On Sat, 31 May 1997, COLIN WIGHT wrote:
> You see I think that at one very fundamental level you are doing something
> very un-Foucaultian here. You keep introducing examples of objects that may
> or may not be socially constructed. I have no problem in agreeing with such
> arguments, even though I might disagree with the substantive points. My
> point is that not everything, and certainly not every truth is socially
> constucted, unless by truth you simply mean one side of the ontology
> epistemology relationship. Foucault himself had no problem accepting that
> his work could say nothing about the so called natural sciences and in my
> opinion thye illicit extension of his work is a particularly crude (soory I
> couldn't think of a better word) form of totalisation.
The question is, where is reality's "floor." That is, at what point do we
stop encountering socially produced truths and start going up against
truths that exist "no matter what," regardless of social context. Your
oft-cited example of the latter is gravity. My oft-used example of the
former (socially produced truths) is homosexuals. Perhaps we can think of
reality and its relation to human cognition and production in terms of a
continuum?
gravity homosexual
|------------------------------------------------------------------|
"no matter what" truths socially produced truths
One of the impressions I have from your posts, Colin, is that while you
are willing to admit (as above) that lots of truths are socially produced,
you become abusive and dismissive (which is fine; I'm not complaining)
when postmodernists try to trace out the twists and turns of
truth-production. And I don't understand -- not that you owe anyone an
explanation -- why after granting a point that after all has been
primarily established and popularized for by postmodernists (namely, the
social construction of all sorts of truths) you dismiss them so
contemptuously.
The relevant question probably isn't: Do you think there's a real world
which exists no matter what, no matter how you interpret it? The question
rather is: where on the continuum above do we roughly locate the dividing
line (if we grant there is one) between socially constructed and
no-matter-what truths?
I would put my line pretty far to the left of the continuum. The truths
that are manifestly socially produced -- such as, "it is true that human
beings are greedy and selfish and self-interested" -- poses a problem, I
take it, for neither of us, nor for the rest of the postmodern world you
so wantonly ridicule. And I completely agree with you that Foucault is
much more concerned with the mid-point of the continuum and continuing on
to the right. Foucault is not trying to get us to question the existence
of gravity; he, I completely admit, could not care less about how long
animals sleep each day, and so on.
But I am also taken by Nietzsche's argument (and Kant's; at least for the
first point) that the natural world is (1) organized by restricted and
specific kinds of human perception that do not and cannot encompass all of
reality; (2) often *re*-organized and "re-perceived" in line with paradigm
shifts we are familiar with from the history of science. Thus, to talk of
a "reality" existing independent of the "mind" is genuinely misleading,
and would lead (and has led) practitioners of both the social and natural
sciences down dead ends.
>
> >
> >
> >No doubt, the powerful possess and create lots of truths. These
> >truths then get challenged, rearranged, re-"coded," submitted to,
> >and so on, by people subjected to them. Power and the truths associated
> >with them "circulate."
>
> Yes, maybe, but if truth(epistemologically) is a function of power then only
> those with power can get their truths (epist) accepted. The picture you
> present above is a very good rationalist model of knowledge contestation.
> Nobody doubts this. Truth is not self evident and hence has to be fought
> for, but some truths, like the existence of gravity seem indeed to hit you
> in the face, and i doubt very much that even the most powerful would ever be
> able to get around this. I don't doubt however, that our understandings of
> gravity will change and that we may come to rescribe it in very interesting
> ways (I accept the fallibility of all knowledge, but this is only
> sustainable on a realist metaphysics), what i do doubt is that the force
> that attracts will change with our descriptions.
But Colin, if we stop *describing* it as "the force that attracts" and
instead describe it as "the ether that connects all" or "the repulsion
that keeps everything in harmony" won't our picture of reality change and
thus the truth about that reality change? Because we won't say anymore
"this is the force that attracts." Instead we say "this is the ether that
connects." Those two descriptions of the "same" force make it out to be
very different kinds of forces!
