On Fri, 23 May 1997, COLIN WIGHT wrote (but first he quotes someone else):
> >But do the potential political repercussions lie solely with the
> >author? I
> >think Foucault was acknowledging that the function of the author could not
> >have total control of the life of the interpretations of the work.
>
> Oh I would absolutely agree. I, for example, cannot be held totally
> responsible, if (as some have done) people on the list interpret my
> questioning as "smashing" or "disrupting". But the point for me is that some
> level of responsibility does lie with me and I accept it. Yes I acknowledge
> that sometimes my posts are over polemical, absurd, and partially
> incoherent. sometimes this is deliberate, sometime unintentional. Equally,
> however, I don't think we would want to get into a situation where we allow
> people to produce a pamphlet full of racist slogans and Fascist images and
> then allow them to turn round and say "that's your interpretation of it!".
> So for me it is a two way process, texts need writers and an audience.
>
> >The way I read F is that one must write
> >despite the possible appropriation of one's words beyond the author's
> >intentions. I don't find that irresponsible. Can you hold Hegel or Marx
> >responsible for Stalin? If anything I would say that the responsibility
> >lies with the reader of the text.
>
> I think here, you might be glossing over some fundamental points. The work
> of Heiddegger, for example, did not simply get appropriated by fascists and
> indeed perhaps his political beliefs were a motivating factor in his
> philosophy, De Man, of course has the same problem. Nietzsche, although
> never directly espousing fascism (temporally, of course, this was not
> possible), did provide much that licenses such a form of politics. And I
> find all that stuff about supermen deeply offensive and his misogny really
> troubles me.
Do you feel the same way about Hobbes? I mean, why not just say there's a
straight line from Hobbes' notion of the 'Leviathan' as an all-powerful
ruler second only to God to Hitler's idea of the Feuhrer principle? Or
does Hobbes get a free pass because he's from Great Britain while
Nietzsche and Heidegger get blamed for the twentieth century?
> Now, I am not saying that we should stop reading these people,
> but that, yes they themselves are indeed partially responsible for the way
> they have been appropriated, because certainly in Nietzsche's case he was
> very elitist (not _read_ this way this is what he actually meant) and
> dismissive of the herd. So I don't really like Nietzsche, not simply the use
> to which his work has been out, although that doesn't mean I havent used him
> at times.
Do you feel the same way about Mill? His _Representative Government_ is
very elitist and dismissive of the herd, though he doesn't use that term;
I won't even bring up _On Liberty_; that would be a cheap shot.
>
> >I hesitate to say this, because it seems I'm conceding to your point, but I
> >don't think he would act any differently than you or I or any other
> >rational person in contemporary society. But he doesn't need his work to
> >inform him of that.
>
>
> You see I still think you are misunderstanding me here. I am not saying that
> he needs his work to inform him. My point is much more fundamental. That is,
> if we, or he, really took his work seriously then he would never act,
> because there are no grounds for action, but rather plenty of grounds for
> inaction. So as I have already stated, when Foucaults acts he only acts by
> becoming not-Foucault.
What's wrong with the response that you put too much emphasis on a certain
kind of "grounds"? Why is it impossible to act if one does not have a
full-blown set of normative criteria? There are all sorts of other bases
on which to act and respond than normative ones.
> >Where have you read that for Foucault the background is to be constructed?
> >I read him as explicating the background, although realising, following
> >Heidegger, that the background can never be fully articulable. And yes, I
> >read some Marx in his work as well, though I wouldn't call it Marxist.
