Well,
Thanks to everyone for their kind comments and attepts to perhaps explain
positions vis-a-vis the many issues. I suppose the responses could be
crudely grouped into two. One, are those responses which claim that none of
this has anything to do with Foucault. If people are happy with this then so
be it. I find it a deeply troubling response. To me, philsophical positions
on power and truth are part and parcel of the political process and as
Foucault wrote on these issues then the claim that Foucault's work did not
address the issue of the moral exercise of power (which is basically the
crux of the issue of whether to censor Nazis) is simply naive. Besides,
philosophical positions are not simply something one picks up off a
supermarket shelf, but rather deeply infect the thinking processes with
which we navigate our lives. And if we really think truth is simply an
effect of power then we must acceot that those with the most power possess
the most truths. I reject this. Truth is implicated with power, of course,
but it is not simply an effect of power, and the powerless can be in
possession of the truth.
The second set of responses take issue with my framing of the questions, but
basically seem to accept that Foucault may be able to provide some guidance
on such issues but argue that the conclusions I draw do not follow form a
Foucaultian approach. Since time is not on my side (I have a Thesis to
finish) I will be very selective in my responses.
>Well, the context is the relationship of intellectuals (qua
>intellectuals) vis-a-vis non-intellectuals, *not* vis-a-vis other
>intellectuals (qua intellectuals). So Foucault is not contradicting
>himself here.
But he is still telling a group of people what they should not do, that is,
they should not legislate for the masses. I don't see how you can get round
this. He is indeed contradicting himself (not least because his definition
of an intellectual may be open to dispute) as I maintain any Foucaultian
must do in order to speak. I simply don't see how you get round this, truth
is inscribed in discourse, or else what is it you are trying to tell me. If
you tell me this is not so, then you have simply proved that it is.
>
>> What is true simply cannot be reduced or separated from the function of
>> truth. And to think otherwise is simply dangerous. Since the function of
>> truth in a Nazi discourse is to legitimate the destruction of peoples they
>> do not like, then I suppose Foucualt would tell us what we already know.
>> What is true is important because people tell lies. The function of truth is
>> only one of its modes of operation.
>
>> When things do get so bad
>> how will you Foucautians know? I mean, I know this is a cheap shot, but
>> Foucault was at least honest himself about his idealism, discursive or
>> otherwise, and consistently refused to belief in AIDS and safe sex.
>> Unfortunately, for all of us, AIDS was real, independent of what Foucault
>> thought. End of story. I think your own notions of human nature are
>> beginning to show through Sean. Don't you have an overidealised view of
>> humans? And by the way, tell the 50 million, or there abouts, people who
>> died in WWII that fear of the Nazis was irrational, not to mention the many
>> Asians and other who suffer regularly form their practices in my
>> country.
>
>With all due respect, there *is* a "cheap shot" located in your argument
>here. Surely you need to take into account the timeline of discovery
>in the epidemiological course of AIDS. It is nonsensical to say that
>Foucault "consistently refused to belief [sic] in AIDS and safe sex."
Sorry, this (if I may be allowed to slip into what appears to be a rather
naive positivism here) is simply a well documented fact. Foucault simply
refused to belief in AIDS and practice safe sex, it wasn't that he believed
but thought what the hell, he simply thought it was a load of nonsense, a
manufactured truth that he refused to belief. Now you may be wanting to
argue that he cannot be faulted for this since the level of scientific
knowledge was so low as to make his belief rational at that point in time.
But this simply makes my argument for me. The truth of AIDS was and is
independent of our discursive constructions of it, this is not to deny that
the way we construct it affects the way we treat it, but simply to make the
point that there are indeed non-linguistic constraints on our constructions.
>
>Apart from this example, I think a problem that continues to run through
>a lot of this discussion is what truths we are talking about. Clearly
>Foucault was mainly intersted in the sorts of truths that float about
>within the social sciences. He says very little, if anything?, about the
>sorts of basic truths (the existence of HIV or sub-atomic particles or
>whatever) that so-called hard science proposes or denies.
Oh I absolutely agree, he actually says somewhere that his work was not
concerned with the natural science. This raises all manner of issues, not
least the way the natural sciences are in society and society is in the
natural sciences. Also, it seems to me that in locating the human sciences
at the junction of linguistics, economics and biology, as he does, (which I
actually think is too narrow) then it is simply an error to adhere to a
forced separation between the natural and social sciences. I am not, by the
way, advocating a naive form of positivist naturalism, but the point is that
the human sciences get their very identity through a set of oppositions
against their perceived account of science , which is generally taken to be
positivism. But if Positivism does not accuratley describe science, as
recent work in the philsophy of science suggests, then there may be no need
for such a forced separation.