> After all, lets hope not
> anyway, for on current evidence if it did we wouldn't enjoy the luxury of
> being around to redescribe it.
>
> >Here's an example: (I won't use my cat as an example, because I know there
> >are some people on this list with an irrational hatred of cats.) The
> >psycho-normative-institutional circuit of power-knowledge, at a certain
> >point, says: "Here's what a homosexual person is like: a certain set of
> >voice patterns, hand gestures, this and that psychological profile." That
> >is a truth, but a "produced" truth.
>
> Of course it is not, it is an imposed description of a a certain group of
> people, but it is not true. I have many homosexual friends who do not behave
> in this manner.
I'm talking about the hey-day (hay day?) of psycho-normative disciplinary
creation of homosexuality, not today.
>
> It's produced in the sense that a
> >determinate P/K circuit came up with it. It's true in the sense that it
> >does "correspond" to the behavior of significant numbers of individuals.
>
> Yes but the claim is not about significant numbers, it is a truth claim
> about homosexual persons.
Yes, and of course what the power-knowledge circuit then does is do its
best to get everyone to act according to the model, treating variations as
interesting and illuminating but maintaining and attempting to impress on
others the model.
>
> >nontrivially and usefully true (where "true" in this context means "an
> >account of the phenomena productive of rich insights into their features
> >and dynamics")
>
> Well i certainly liked this last point, because it implies a non-negotiable
> commitment to a realist metaphysics: account of the phenomena...their
> features (note not their decribed features). Actulayy I have a theory that
> all forms of idealsim secrete an unthematised realist ontology, and
> generally its an empiricist one.
>
>
> >I don't see why we're finished. Finished doing what? Certainly not
> >finished criticizing, fighting back, agreeing, negotiating -- everything
> >we've done before, we can do now!
>
> Sorry, John, fight for what? Although, the fighting bit is quite striking
> because as far as I can see that is exactly the politics Foucauklt
> advocates: Machivellian, Hobbesian, Kissingerian power politics. If power is
> a necessary condition of possibilty for truth go Real Politik. Problem is,
> we have played this game for centuries. Some of us doubt there is anything
> new here.
People can fight for whatever they want to fight for. If "Real Politik"
means "assessments of and plans for engaging a power-knowledge cathexis,"
then yeah, people should do that, centuries or no centuries.
>
> >
> >Is it possible that we're miscommunicating over the word "ontological"?
> >(Or perhaps this is just my problem.)
>
> This could well be the problem.
>
> >
> >You say that if ontological truth is merely a function of power plays, we
> >will elide the distinction between lies and truth. But notice with the
> >example of the treatment of the homosexual: the battle there isn't between
> >lies and truth. And the fact that the battle there isn't between lies and
> >truth does not lead, as a consequence, to no one being able to say
> >anything critical or do anything oppositional.
>
> But the battle could well have been descxribed as one between lies and
> truth. After, all the powerful have often good reason to present a lie as a
> truth. But what makes it either. And certainly if you want to keep
> homosexuals out of certain parts of society, the Army for example, it is a
> useful weapon to describe them as effeminate and present this as a 'truth'.
That's exactly correct. Truth as a useful weapon. We need to get more Real
Politik about truth. Again, you combine granting huge areas of the
postmodern argument -- areas that would not have been conqeured without
the work of legions of intellectuals in and out of the academy -- with a
dismissive attitude towards it.
> >>
> >> Oh good, but again I think you are again guilty of overextending, are all
> >> realist critics of postmodernism vulgar realists?
> >
> >I must tell you honestly, they all read pretty vulgar to me.
>
> And I must be equally honest and tell you that many, well most, postmoderns
> actually look pretty silly, absurd even. But I don't worry about this
> because eventually they all get serious and have to deal with their
> absurdities. Even good old Stanley Fish has not had to admit that yes there
> is a mind-independent reality.
