On Fri, 23 May 1997, COLIN WIGHT wrote:
[much snipped . . .]
> [Murray said]
> , but the point
> >I am making is that F is not committed to denying the ontological basis
> >of discourse in order to undermine it.
>
> Yes, but you see, as far as I read him this is an empty realism, a
> superficial sop to avoid the charge of idealism. What role does the real,
> considered as mind independent reality (I accept that this formulation may
> be too strong in the social world, but would still argue that the
> preexistence of the social world prior to our birth enables talk of relative
> independece from any particular interpretation of it), play shaping our
> discourses?
>
This question is completely irrelevant to a Foucauldian analysis.
Foucault is not trying to be a philosopher arguing for idealism or
materialism; he is primarily a historian noting how discourse is
embedded in various social contexts, its uses, its effects. All
this has nothing to do with asking about the role of "the real"
on our use of language and discourse.
--A simple example. Imagine I want to do a Foucauldian analysis
of religious discourse and practice in a society that worships a
panopoly of deities. I study the religious texts, observe
religious practices, and note how discourse and practice weave
the panopoly of deities into mundane, everyday social existence;
how, in a social sense, the deities are made real to the people.
Now, in order to carry out this analysis, the ontological question
is irrelevant. Do the deities really exist or not? Are the
religious texts ontologically valid? These are interesting
theological questions, but they have nothing to do with
understanding the use of language and discourse in society.
Whether or not these deities "actually exist", certain discourses
must circulate, certain practices must be carried out, in order
for these deities to have role in this society.
And what is true of deities is true of anything: hysterical women,
sexual perverts, criminals, mental illness. Foucault's work is
not about how language masks, conceals, distorts reality; it is
about how circulation of discourse is necessary for anything to
be socially accepted as a truth. Again, this is a historical
or sociological question, and it has nothing to do with
philosophical arguments about the relation between language
and reality.
Miles Jackson
mjackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx