Murray said:
>
>But this comes back to my other point, which you left out, what is about
>F. that makes you say that this is an area about which he ought to have
>said something. Surely there must be things which are beyond the task
>which F. sets himself, and which are indeed irrelevant to that task.
>What I am arguing is that this is an example of such a thing.
Well i suppose Murray, I think we simply have to disagree about this. But
let me put my point. If truth is an effect of power, then are we not simply
returned to Hobbes and the Nazis insofar as those with the most power get to
define what counts as true? But truth is very often one of the only weapons
the powerless have in fighting power, and moreover, some of us don't
particularly like the machiavellian/hobbesian form of politics. Is it true
that women are oppressed, or is this statement simply an effect of womens
power? As Geras puts it, if there is no truth there is no injustice and
since Foucault writes on truth he is in the politico/ethico game.
>Oh please. I am not suggesting that F.'s work is not deeply imbued with
>political commitment and there is no fact-value divide, I and others
>have said as much many times. The problem is that you are reducing all
>political/ethical engagement to 'prescription'. This is not a binary
>issue 'descriptive-prescriptive'.
Well good, but equally, there is no non-presciptive social philosophy such
as Foucault engages in. Foucaults work, in my opinion, leads to political
quietism, and if it doesn't please correct me, not tell me this point is not
relevant to his work, because once you have accepted that his work is
"deeply imbued with
>political commitment", you have accepted the basis of my argument. the
question is what form of politics?
>>
>> The point is, if he has altered the shape of that space,
>> >then he might consider his job done, whether or not this was in the form
>> >of guidelines or moral injunctions would be irrelevant.
See above about truth.
>
>Again, nonsense. To presribe is to say 'do this', 'do that', 'don't do
>this' and 'don't do that'. F. clearly does not engage in this.
See one of my other posts about his comments about intellectuals. Look, even
the call to do nothing is a call to do something. Inaction is a form of
action. But I won't repeat your charge of nonsense at you.
>I suppose this example must serve some purpose, but I really don't know
>what. I think it is safe to assume that there is a slight difference
>between changing the thinkable and substituting words.
There is also a massive difference between saying and doing. Also, have a
look a Zizek's critique of political correctness on this (Sublime Object of
Ideology, I think).
Having said
>that, I think that the way in which sections of the gay community have
>in fact revived the term 'queer' to describe themselves is evidence of
>an attempt to alter the possibilities of thought.
Oh I absolutely agree that perhaps language my well be a starting point. but
we have to be wary here. In Britain now there is much talk of "Girl Power"
and the reappropriation of symbols and labels by a certain group to show how
such power is manipulable. But does anyone seriously believe that this
particular phenomena really represents 'Girl Power'?
Thanks,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
>
>But this comes back to my other point, which you left out, what is about
>F. that makes you say that this is an area about which he ought to have
>said something. Surely there must be things which are beyond the task
>which F. sets himself, and which are indeed irrelevant to that task.
>What I am arguing is that this is an example of such a thing.
Well i suppose Murray, I think we simply have to disagree about this. But
let me put my point. If truth is an effect of power, then are we not simply
returned to Hobbes and the Nazis insofar as those with the most power get to
define what counts as true? But truth is very often one of the only weapons
the powerless have in fighting power, and moreover, some of us don't
particularly like the machiavellian/hobbesian form of politics. Is it true
that women are oppressed, or is this statement simply an effect of womens
power? As Geras puts it, if there is no truth there is no injustice and
since Foucault writes on truth he is in the politico/ethico game.
>Oh please. I am not suggesting that F.'s work is not deeply imbued with
>political commitment and there is no fact-value divide, I and others
>have said as much many times. The problem is that you are reducing all
>political/ethical engagement to 'prescription'. This is not a binary
>issue 'descriptive-prescriptive'.
Well good, but equally, there is no non-presciptive social philosophy such
as Foucault engages in. Foucaults work, in my opinion, leads to political
quietism, and if it doesn't please correct me, not tell me this point is not
relevant to his work, because once you have accepted that his work is
"deeply imbued with
>political commitment", you have accepted the basis of my argument. the
question is what form of politics?
>>
>> The point is, if he has altered the shape of that space,
>> >then he might consider his job done, whether or not this was in the form
>> >of guidelines or moral injunctions would be irrelevant.
See above about truth.
>
>Again, nonsense. To presribe is to say 'do this', 'do that', 'don't do
>this' and 'don't do that'. F. clearly does not engage in this.
See one of my other posts about his comments about intellectuals. Look, even
the call to do nothing is a call to do something. Inaction is a form of
action. But I won't repeat your charge of nonsense at you.
>I suppose this example must serve some purpose, but I really don't know
>what. I think it is safe to assume that there is a slight difference
>between changing the thinkable and substituting words.
There is also a massive difference between saying and doing. Also, have a
look a Zizek's critique of political correctness on this (Sublime Object of
Ideology, I think).
Having said
>that, I think that the way in which sections of the gay community have
>in fact revived the term 'queer' to describe themselves is evidence of
>an attempt to alter the possibilities of thought.
Oh I absolutely agree that perhaps language my well be a starting point. but
we have to be wary here. In Britain now there is much talk of "Girl Power"
and the reappropriation of symbols and labels by a certain group to show how
such power is manipulable. But does anyone seriously believe that this
particular phenomena really represents 'Girl Power'?
Thanks,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------