>
>I couldn't agree more. Except that I would add that characterizing it
>as a "power play" is also a power play.
Which of course is another power play ad infinitum. Why don't we just get
really intellectual here. You started this first. No I didn't. Yes you did.
NO I DIDN'T! DID. DIDN'T.........
>Moreover, I agree with Foucault that truth is only possible in
>contexts where power is being or has been excercized.
Back to square one I suppose. I don't even think this is the best, or only
reading of Foucualt's notion of truth. But if it is, does this mean that the
powerful possess the most truths? And if not why not?
In fact, I
>think that Foucault and others (notably Joseph Rouse) have shown
>convincingly that it is not possible even to believe anything outside
>of power relations, much less to say anything, and least of all to say
>anything that is true, outside of such relations.
Well then we are all finished then aren't we. Habermas has equally argued
that it is not possible to communicate such a thought without truth being
inscribed in the act of communication. Is this true, what would make it
true? Yes the social world is pervaded by power relations and yes truths are
constructed in virtue of them. But no, truth, ontological truth is not a
function of those power plays. Otherwise, you have elided the distinction
between lies and truth. After all, is anything that Foucault says true, and
if so, what makes it thus?
>To give two even more blatant examples: citing a passage from
>Foucault's work on a Foucault list is a power play, as is appealing to
>the name of Bertrand Russell.
This reminds me of the discussion we had on epistemic violence some time
ago. It seems to me that in both instances _some_ people were working with a
dreadfully undifferentiated notion of violence, then, and now power. After
all, there is a difference between the power play that denies a woman, or a
person of a certain colour a job because she is a woman, or they are
coloured, and that of throwing in an off-hand note from Russell. Anyway, is
what Russell says true, that's the real question? If you are going to call
everything a power-play then everything is ipso facto a power-play. Doesn't
help much though does it?
>
>Having said that, I want to address the unsubstantiated implication
>that there was something wrong with me using the phrase "vulgar
>realism." First of all, the phrase "vulgar realism", far from
>implying that all realism must be "vulgar," implies the opposite: that
>there are distinctions to be made between the sort of realism (the
>vulgar sort) that some people who identify with the Anti-postmodernism
>Industry have been known to disseminate, and other (more nuanced and
>plausible) sorts of realism.
Oh good, but again I think you are again guilty of overextending, are all
realist critics of postmodernism vulgar realists? I mean look, Foucault
(yes, yes, it is a power play) when asked about postmodernism basically said
that yes Habermas was right in a sense and that we cannot afford to give up
on rationality and of course he basically went on to reiterate the Kantian
point that this does not mean that we should never not be critical of
rationality (sorry about the double neg, hope it makes sense). I agree with
this, but the point is that we can be critical of rationality but we can't
do it by being irrational. That is we have no choice but to use our
rationality to critique our rationality and the uses to which it is put.
>
>It in defense of the more plausible, less superstitious forms of
>realism that I insist on exposing vulgar realism for what it is:
>vulgar.
And where does that leave me in your opinion?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
>I couldn't agree more. Except that I would add that characterizing it
>as a "power play" is also a power play.
Which of course is another power play ad infinitum. Why don't we just get
really intellectual here. You started this first. No I didn't. Yes you did.
NO I DIDN'T! DID. DIDN'T.........
>Moreover, I agree with Foucault that truth is only possible in
>contexts where power is being or has been excercized.
Back to square one I suppose. I don't even think this is the best, or only
reading of Foucualt's notion of truth. But if it is, does this mean that the
powerful possess the most truths? And if not why not?
In fact, I
>think that Foucault and others (notably Joseph Rouse) have shown
>convincingly that it is not possible even to believe anything outside
>of power relations, much less to say anything, and least of all to say
>anything that is true, outside of such relations.
Well then we are all finished then aren't we. Habermas has equally argued
that it is not possible to communicate such a thought without truth being
inscribed in the act of communication. Is this true, what would make it
true? Yes the social world is pervaded by power relations and yes truths are
constructed in virtue of them. But no, truth, ontological truth is not a
function of those power plays. Otherwise, you have elided the distinction
between lies and truth. After all, is anything that Foucault says true, and
if so, what makes it thus?
>To give two even more blatant examples: citing a passage from
>Foucault's work on a Foucault list is a power play, as is appealing to
>the name of Bertrand Russell.
This reminds me of the discussion we had on epistemic violence some time
ago. It seems to me that in both instances _some_ people were working with a
dreadfully undifferentiated notion of violence, then, and now power. After
all, there is a difference between the power play that denies a woman, or a
person of a certain colour a job because she is a woman, or they are
coloured, and that of throwing in an off-hand note from Russell. Anyway, is
what Russell says true, that's the real question? If you are going to call
everything a power-play then everything is ipso facto a power-play. Doesn't
help much though does it?
>
>Having said that, I want to address the unsubstantiated implication
>that there was something wrong with me using the phrase "vulgar
>realism." First of all, the phrase "vulgar realism", far from
>implying that all realism must be "vulgar," implies the opposite: that
>there are distinctions to be made between the sort of realism (the
>vulgar sort) that some people who identify with the Anti-postmodernism
>Industry have been known to disseminate, and other (more nuanced and
>plausible) sorts of realism.
Oh good, but again I think you are again guilty of overextending, are all
realist critics of postmodernism vulgar realists? I mean look, Foucault
(yes, yes, it is a power play) when asked about postmodernism basically said
that yes Habermas was right in a sense and that we cannot afford to give up
on rationality and of course he basically went on to reiterate the Kantian
point that this does not mean that we should never not be critical of
rationality (sorry about the double neg, hope it makes sense). I agree with
this, but the point is that we can be critical of rationality but we can't
do it by being irrational. That is we have no choice but to use our
rationality to critique our rationality and the uses to which it is put.
>
>It in defense of the more plausible, less superstitious forms of
>realism that I insist on exposing vulgar realism for what it is:
>vulgar.
And where does that leave me in your opinion?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------