>
> Well the first question relates to my reading of Foucault as a discursive
> idealist. If this reading is simply incorrect could someone please coorect
> me with references. Now of course, discursive idealism, like any form of
> idealism, hits a major problem. If discourses construct their objects what
> constructs the discourses. At this point Hegelian idealism goes mystical,
> Berkelyian Idealism gets theistic, I simply wonder what Foucault does, how
> does he explain the fact of object producing discourse, apart form other
> discourses ad infinitum (in effect a viscious regress, with that which must
> be explained being used to explian itself)? If he makes the move that there
> is an ontological realm independent of discourse, then why does he not
> accept that this may place strategic limits on our constructions of it? It
> seems to me that foucault is very, very close to Rorty's position wherein
> there are simply no non-linguistic constraints on how we talk about the
> world. If I am wrong about this please correct me, because there is much in
> foucault I like, but deep metaphysical disagreements (and, of course, I hate
> his latent Hobbesianism: war of all against all etc. Power is everywhere. A
> joke, by the way. If as Foucault says power is everywhere, why do I still
> have to pay my electricity bills?).
I'm not sure I understand the problem. Please clarify if you feel like it.
I think you are too taken with these infinite regress arguments and I
don't understand what it is about them that persuades you of things. You
ask, "If discourses construct their objects what constructs the
discourses." In the real world, don't these things interact with one
another? For instance, the psychiatrist comes up with a line on what
characterizes and makes up the serial killer; people who kill people
consecutively start to act like serial killers; judges and juries start
treating them like serial killers; institutions are set up to house and
treat or dispense with serial killers. All this feeds back and informs the
original discourse of the psychiatrist concerning serial killers. Power
and knowledge make up a "circuit." Power from one angle is knowledge from
another; and vice versa.
Foucualt says power is everywhere. But remember: Foucault is not a member
of the Frankfurt School. He is not trying to describe a closed,
administered, dark world of oppression. He is not trying to be the French
version of Max Weber, telling us about some iron cage. Of course, all this
is covered in my book!
>
>
> And yes I agree, this is often more Marx in there than people care to admit.
>
>
> >Are you saying that he cannot avoid the role of "traditional intellectual"
> >even when he pronounces otherwise?
>
> Yes, I suppose that is exactly my point. Here I think your argument about
> not being totally in control is apt. Intellectuals play a specific role
> independent of what they think their role is. They are simply not totally,
> although not totally not as well, in control of their role.
I agree, but can't one come to the conclusion that "epochally" the old way
of thinking about the intellectual as guarantor of moral choices is one
that is not so much wrong as out of date?
> >Like I said above, you don't need a moral
> >philosophy in order to act morally.
>
> Then how would such action be possible. Without such a philosophy how could
> you distinguish a moral act form an immoral one? Look I too am against
> formalism in ethics of the Kantian categorical imperative form or
> consequentialism, my point is that morality is only possible if orientated
> to a moral subject. Would it be moral to prefer the destruction of the world
> to one's own little finger as Hume put it somewhere. If not why not, what is
> the moral subject in such a decision, the enviroment or humanity?
Take a decision like, "I will not cheat on my wife." You can justify that
decision with moral arguments, right? Namely, I have made certain promises
and I will execute promises that I have made that were voluntary, etc. But
you can also ground it on sort of utilitarian arguments, right? "I will
not cheat on my wife because despite the pleasure I would enjoy from
extra-marital sexual acts, such activity threatens the marital bond and I
gain more long-term, surer pleasure through maintaining the marital bond."
Or one can adopt an ethical line: "I will not engage in extra-marital
affairs because such temptations are actually an attempt by one part of my
soul (the appetites) to dominate the rest of my soul, and as part of my
effort to create and sustain a life where such-and-such a harmony exists
within my soul, I will refrain from the pleasures associated with
extra-marital affairs."
These points are discussed in F's Introduction to _The Use of Pleasures_,
if anyone wants to check that out.
>
> >A
> >"Political Theorists like Walzer and Taylor think that Foucault's social
> >criticism tacitly presupposesthe ideals of freedom, truth, justice, and
> >progress that he discounts. Foucault's line of response has been the
> >indirect one of denying that he either is or needs to be a political
> >theorist.
>
> I simply find this naive, do you really find this a defence? I mean
> seriously, I am not having a go at you. He is a political theorist. I mean
> here his latent commitment to a very strange form of the fact/value
> distinction is bursting out.
I agree with Colin that F is a political theorist. He says, after all,
that in political theory we still need to cut off the king's head. That
and related points makes him at least a contributor to debates in
political theory.