But it ill-becomes someone who grants so much of the postmodernist
argument to claim that "most postmoderns actually look pretty silly and
absurd."
>
>
> >Have you noticed that Habermas has completely given up on a radical
> >critique of Western society? He's basically turned himself into a German
> >Rawls. And I know there are a lot of people who will say, "Well, if
> >Habermas has managed that, good for him! 'Bout time!" But for me, this
> >turn toward liberalism in Continental thought by one of its most starred
> >representatives reveals the futility of a reliance on the opposition
> >between "truth" and "falsity" for critical thought.
>
> I have written on Habermas's recent work, and your reading is simply not
> correct, or should I say true. Interesting point here is I can marshall
> textual support to prove your assertion false. You in denying the
> distinction seem to have nowhere to go for support apart from a rampant
> subjectivism. The world, much like Habermas's writings I presume are simply
> as you say they are.
In fact, we are both on that continuum mentioned above. You may be located
a little more to the right of center and I may be located somewhere
further to the left of center, but our joint position on this continuum
makes your sarcastic dismissals ring hollow. In fact, we are both willing
to admit (and have agreed) that some truths are socially produced. This
is, you know, a fairly recent development -- one which we owe to
postmodernists and others (such as historians of science). You want to
take everyone who says "truth is constructed" and put them on Ridiculous
Island, where people say things like: "I construct all truth with my mind;
therefore, I will stand in front of this oncoming vehicle and simply make
it not true that being hit by an oncoming vehicle will harm me."
> If this is indeed your position no wonder the realist
> critics of postmodernism have to get vulgar, after all what they are
> attacking would be rejected by my four year old. But, of course, I am sure
> your postmodern hubris will find this no problem. After all, you know the
> truth about truth and my four year old is simply wrong.
Well, I don't know. What does your four year old say about gravity?
--John
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> -----
>
> Colin Wight
> Department of International Politics
> University of Wales, Aberystwyth
> Aberystwyth
> SY23 3DA
>
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
> You see I think that at one very fundamental level you are doing something
> very un-Foucaultian here. You keep introducing examples of objects that may
> or may not be socially constructed. I have no problem in agreeing with such
> arguments, even though I might disagree with the substantive points. My
> point is that not everything, and certainly not every truth is socially
> constucted, unless by truth you simply mean one side of the ontology
> epistemology relationship. Foucault himself had no problem accepting that
> his work could say nothing about the so called natural sciences and in my
> opinion thye illicit extension of his work is a particularly crude (soory I
> couldn't think of a better word) form of totalisation.
The question is, where is reality's "floor." That is, at what point do we
stop encountering socially produced truths and start going up against
truths that exist "no matter what," regardless of social context. Your
oft-cited example of the latter is gravity. My oft-used example of the
former (socially produced truths) is homosexuals. Perhaps we can think of
reality and its relation to human cognition and production in terms of a
continuum?
gravity homosexual
|------------------------------------------------------------------|
"no matter what" truths socially produced truths
One of the impressions I have from your posts, Colin, is that while you
are willing to admit (as above) that lots of truths are socially produced,
you become abusive and dismissive (which is fine; I'm not complaining)
when postmodernists try to trace out the twists and turns of
truth-production. And I don't understand -- not that you owe anyone an
explanation -- why after granting a point that after all has been
primarily established and popularized for by postmodernists (namely, the
social construction of all sorts of truths) you dismiss them so
contemptuously.
The relevant question probably isn't: Do you think there's a real world
which exists no matter what, no matter how you interpret it? The question
rather is: where on the continuum above do we roughly locate the dividing
line (if we grant there is one) between socially constructed and
no-matter-what truths?
I would put my line pretty far to the left of the continuum. The truths
that are manifestly socially produced -- such as, "it is true that human
beings are greedy and selfish and self-interested" -- poses a problem, I
take it, for neither of us, nor for the rest of the postmodern world you
so wantonly ridicule. And I completely agree with you that Foucault is
much more concerned with the mid-point of the continuum and continuing on
to the right. Foucault is not trying to get us to question the existence
of gravity; he, I completely admit, could not care less about how long
animals sleep each day, and so on.
