following a couple of recent posts, I am beginning to see that there is
possibly a deeper issue behind much of this discussion, and I think
certainly between the disagreements between Colin and myself. This is
the question of 'truth' to which Colin has drawn attention. I was
struck by a post you made a couple of days ago, sorry I'm only just
responding, which led me to think that we have radically different views
of Foucault. You said,
> Let me
> be clear, I chracterise my metaphysical position as: ontologically realist,
> epistemologically relativist (in the sense that I accept that all beliefs
> and truth claims are socially embedded), and jugementally rationalist.
Now I do not see this as being radically different from Foucault's
position and in this respect I side with those who do not regard
Foucault as a post-modernist, indeed I would share many of Colin's
concerns expressed about Foucault but in relation to post-modernists. I
may be wrong, but it seems to me, Colin, that you are situating F in
this camp, to a large degree at least.
Now you rightly point out that F. regarded truth as an effect of power,
indeed this is so, but as I read it a) he is talking precisely about
episemological truth, b) he does not imply that all things which are
called 'truths' have equal value, he clearly priveleges critical and
scientific reason over other approaches, and c) following on from this,
to take one example, F. is fairly clear in OT that he does not think
that the human sciences are all bogus and have no 'scientific'
credibility whatsoever, he is I think trying to destabilise them in a
much more general way. Although still skeptical, even Habermas
conceded, in the final instance, that F was an Enlightenment thinker in
the Kantian tradition ('Taking aim at the heart of the present').
So why is there no recognition of this or discussion of ontological
truth in Foucault? Well, I'll resist the temptation to say it was
irrelevant, for me, I take F's silence on this to be borne out of the
futility of it as an enterprise, ontology is doomed to epistemology in
the very act of speaking about it. So, for instance, whilst other
critiques of psychiatry have fallen away, since they essentially tried
to deny the 'reality' of mental illness but were faced with increasing
evidence, e.g. from genetics, F's critique remains powerful since it
does not amount to saying, 'the _truths_ of psychiatry are nothing but
fabrications', instead he is saying that 'this particular arrangement of
knowledge and power does not follow as an inevitable consequence of
these facts'. Of course, this is a gross simplification, but the point
I am making is that F is not committed to denying the ontological basis
of discourse in order to undermine it. For this reason, F. is able, for
instance, to treat statements themselves as 'facts' and 'events', in a
way which implicitly accept their ontological reality.
Best wishes
Murray
=================================
Murray K. Simpson,
Department of Social Work,
Frankland Building,
The University of Dundee,
Dundee DD1 4HN,
United Kingdom.
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/SocialWork/mainpage.htm
tel. 01382 344948
fax. 01382 221512
e.mail m.k.simpson@xxxxxxxxxxxx
possibly a deeper issue behind much of this discussion, and I think
certainly between the disagreements between Colin and myself. This is
the question of 'truth' to which Colin has drawn attention. I was
struck by a post you made a couple of days ago, sorry I'm only just
responding, which led me to think that we have radically different views
of Foucault. You said,
> Let me
> be clear, I chracterise my metaphysical position as: ontologically realist,
> epistemologically relativist (in the sense that I accept that all beliefs
> and truth claims are socially embedded), and jugementally rationalist.
Now I do not see this as being radically different from Foucault's
position and in this respect I side with those who do not regard
Foucault as a post-modernist, indeed I would share many of Colin's
concerns expressed about Foucault but in relation to post-modernists. I
may be wrong, but it seems to me, Colin, that you are situating F in
this camp, to a large degree at least.
Now you rightly point out that F. regarded truth as an effect of power,
indeed this is so, but as I read it a) he is talking precisely about
episemological truth, b) he does not imply that all things which are
called 'truths' have equal value, he clearly priveleges critical and
scientific reason over other approaches, and c) following on from this,
to take one example, F. is fairly clear in OT that he does not think
that the human sciences are all bogus and have no 'scientific'
credibility whatsoever, he is I think trying to destabilise them in a
much more general way. Although still skeptical, even Habermas
conceded, in the final instance, that F was an Enlightenment thinker in
the Kantian tradition ('Taking aim at the heart of the present').
So why is there no recognition of this or discussion of ontological
truth in Foucault? Well, I'll resist the temptation to say it was
irrelevant, for me, I take F's silence on this to be borne out of the
futility of it as an enterprise, ontology is doomed to epistemology in
the very act of speaking about it. So, for instance, whilst other
critiques of psychiatry have fallen away, since they essentially tried
to deny the 'reality' of mental illness but were faced with increasing
evidence, e.g. from genetics, F's critique remains powerful since it
does not amount to saying, 'the _truths_ of psychiatry are nothing but
fabrications', instead he is saying that 'this particular arrangement of
knowledge and power does not follow as an inevitable consequence of
these facts'. Of course, this is a gross simplification, but the point
I am making is that F is not committed to denying the ontological basis
of discourse in order to undermine it. For this reason, F. is able, for
instance, to treat statements themselves as 'facts' and 'events', in a
way which implicitly accept their ontological reality.
Best wishes
Murray
=================================
Murray K. Simpson,
Department of Social Work,
Frankland Building,
The University of Dundee,
Dundee DD1 4HN,
United Kingdom.
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/SocialWork/mainpage.htm
tel. 01382 344948
fax. 01382 221512
e.mail m.k.simpson@xxxxxxxxxxxx