On Mon, 19 May 1997, Sean Hill wrote [in part]:
> [Foucault] does not deny the concept of human nature;
> rather, he wishes to examine the ways in which the concept FUNCTIONS in
> different discourses. In the same way, he never attacks truth per se, but
> examines how truth FUNCTIONS in different discourses. Finally, he does not
> have a "discursive idealism" though he did attempt a theory of discourse in
> the _Archaeology of Knowledge_ but subsequently admitted the failure of
> that project. He does not consider discourse to be non-referential, nor
> merely an arbitrary construction. As he says in countless places: it is
> not his task to verify the truth validity of statements. Rather, his
> concern is to examine the FUNCTION of what counts as true in relation to
> the complexity of its socio-historical context. These are separate issues
> with complex relations. The confusion lies not in Foucault, but in those
> such as Habermas and Colin who refuse to set aside (provisionally, of
> course) their moralities in order to examine the rationality of the
> unintended effects of their moralities. For this Foucault gets called
> neo-conservative, irrational, immoral, an epistemoligical relativist, a
> nihilist, etc. These accusations are quite reactionary and tirelessly seem
> to miss the point that Foucault's analyses are attempts to examine the ways
> in which actions affect other actions, despite the conscious awareness of
> the those who practice them, including, admittedly, Foucault's own
> discourse. And it is precisely these unintended effects, in relation to
> this discussion of censorship and the Nazi newsgroup, that should raise a
> Foucauldian eyebrow.
I agree with much of the above and learned from it, but one thought: Does
F think that people who employ power don't know what they're doing? I
would agree with you that actors cannot predict unintended consequences of
what they do, but that doesn't mean the particular operation of power they
are engaged in is somehow obscure to them, right?
Coming out of the above point, I don't think we can use the claim
"exercises of power sometimes or even regularly end up producing
unintended effects" as an argument against exercises of power. That's why
I don't think we should collectively raise our Fdian eyebrow at the
possibility that surveillance techniques et al would be employed against
Nazis on Usenet.
It seems to me that a better term than "unintended" here is "ambiguous."
Maybe I'm splitting hairs, but the good thing about "ambiguous" is that
the dichotomous good/bad categorization is avoided. Surveillance is a
tool, not a technique that has domination encoded into its structure, such
that anyone using it is automatically committed to sucking the life out of
people. Surveillance can be a helpful tool in teaching someone how to type
or play the piano. There may even be some anti-social behaviors that can
be corrected with its help! Surveillance can also be a key ingredient for
normalizing a population into an unthinking acceptance of the social
world. Like all tools, surveillance can be used for this or that; thus,
its effects are "ambiguous."
One point the above underlines is that F was not a member of the
Frankfurt School. He does not believe, as Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno
do, that the critique of domination meant the critique of technique or of
rationality.
Sean continues:
>
> Now in the following, Colin fails to address the effects of his own
> will-to-censorship and, furthermore, lapses into a "slippery slope"
> argument:
>
> >How do we sift out those groups that are not
> >ethically acceptable, or do we not even bother to try. On a Foucaultian
> >reading I think the latter answer is the only one you can extract. However,
> >the story aboout the Nazi' coming for group A, and noone doing anything,
> >then for group B and noone doing anything, and then them coming for you, and
> >there was noone left to do anything seems pertinent here. After all, you are
> >absolutely right, at the end of the day there will be noone left but the
> >Nazis and people reading Foucault, and then who do you think they are going
> >to come for?
>
> Nothing left but Nazis and Foucauldians! (laughter) This is clearly
> irrational fear at work. There is nothing about the failure to censor this
> newsgroup that would necessarily lead to the rapid spread of Nazi idealogy.
> However, there is a negative effect that follows necessarily from the
> silencing of a group of people. For instance, what regulatory programs,
> surveilance systems, or internet police control will be needed to ensure
> that these groups remain silenced? Ironically, the effects of these very
> tactics which obviously concern Foucault are ones which in large part were
> practiced notoriously by, among others, the Nazis themselves. And it is
> the rationality of practices such as censorship that Foucault questions
I tentatively disagree. I don't think F is a critique of the *rationality*
of practices. That brings him too close to the Frankfurt School.
