'/'je' who speaks is never the same as the
'me'/'moi' of experience.
Nevertheless, in his account of the 'speaking subject', I think Lacan's
schema adheres more closely to Hegel's dialectic of transcendence. In this
process both Hegel and Lacan depict an initial 'affirmation' in immediate
experience, followed by inadequacy, which is negation, and then a
reconciliation of two previous movements into a deeper view of the process
and hence a 'higher' movement. Each cycle of
affirmation-negation-synthesis of the subject is a 'mediation', the
mediation of immediate experience into knowledge, (Muller & Richardson
1982: 362), or the transcendence of immanence. Lacanian psychoanalysis
investigates the transition from the immanence of merged existence ('not
I') through a process of negation and affirmation, transcending immanence
to formulate the speaking subject ('I').
But isn't the difference between Lacan and Bataille that Lacan speaks of
the inarticulable 'moi' (which is more aligned to the mirror stage) and
Bataille is concerned with merged existence (prior to the mirror) where
there are *no* objects or subjects???
Bataille is more concerned with the immediacy of experience; the 'loss' of
subject/object relations. Central to Bataille's notion of inner experience
is the coalescence of the subject and object of experience. For Hegel this
state of immanence needs to be transcended in order that there could emerge
a knowing subject. For Lacan this subject/object merge is "castrated" or
permanently removed to constitute the lack. So I think Lacan adheres more
to any Hegelian notion of transcendence than Bataille.???
"At a
particticular point in the text, Lacan says something like we need the 10
commandments so that we can spend our time breaking them. This has puzzled m=
e
for several days, and I wonder if there are those on the list who are more
familiar with this link to Bataille than I.
I will look at the text a bit closer to examine this problem if anyone is
interested in discussing this topic".
Is this referring to Bataille's notion of transgression. I guess that's
the important point that pulls Bataille's critique of a Hegelian dialectic
together. The immediate experience (which occurs in the recognition of
one's animality and a subsequent horror, leading to non-knowlege)
transgresses the limits of culture (the Oedipal limits of the
socio-symbolic contract?) to make up the 'totality'.
In other words the immanence (immediate experience/animality) is not a
'base' of "nature" that we transcend as we learn to speak and enter
culture. Rather, as John Lechte puts it, immmanence and transcendence
always form an axis to make up the totality. Transcendence can never fully
expel immanence. "Nature" is implicit in "culture" but it is heterogenous
or non-homogenous.
???
gwen
Gwen Nettlefold
Masters Candidate
The Department of Philosophy
The University of Tasmania
ph: (03) 6226 7848