--John
> >But do the potential political repercussions lie solely with the
> >author? I
> >think Foucault was acknowledging that the function of the author could not
> >have total control of the life of the interpretations of the work.
>
> Oh I would absolutely agree. I, for example, cannot be held totally
> responsible, if (as some have done) people on the list interpret my
> questioning as "smashing" or "disrupting". But the point for me is that some
> level of responsibility does lie with me and I accept it. Yes I acknowledge
> that sometimes my posts are over polemical, absurd, and partially
> incoherent. sometimes this is deliberate, sometime unintentional. Equally,
> however, I don't think we would want to get into a situation where we allow
> people to produce a pamphlet full of racist slogans and Fascist images and
> then allow them to turn round and say "that's your interpretation of it!".
> So for me it is a two way process, texts need writers and an audience.
>
> >The way I read F is that one must write
> >despite the possible appropriation of one's words beyond the author's
> >intentions. I don't find that irresponsible. Can you hold Hegel or Marx
> >responsible for Stalin? If anything I would say that the responsibility
> >lies with the reader of the text.
>
> I think here, you might be glossing over some fundamental points. The work
> of Heiddegger, for example, did not simply get appropriated by fascists and
> indeed perhaps his political beliefs were a motivating factor in his
> philosophy, De Man, of course has the same problem. Nietzsche, although
> never directly espousing fascism (temporally, of course, this was not
> possible), did provide much that licenses such a form of politics. And I
> find all that stuff about supermen deeply offensive and his misogny really
> troubles me.
Do you feel the same way about Hobbes? I mean, why not just say there's a
straight line from Hobbes' notion of the 'Leviathan' as an all-powerful
ruler second only to God to Hitler's idea of the Feuhrer principle? Or
does Hobbes get a free pass because he's from Great Britain while
Nietzsche and Heidegger get blamed for the twentieth century?
> Now, I am not saying that we should stop reading these people,
> but that, yes they themselves are indeed partially responsible for the way
> they have been appropriated, because certainly in Nietzsche's case he was
> very elitist (not _read_ this way this is what he actually meant) and
> dismissive of the herd. So I don't really like Nietzsche, not simply the use
> to which his work has been out, although that doesn't mean I havent used him
> at times.
Do you feel the same way about Mill? His _Representative Government_ is
very elitist and dismissive of the herd, though he doesn't use that term;
I won't even bring up _On Liberty_; that would be a cheap shot.
>
> >I hesitate to say this, because it seems I'm conceding to your point, but I
> >don't think he would act any differently than you or I or any other
> >rational person in contemporary society. But he doesn't need his work to
> >inform him of that.
>
>
> You see I still think you are misunderstanding me here. I am not saying that
> he needs his work to inform him. My point is much more fundamental. That is,
> if we, or he, really took his work seriously then he would never act,
> because there are no grounds for action, but rather plenty of grounds for
> inaction. So as I have already stated, when Foucaults acts he only acts by
> becoming not-Foucault.
What's wrong with the response that you put too much emphasis on a certain
kind of "grounds"? Why is it impossible to act if one does not have a
full-blown set of normative criteria? There are all sorts of other bases
on which to act and respond than normative ones.
> >Where have you read that for Foucault the background is to be constructed?
> >I read him as explicating the background, although realising, following
> >Heidegger, that the background can never be fully articulable. And yes, I
> >read some Marx in his work as well, though I wouldn't call it Marxist.
>
> Well the first question relates to my reading of Foucault as a discursive
> idealist. If this reading is simply incorrect could someone please coorect
> me with references. Now of course, discursive idealism, like any form of
> idealism, hits a major problem. If discourses construct their objects what
> constructs the discourses. At this point Hegelian idealism goes mystical,
> Berkelyian Idealism gets theistic, I simply wonder what Foucault does, how
> does he explain the fact of object producing discourse, apart form other
> discourses ad infinitum (in effect a viscious regress, with that which must
> be explained being used to explian itself)? If he makes the move that there
> is an ontological realm independent of discourse, then why does he not
> accept that this may place strategic limits on our constructions of it? It
> seems to me that foucault is very, very close to Rorty's position wherein
> there are simply no non-linguistic constraints on how we talk about the
> world. If I am wrong about this please correct me, because there is much in
> foucault I like, but deep metaphysical disagreements (and, of course, I hate
> his latent Hobbesianism: war of all against all etc. Power is everywhere. A
> joke, by the way. If as Foucault says power is everywhere, why do I still
> have to pay my electricity bills?).