>In "Truth and Power," Foucault tries to explain that "by truth I do not
>mean 'the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,'
>but rather 'the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the
>false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true,'
>it being understood also that it's not a matter of a battle 'on behalf'
>of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic
>and political role it plays."
You see, I am largely sympathetic to this but would add the very important
caveat that the economic and political role truth plays can not be divorced
form the question of what is true. Because we simply cannot allow political
forces to proscribe truth, as Foucault himself argues.
>His concern would be more akin to understanding the role that an
>awareness of the holocaust and Naziism has on the way people today
>govern and are governed (in a local, immediate way) by themselves and
>others. Calling someone a Nazi or raising the spectre of fascism or the
>holocaust is extremely widespread. (I think it was on this list, about 2
>or 3 years ago, someone had collected all the instances of the holocaust
>being used as a metaphor or argument they could find over a few weeks,
>and there were literally hundreds. *Everyone* is acting "like Hitler" or
>"being a Nazi" these days, it seems.)
Well yes, I see your point, but this alone does not detract from whether or
not an argument is true and often the refutation of an argument depends upon
what the argument is saying not simply how the arguemnt is used.
>
>Anyway, at the end of the day, I doubt that Foucault's work can ever
>tell us whether we ought to censor the Nazis. But at the end of the day,
>I doubt whether good old fashioned liberalism can, either. Or Kant. Or
>Utilitarianism. Or Hobbes.
But does it make such decisions impossible? I stil don't know how you are
advocating such choices.
>I'm not sure I count as what you would consider a Foucaultian, but I'm
>probably as close as anyone. I act all the time, and because I am human
>above all. I am influenced by Foucault's work, it is true. But does that
>immobilize me? Far from it. Why *wouldn't* I act? I don't get it.
Oh but that is the point you do, nay must. But you can act only by
"forgetting" Foucault that is my argument. I return here to my point about
truth being an effect of power. I am sure there are answers here but I
wonder whether some one could elaborate them.
>
>I think that certain people want to read Foucault as denying the
>existence of a Kantian intrinsic human worth, a utilitarian concern with
>pain and happiness, the importance of contractarian sociality,
>Aristotelian teleology and order, the indescribable horribleness of the
>holocaust, the pain and politics of AIDS. Frankly, such denial is not to
>be found in Foucault's work.
Yes, I would tend to agree, problematic though isn't it? Where does this
reading come from (and it is not only from the doubters, I mean look at
Judith Butler)?
Thanks,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
Thanks to everyone for their kind comments and attepts to perhaps explain
positions vis-a-vis the many issues. I suppose the responses could be
crudely grouped into two. One, are those responses which claim that none of
this has anything to do with Foucault. If people are happy with this then so
be it. I find it a deeply troubling response. To me, philsophical positions
on power and truth are part and parcel of the political process and as
Foucault wrote on these issues then the claim that Foucault's work did not
address the issue of the moral exercise of power (which is basically the
crux of the issue of whether to censor Nazis) is simply naive. Besides,
philosophical positions are not simply something one picks up off a
supermarket shelf, but rather deeply infect the thinking processes with
which we navigate our lives. And if we really think truth is simply an
effect of power then we must acceot that those with the most power possess
the most truths. I reject this. Truth is implicated with power, of course,
but it is not simply an effect of power, and the powerless can be in
possession of the truth.
The second set of responses take issue with my framing of the questions, but
basically seem to accept that Foucault may be able to provide some guidance
on such issues but argue that the conclusions I draw do not follow form a
Foucaultian approach. Since time is not on my side (I have a Thesis to
finish) I will be very selective in my responses.
>Well, the context is the relationship of intellectuals (qua
>intellectuals) vis-a-vis non-intellectuals, *not* vis-a-vis other
>intellectuals (qua intellectuals). So Foucault is not contradicting
>himself here.
But he is still telling a group of people what they should not do, that is,
they should not legislate for the masses. I don't see how you can get round
this. He is indeed contradicting himself (not least because his definition
of an intellectual may be open to dispute) as I maintain any Foucaultian
must do in order to speak. I simply don't see how you get round this, truth
is inscribed in discourse, or else what is it you are trying to tell me. If
you tell me this is not so, then you have simply proved that it is.
>
>> What is true simply cannot be reduced or separated from the function of
>> truth. And to think otherwise is simply dangerous. Since the function of
>> truth in a Nazi discourse is to legitimate the destruction of peoples they
>> do not like, then I suppose Foucualt would tell us what we already know.
>> What is true is important because people tell lies. The function of truth is
>> only one of its modes of operation.
>
>> When things do get so bad
>> how will you Foucautians know? I mean, I know this is a cheap shot, but
>> Foucault was at least honest himself about his idealism, discursive or
>> otherwise, and consistently refused to belief in AIDS and safe sex.