But I am also taken by Nietzsche's argument (and Kant's; at least for the
first point) that the natural world is (1) organized by restricted and
specific kinds of human perception that do not and cannot encompass all of
reality; (2) often *re*-organized and "re-perceived" in line with paradigm
shifts we are familiar with from the history of science. Thus, to talk of
a "reality" existing independent of the "mind" is genuinely misleading,
and would lead (and has led) practitioners of both the social and natural
sciences down dead ends.
>
> >
> >
> >No doubt, the powerful possess and create lots of truths. These
> >truths then get challenged, rearranged, re-"coded," submitted to,
> >and so on, by people subjected to them. Power and the truths associated
> >with them "circulate."
>
> Yes, maybe, but if truth(epistemologically) is a function of power then only
> those with power can get their truths (epist) accepted. The picture you
> present above is a very good rationalist model of knowledge contestation.
> Nobody doubts this. Truth is not self evident and hence has to be fought
> for, but some truths, like the existence of gravity seem indeed to hit you
> in the face, and i doubt very much that even the most powerful would ever be
> able to get around this. I don't doubt however, that our understandings of
> gravity will change and that we may come to rescribe it in very interesting
> ways (I accept the fallibility of all knowledge, but this is only
> sustainable on a realist metaphysics), what i do doubt is that the force
> that attracts will change with our descriptions.
But Colin, if we stop *describing* it as "the force that attracts" and
instead describe it as "the ether that connects all" or "the repulsion
that keeps everything in harmony" won't our picture of reality change and
thus the truth about that reality change? Because we won't say anymore
"this is the force that attracts." Instead we say "this is the ether that
connects." Those two descriptions of the "same" force make it out to be
very different kinds of forces!
> After all, lets hope not
> anyway, for on current evidence if it did we wouldn't enjoy the luxury of
> being around to redescribe it.
>
> >Here's an example: (I won't use my cat as an example, because I know there
> >are some people on this list with an irrational hatred of cats.) The
> >psycho-normative-institutional circuit of power-knowledge, at a certain
> >point, says: "Here's what a homosexual person is like: a certain set of
> >voice patterns, hand gestures, this and that psychological profile." That
> >is a truth, but a "produced" truth.
>
> Of course it is not, it is an imposed description of a a certain group of
> people, but it is not true. I have many homosexual friends who do not behave
> in this manner.
I'm talking about the hey-day (hay day?) of psycho-normative disciplinary
creation of homosexuality, not today.
>
> It's produced in the sense that a
> >determinate P/K circuit came up with it. It's true in the sense that it
> >does "correspond" to the behavior of significant numbers of individuals.
>
> Yes but the claim is not about significant numbers, it is a truth claim
> about homosexual persons.
Yes, and of course what the power-knowledge circuit then does is do its
best to get everyone to act according to the model, treating variations as
interesting and illuminating but maintaining and attempting to impress on
others the model.
>
> >nontrivially and usefully true (where "true" in this context means "an
> >account of the phenomena productive of rich insights into their features
> >and dynamics")
>
> Well i certainly liked this last point, because it implies a non-negotiable
> commitment to a realist metaphysics: account of the phenomena...their
> features (note not their decribed features). Actulayy I have a theory that
> all forms of idealsim secrete an unthematised realist ontology, and
> generally its an empiricist one.
>
>
> >I don't see why we're finished. Finished doing what? Certainly not
> >finished criticizing, fighting back, agreeing, negotiating -- everything
> >we've done before, we can do now!