--John
> [Foucault] does not deny the concept of human nature;
> rather, he wishes to examine the ways in which the concept FUNCTIONS in
> different discourses. In the same way, he never attacks truth per se, but
> examines how truth FUNCTIONS in different discourses. Finally, he does not
> have a "discursive idealism" though he did attempt a theory of discourse in
> the _Archaeology of Knowledge_ but subsequently admitted the failure of
> that project. He does not consider discourse to be non-referential, nor
> merely an arbitrary construction. As he says in countless places: it is
> not his task to verify the truth validity of statements. Rather, his
> concern is to examine the FUNCTION of what counts as true in relation to
> the complexity of its socio-historical context. These are separate issues
> with complex relations. The confusion lies not in Foucault, but in those
> such as Habermas and Colin who refuse to set aside (provisionally, of
> course) their moralities in order to examine the rationality of the
> unintended effects of their moralities. For this Foucault gets called
> neo-conservative, irrational, immoral, an epistemoligical relativist, a
> nihilist, etc. These accusations are quite reactionary and tirelessly seem
> to miss the point that Foucault's analyses are attempts to examine the ways
> in which actions affect other actions, despite the conscious awareness of
> the those who practice them, including, admittedly, Foucault's own
> discourse. And it is precisely these unintended effects, in relation to
> this discussion of censorship and the Nazi newsgroup, that should raise a
> Foucauldian eyebrow.
I agree with much of the above and learned from it, but one thought: Does
F think that people who employ power don't know what they're doing? I
would agree with you that actors cannot predict unintended consequences of
what they do, but that doesn't mean the particular operation of power they
are engaged in is somehow obscure to them, right?
Coming out of the above point, I don't think we can use the claim
"exercises of power sometimes or even regularly end up producing
unintended effects" as an argument against exercises of power. That's why
I don't think we should collectively raise our Fdian eyebrow at the
possibility that surveillance techniques et al would be employed against
Nazis on Usenet.
It seems to me that a better term than "unintended" here is "ambiguous."
Maybe I'm splitting hairs, but the good thing about "ambiguous" is that
the dichotomous good/bad categorization is avoided. Surveillance is a
tool, not a technique that has domination encoded into its structure, such
that anyone using it is automatically committed to sucking the life out of
people. Surveillance can be a helpful tool in teaching someone how to type
or play the piano. There may even be some anti-social behaviors that can
be corrected with its help! Surveillance can also be a key ingredient for
normalizing a population into an unthinking acceptance of the social
world. Like all tools, surveillance can be used for this or that; thus,
its effects are "ambiguous."
One point the above underlines is that F was not a member of the
Frankfurt School. He does not believe, as Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno
do, that the critique of domination meant the critique of technique or of
rationality.
Sean continues:
>
> Now in the following, Colin fails to address the effects of his own
> will-to-censorship and, furthermore, lapses into a "slippery slope"
> argument:
>
> >How do we sift out those groups that are not
> >ethically acceptable, or do we not even bother to try. On a Foucaultian
> >reading I think the latter answer is the only one you can extract. However,
> >the story aboout the Nazi' coming for group A, and noone doing anything,
> >then for group B and noone doing anything, and then them coming for you, and
> >there was noone left to do anything seems pertinent here. After all, you are
> >absolutely right, at the end of the day there will be noone left but the
> >Nazis and people reading Foucault, and then who do you think they are going
> >to come for?
>
> Nothing left but Nazis and Foucauldians! (laughter) This is clearly
> irrational fear at work. There is nothing about the failure to censor this
> newsgroup that would necessarily lead to the rapid spread of Nazi idealogy.
> However, there is a negative effect that follows necessarily from the
> silencing of a group of people. For instance, what regulatory programs,
> surveilance systems, or internet police control will be needed to ensure
> that these groups remain silenced? Ironically, the effects of these very
> tactics which obviously concern Foucault are ones which in large part were
> practiced notoriously by, among others, the Nazis themselves. And it is
> the rationality of practices such as censorship that Foucault questions
I tentatively disagree. I don't think F is a critique of the *rationality*
of practices. That brings him too close to the Frankfurt School.
--John