>> Unfortunately, for all of us, AIDS was real, independent of what Foucault
>> thought. End of story. I think your own notions of human nature are
>> beginning to show through Sean. Don't you have an overidealised view of
>> humans? And by the way, tell the 50 million, or there abouts, people who
>> died in WWII that fear of the Nazis was irrational, not to mention the many
>> Asians and other who suffer regularly form their practices in my
>> country.
>
>With all due respect, there *is* a "cheap shot" located in your argument
>here. Surely you need to take into account the timeline of discovery
>in the epidemiological course of AIDS. It is nonsensical to say that
>Foucault "consistently refused to belief [sic] in AIDS and safe sex."
Sorry, this (if I may be allowed to slip into what appears to be a rather
naive positivism here) is simply a well documented fact. Foucault simply
refused to belief in AIDS and practice safe sex, it wasn't that he believed
but thought what the hell, he simply thought it was a load of nonsense, a
manufactured truth that he refused to belief. Now you may be wanting to
argue that he cannot be faulted for this since the level of scientific
knowledge was so low as to make his belief rational at that point in time.
But this simply makes my argument for me. The truth of AIDS was and is
independent of our discursive constructions of it, this is not to deny that
the way we construct it affects the way we treat it, but simply to make the
point that there are indeed non-linguistic constraints on our constructions.
>
>Apart from this example, I think a problem that continues to run through
>a lot of this discussion is what truths we are talking about. Clearly
>Foucault was mainly intersted in the sorts of truths that float about
>within the social sciences. He says very little, if anything?, about the
>sorts of basic truths (the existence of HIV or sub-atomic particles or
>whatever) that so-called hard science proposes or denies.
Oh I absolutely agree, he actually says somewhere that his work was not
concerned with the natural science. This raises all manner of issues, not
least the way the natural sciences are in society and society is in the
natural sciences. Also, it seems to me that in locating the human sciences
at the junction of linguistics, economics and biology, as he does, (which I
actually think is too narrow) then it is simply an error to adhere to a
forced separation between the natural and social sciences. I am not, by the
way, advocating a naive form of positivist naturalism, but the point is that
the human sciences get their very identity through a set of oppositions
against their perceived account of science , which is generally taken to be
positivism. But if Positivism does not accuratley describe science, as
recent work in the philsophy of science suggests, then there may be no need
for such a forced separation.
>In "Truth and Power," Foucault tries to explain that "by truth I do not
>mean 'the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,'
>but rather 'the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the
>false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true,'
>it being understood also that it's not a matter of a battle 'on behalf'
>of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic
>and political role it plays."
You see, I am largely sympathetic to this but would add the very important
caveat that the economic and political role truth plays can not be divorced
form the question of what is true. Because we simply cannot allow political
forces to proscribe truth, as Foucault himself argues.
>His concern would be more akin to understanding the role that an
>awareness of the holocaust and Naziism has on the way people today
>govern and are governed (in a local, immediate way) by themselves and
>others. Calling someone a Nazi or raising the spectre of fascism or the
>holocaust is extremely widespread. (I think it was on this list, about 2
>or 3 years ago, someone had collected all the instances of the holocaust
>being used as a metaphor or argument they could find over a few weeks,
>and there were literally hundreds. *Everyone* is acting "like Hitler" or
>"being a Nazi" these days, it seems.)
Well yes, I see your point, but this alone does not detract from whether or
not an argument is true and often the refutation of an argument depends upon
what the argument is saying not simply how the arguemnt is used.
>
>Anyway, at the end of the day, I doubt that Foucault's work can ever
>tell us whether we ought to censor the Nazis. But at the end of the day,
>I doubt whether good old fashioned liberalism can, either. Or Kant. Or
>Utilitarianism. Or Hobbes.
But does it make such decisions impossible? I stil don't know how you are
advocating such choices.
>I'm not sure I count as what you would consider a Foucaultian, but I'm
>probably as close as anyone. I act all the time, and because I am human
>above all. I am influenced by Foucault's work, it is true. But does that
>immobilize me? Far from it. Why *wouldn't* I act? I don't get it.
Oh but that is the point you do, nay must. But you can act only by
"forgetting" Foucault that is my argument. I return here to my point about
truth being an effect of power. I am sure there are answers here but I
wonder whether some one could elaborate them.
>
>I think that certain people want to read Foucault as denying the
>existence of a Kantian intrinsic human worth, a utilitarian concern with
>pain and happiness, the importance of contractarian sociality,
>Aristotelian teleology and order, the indescribable horribleness of the
>holocaust, the pain and politics of AIDS. Frankly, such denial is not to
>be found in Foucault's work.
Yes, I would tend to agree, problematic though isn't it? Where does this
reading come from (and it is not only from the doubters, I mean look at
Judith Butler)?
Thanks,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------