>
> Sorry, John, fight for what? Although, the fighting bit is quite striking
> because as far as I can see that is exactly the politics Foucauklt
> advocates: Machivellian, Hobbesian, Kissingerian power politics. If power is
> a necessary condition of possibilty for truth go Real Politik. Problem is,
> we have played this game for centuries. Some of us doubt there is anything
> new here.
People can fight for whatever they want to fight for. If "Real Politik"
means "assessments of and plans for engaging a power-knowledge cathexis,"
then yeah, people should do that, centuries or no centuries.
>
> >
> >Is it possible that we're miscommunicating over the word "ontological"?
> >(Or perhaps this is just my problem.)
>
> This could well be the problem.
>
> >
> >You say that if ontological truth is merely a function of power plays, we
> >will elide the distinction between lies and truth. But notice with the
> >example of the treatment of the homosexual: the battle there isn't between
> >lies and truth. And the fact that the battle there isn't between lies and
> >truth does not lead, as a consequence, to no one being able to say
> >anything critical or do anything oppositional.
>
> But the battle could well have been descxribed as one between lies and
> truth. After, all the powerful have often good reason to present a lie as a
> truth. But what makes it either. And certainly if you want to keep
> homosexuals out of certain parts of society, the Army for example, it is a
> useful weapon to describe them as effeminate and present this as a 'truth'.
That's exactly correct. Truth as a useful weapon. We need to get more Real
Politik about truth. Again, you combine granting huge areas of the
postmodern argument -- areas that would not have been conqeured without
the work of legions of intellectuals in and out of the academy -- with a
dismissive attitude towards it.
> >>
> >> Oh good, but again I think you are again guilty of overextending, are all
> >> realist critics of postmodernism vulgar realists?
> >
> >I must tell you honestly, they all read pretty vulgar to me.
>
> And I must be equally honest and tell you that many, well most, postmoderns
> actually look pretty silly, absurd even. But I don't worry about this
> because eventually they all get serious and have to deal with their
> absurdities. Even good old Stanley Fish has not had to admit that yes there
> is a mind-independent reality.
But it ill-becomes someone who grants so much of the postmodernist
argument to claim that "most postmoderns actually look pretty silly and
absurd."
>
>
> >Have you noticed that Habermas has completely given up on a radical
> >critique of Western society? He's basically turned himself into a German
> >Rawls. And I know there are a lot of people who will say, "Well, if
> >Habermas has managed that, good for him! 'Bout time!" But for me, this
> >turn toward liberalism in Continental thought by one of its most starred
> >representatives reveals the futility of a reliance on the opposition
> >between "truth" and "falsity" for critical thought.
>
> I have written on Habermas's recent work, and your reading is simply not
> correct, or should I say true. Interesting point here is I can marshall
> textual support to prove your assertion false. You in denying the
> distinction seem to have nowhere to go for support apart from a rampant
> subjectivism. The world, much like Habermas's writings I presume are simply
> as you say they are.
In fact, we are both on that continuum mentioned above. You may be located
a little more to the right of center and I may be located somewhere
further to the left of center, but our joint position on this continuum
makes your sarcastic dismissals ring hollow. In fact, we are both willing
to admit (and have agreed) that some truths are socially produced. This
is, you know, a fairly recent development -- one which we owe to
postmodernists and others (such as historians of science). You want to
take everyone who says "truth is constructed" and put them on Ridiculous
Island, where people say things like: "I construct all truth with my mind;
therefore, I will stand in front of this oncoming vehicle and simply make
it not true that being hit by an oncoming vehicle will harm me."
> If this is indeed your position no wonder the realist
> critics of postmodernism have to get vulgar, after all what they are
> attacking would be rejected by my four year old. But, of course, I am sure
> your postmodern hubris will find this no problem. After all, you know the
> truth about truth and my four year old is simply wrong.
Well, I don't know. What does your four year old say about gravity?
--John
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> -----
>
> Colin Wight
> Department of International Politics
> University of Wales, Aberystwyth
> Aberystwyth
> SY23 3DA
>
> --------------------------------------------------------
>