I'm not sure I understand the problem. Please clarify if you feel like it.
I think you are too taken with these infinite regress arguments and I
don't understand what it is about them that persuades you of things. You
ask, "If discourses construct their objects what constructs the
discourses." In the real world, don't these things interact with one
another? For instance, the psychiatrist comes up with a line on what
characterizes and makes up the serial killer; people who kill people
consecutively start to act like serial killers; judges and juries start
treating them like serial killers; institutions are set up to house and
treat or dispense with serial killers. All this feeds back and informs the
original discourse of the psychiatrist concerning serial killers. Power
and knowledge make up a "circuit." Power from one angle is knowledge from
another; and vice versa.
Foucualt says power is everywhere. But remember: Foucault is not a member
of the Frankfurt School. He is not trying to describe a closed,
administered, dark world of oppression. He is not trying to be the French
version of Max Weber, telling us about some iron cage. Of course, all this
is covered in my book!
>
>
> And yes I agree, this is often more Marx in there than people care to admit.
>
>
> >Are you saying that he cannot avoid the role of "traditional intellectual"
> >even when he pronounces otherwise?
>
> Yes, I suppose that is exactly my point. Here I think your argument about
> not being totally in control is apt. Intellectuals play a specific role
> independent of what they think their role is. They are simply not totally,
> although not totally not as well, in control of their role.
I agree, but can't one come to the conclusion that "epochally" the old way
of thinking about the intellectual as guarantor of moral choices is one
that is not so much wrong as out of date?
> >Like I said above, you don't need a moral
> >philosophy in order to act morally.
>
> Then how would such action be possible. Without such a philosophy how could
> you distinguish a moral act form an immoral one? Look I too am against
> formalism in ethics of the Kantian categorical imperative form or
> consequentialism, my point is that morality is only possible if orientated
> to a moral subject. Would it be moral to prefer the destruction of the world
> to one's own little finger as Hume put it somewhere. If not why not, what is
> the moral subject in such a decision, the enviroment or humanity?
Take a decision like, "I will not cheat on my wife." You can justify that
decision with moral arguments, right? Namely, I have made certain promises
and I will execute promises that I have made that were voluntary, etc. But
you can also ground it on sort of utilitarian arguments, right? "I will
not cheat on my wife because despite the pleasure I would enjoy from
extra-marital sexual acts, such activity threatens the marital bond and I
gain more long-term, surer pleasure through maintaining the marital bond."
Or one can adopt an ethical line: "I will not engage in extra-marital
affairs because such temptations are actually an attempt by one part of my
soul (the appetites) to dominate the rest of my soul, and as part of my
effort to create and sustain a life where such-and-such a harmony exists
within my soul, I will refrain from the pleasures associated with
extra-marital affairs."
These points are discussed in F's Introduction to _The Use of Pleasures_,
if anyone wants to check that out.
>
> >A
> >"Political Theorists like Walzer and Taylor think that Foucault's social
> >criticism tacitly presupposesthe ideals of freedom, truth, justice, and
> >progress that he discounts. Foucault's line of response has been the
> >indirect one of denying that he either is or needs to be a political
> >theorist.
>
> I simply find this naive, do you really find this a defence? I mean
> seriously, I am not having a go at you. He is a political theorist. I mean
> here his latent commitment to a very strange form of the fact/value
> distinction is bursting out.
I agree with Colin that F is a political theorist. He says, after all,
that in political theory we still need to cut off the king's head. That
and related points makes him at least a contributor to debates in
political theory.
--John