5/30/97 9:21 am: COLIN WIGHT writes...
>My point was that I did indeed
>read Steve as being 'vulgar', in the sense of presenting a one-dimensional
>view of realism. So in that sense my awful caricature was constructed t
>object to the 'vulgar construction of vulgar realism'.
Ah, yes, I see your point here, and I should apologize for responding to
your first post somewhat out of context. I must admit that I find the
discussion of truth a bit misplaced in the context of Foucault's writings
(i.e. we end up asking questions that a close reading of Foucault might
lead us to resist asking), but that's a much longer argument that I don't
have the time to try to make in any adequate sense.
While we clearly disagree about the relevance of truth as an ontic
question, I completely concur with you on "the vulgar construction of
vulgar realism." For example (and see below), I take Habermas to espouse
a sort of realism that I would wish (taking a Foucaultian line of
argument) to dispute as forcefully as possible. Nonetheless, I can't
possibly see how one could successfully argue that Habermas is a "vulgar
realist." Habermas, relying on Peirce, directly rejects the idea of a
correspondence theory of truth. He argues instead (at least in the
intersubjective realm of moral relationships) for validity claims: "A
validity claim says that that the conditions of validity [i.e. its truth
value] of an utterance...are satisfied, something that cannot be shown by
direct appeal to decisive evidence but only through discursive redemption
of the claim to the propositional truth or normative rightness" ("Remarks
on Discourse Ethics," in _Justification and Application_, p. 29).
>>
>>I don't read Foucault's works (or anyone else's for that matter) in order
>>to "confirm my own world view"--just the opposite in fact. The
>>historical sense that Foucault develops from Nietzsche is what makes it
>>possible to render our own worldview contingent; it therefore creates the
>>conditions for change--in the way we think, act, write. Whether we want
>>to defend or criticize Foucault's positions (and there are more than one
>>of them), doesn't his writing at least give us this ability to think
>>differently.
>
>Yes, absolutely, in fact it demands it. But I have to admit, and again this
>is a personal opinion, that I often get the impression that many readers of
>Foucault are not critical readers of Foucault. Now it may be the case that
>any writer (i hesitate to use the word philosopher here out of respect for
>Foucault's own anguished search to find a label for his work) is susceptible
>to this form of reading, but that doesn't negate that fact that we should be
>wary of this when it occurs.
Fair enough--and I couldn't agree more with your choice of words, "it
*demands* it"--but my personal opinion is that many critics of Foucault
don't read him very closely or carefully and that many people who read
those criticisms (YES, I have Habermas as a reader of Foucault and
readers of Habermas in mind here) aren't very critical in their
assessments. So, I'll grant you this: we *should* be wary of uncritical
readers of Foucault. But, maybe you'll grant me this: we *should* also
be wary of uncritical readers of Habermas who never even read Foucault
because they simply assume that Habermas' critique of Foucault is on the
mark.
And here I would invoke John Ransom's recent post; Habermas has turned
into a German Rawls and anachronistically this is Kant. Moreover, (and
here I simply state an argument that would be difficult and timely,
though nevertheless possible, to demonstrate) Habermas' completely
misreads Foucault--substituting POWER for Foucault's discursive
understanding of the relation of power/knowledge and then using this
substitution as a weapon against Foucault. But I digress.
The point of the digression is that "Foucaultians" can't just reject
Habermas because he fits into the category of a "vulgar realist.
Similarly, "Habermasians" can't just dismiss Foucault because (as
Habermas says) he's a conservative postmodern who rejects (following
Nietzsche) truth and all possible forms of modern rationality.
If there's an answer to any of this it lies in careful, close reading;
something, of course, quite difficult to do on-line.
>Thanks, for your comments, which I found even-handed and consistent, even if
>we may disagree on fundamentals.
>
Thank you for the same treatment (possibly more so)..
--Sam
>My point was that I did indeed
>read Steve as being 'vulgar', in the sense of presenting a one-dimensional
>view of realism. So in that sense my awful caricature was constructed t
>object to the 'vulgar construction of vulgar realism'.
Ah, yes, I see your point here, and I should apologize for responding to
your first post somewhat out of context. I must admit that I find the
discussion of truth a bit misplaced in the context of Foucault's writings
(i.e. we end up asking questions that a close reading of Foucault might
lead us to resist asking), but that's a much longer argument that I don't
have the time to try to make in any adequate sense.
While we clearly disagree about the relevance of truth as an ontic
question, I completely concur with you on "the vulgar construction of
vulgar realism." For example (and see below), I take Habermas to espouse
a sort of realism that I would wish (taking a Foucaultian line of
argument) to dispute as forcefully as possible. Nonetheless, I can't
possibly see how one could successfully argue that Habermas is a "vulgar
realist." Habermas, relying on Peirce, directly rejects the idea of a
correspondence theory of truth. He argues instead (at least in the
intersubjective realm of moral relationships) for validity claims: "A
validity claim says that that the conditions of validity [i.e. its truth
value] of an utterance...are satisfied, something that cannot be shown by
direct appeal to decisive evidence but only through discursive redemption
of the claim to the propositional truth or normative rightness" ("Remarks
on Discourse Ethics," in _Justification and Application_, p. 29).
>>
>>I don't read Foucault's works (or anyone else's for that matter) in order
>>to "confirm my own world view"--just the opposite in fact. The
>>historical sense that Foucault develops from Nietzsche is what makes it
>>possible to render our own worldview contingent; it therefore creates the
>>conditions for change--in the way we think, act, write. Whether we want
>>to defend or criticize Foucault's positions (and there are more than one
>>of them), doesn't his writing at least give us this ability to think
>>differently.
>
>Yes, absolutely, in fact it demands it. But I have to admit, and again this
>is a personal opinion, that I often get the impression that many readers of
>Foucault are not critical readers of Foucault. Now it may be the case that
>any writer (i hesitate to use the word philosopher here out of respect for
>Foucault's own anguished search to find a label for his work) is susceptible
>to this form of reading, but that doesn't negate that fact that we should be
>wary of this when it occurs.
Fair enough--and I couldn't agree more with your choice of words, "it
*demands* it"--but my personal opinion is that many critics of Foucault
don't read him very closely or carefully and that many people who read
those criticisms (YES, I have Habermas as a reader of Foucault and
readers of Habermas in mind here) aren't very critical in their
assessments. So, I'll grant you this: we *should* be wary of uncritical
readers of Foucault. But, maybe you'll grant me this: we *should* also
be wary of uncritical readers of Habermas who never even read Foucault
because they simply assume that Habermas' critique of Foucault is on the
mark.
And here I would invoke John Ransom's recent post; Habermas has turned
into a German Rawls and anachronistically this is Kant. Moreover, (and
here I simply state an argument that would be difficult and timely,
though nevertheless possible, to demonstrate) Habermas' completely
misreads Foucault--substituting POWER for Foucault's discursive
understanding of the relation of power/knowledge and then using this
substitution as a weapon against Foucault. But I digress.
The point of the digression is that "Foucaultians" can't just reject
Habermas because he fits into the category of a "vulgar realist.
Similarly, "Habermasians" can't just dismiss Foucault because (as
Habermas says) he's a conservative postmodern who rejects (following
Nietzsche) truth and all possible forms of modern rationality.
If there's an answer to any of this it lies in careful, close reading;
something, of course, quite difficult to do on-line.
>Thanks, for your comments, which I found even-handed and consistent, even if
>we may disagree on fundamentals.
>
Thank you for the same treatment (possibly more so)..
--Sam