You see I think that at one very fundamental level you are doing something
very un-Foucaultian here. You keep introducing examples of objects that may
or may not be socially constructed. I have no problem in agreeing with such
arguments, even though I might disagree with the substantive points. My
point is that not everything, and certainly not every truth is socially
constucted, unless by truth you simply mean one side of the ontology
epistemology relationship. Foucault himself had no problem accepting that
his work could say nothing about the so called natural sciences and in my
opinion thye illicit extension of his work is a particularly crude (soory I
couldn't think of a better word) form of totalisation.
>
>
>No doubt, the powerful possess and create lots of truths. These
>truths then get challenged, rearranged, re-"coded," submitted to,
>and so on, by people subjected to them. Power and the truths associated
>with them "circulate."
Yes, maybe, but if truth(epistemologically) is a function of power then only
those with power can get their truths (epist) accepted. The picture you
present above is a very good rationalist model of knowledge contestation.
Nobody doubts this. Truth is not self evident and hence has to be fought
for, but some truths, like the existence of gravity seem indeed to hit you
in the face, and i doubt very much that even the most powerful would ever be
able to get around this. I don't doubt however, that our understandings of
gravity will change and that we may come to rescribe it in very interesting
ways (I accept the fallibility of all knowledge, but this is only
sustainable on a realist metaphysics), what i do doubt is that the force
that attracts will change with our descriptions. After all, lets hope not
anyway, for on current evidence if it did we wouldn't enjoy the luxury of
being around to redescribe it.
>Here's an example: (I won't use my cat as an example, because I know there
>are some people on this list with an irrational hatred of cats.) The
>psycho-normative-institutional circuit of power-knowledge, at a certain
>point, says: "Here's what a homosexual person is like: a certain set of
>voice patterns, hand gestures, this and that psychological profile." That
>is a truth, but a "produced" truth.
Of course it is not, it is an imposed description of a a certain group of
people, but it is not true. I have many homosexual friends who do not behave
in this manner.
It's produced in the sense that a
>determinate P/K circuit came up with it. It's true in the sense that it
>does "correspond" to the behavior of significant numbers of individuals.
Yes but the claim is not about significant numbers, it is a truth claim
about homosexual persons.
>nontrivially and usefully true (where "true" in this context means "an
>account of the phenomena productive of rich insights into their features
>and dynamics")
Well i certainly liked this last point, because it implies a non-negotiable
commitment to a realist metaphysics: account of the phenomena...their
features (note not their decribed features). Actulayy I have a theory that
all forms of idealsim secrete an unthematised realist ontology, and
generally its an empiricist one.
>I don't see why we're finished. Finished doing what? Certainly not
>finished criticizing, fighting back, agreeing, negotiating -- everything
>we've done before, we can do now!
Sorry, John, fight for what? Although, the fighting bit is quite striking
because as far as I can see that is exactly the politics Foucauklt
advocates: Machivellian, Hobbesian, Kissingerian power politics. If power is
a necessary condition of possibilty for truth go Real Politik. Problem is,
we have played this game for centuries. Some of us doubt there is anything
new here.
>
>Is it possible that we're miscommunicating over the word "ontological"?
>(Or perhaps this is just my problem.)
This could well be the problem.
>
>You say that if ontological truth is merely a function of power plays, we
>will elide the distinction between lies and truth. But notice with the
>example of the treatment of the homosexual: the battle there isn't between
>lies and truth. And the fact that the battle there isn't between lies and
>truth does not lead, as a consequence, to no one being able to say
>anything critical or do anything oppositional.
But the battle could well have been descxribed as one between lies and
truth. After, all the powerful have often good reason to present a lie as a
truth. But what makes it either. And certainly if you want to keep
homosexuals out of certain parts of society, the Army for example, it is a
useful weapon to describe them as effeminate and present this as a 'truth'.
>>
>> Oh good, but again I think you are again guilty of overextending, are all
>> realist critics of postmodernism vulgar realists?
>
>I must tell you honestly, they all read pretty vulgar to me.
And I must be equally honest and tell you that many, well most, postmoderns
actually look pretty silly, absurd even. But I don't worry about this
because eventually they all get serious and have to deal with their
absurdities. Even good old Stanley Fish has not had to admit that yes there
is a mind-independent reality.
>Have you noticed that Habermas has completely given up on a radical
>critique of Western society? He's basically turned himself into a German
>Rawls. And I know there are a lot of people who will say, "Well, if
>Habermas has managed that, good for him! 'Bout time!" But for me, this
>turn toward liberalism in Continental thought by one of its most starred
>representatives reveals the futility of a reliance on the opposition
>between "truth" and "falsity" for critical thought.
I have written on Habermas's recent work, and your reading is simply not
correct, or should I say true. Interesting point here is I can marshall
textual support to prove your assertion false. You in denying the
distinction seem to have nowhere to go for support apart from a rampant
subjectivism. The world, much like Habermas's writings I presume are simply
as you say they are. If this is indeed your position no wonder the realist
critics of postmodernism have to get vulgar, after all what they are
attacking would be rejected by my four year old. But, of course, I am sure
your postmodern hubris will find this no problem. After all, you know the
truth about truth and my four year old is simply wrong.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
very un-Foucaultian here. You keep introducing examples of objects that may
or may not be socially constructed. I have no problem in agreeing with such
arguments, even though I might disagree with the substantive points. My
point is that not everything, and certainly not every truth is socially
constucted, unless by truth you simply mean one side of the ontology
epistemology relationship. Foucault himself had no problem accepting that
his work could say nothing about the so called natural sciences and in my
opinion thye illicit extension of his work is a particularly crude (soory I
couldn't think of a better word) form of totalisation.
>
>
>No doubt, the powerful possess and create lots of truths. These
>truths then get challenged, rearranged, re-"coded," submitted to,
>and so on, by people subjected to them. Power and the truths associated
>with them "circulate."
Yes, maybe, but if truth(epistemologically) is a function of power then only
those with power can get their truths (epist) accepted. The picture you
present above is a very good rationalist model of knowledge contestation.
Nobody doubts this. Truth is not self evident and hence has to be fought
for, but some truths, like the existence of gravity seem indeed to hit you
in the face, and i doubt very much that even the most powerful would ever be
able to get around this. I don't doubt however, that our understandings of
gravity will change and that we may come to rescribe it in very interesting
ways (I accept the fallibility of all knowledge, but this is only
sustainable on a realist metaphysics), what i do doubt is that the force
that attracts will change with our descriptions. After all, lets hope not
anyway, for on current evidence if it did we wouldn't enjoy the luxury of
being around to redescribe it.
>Here's an example: (I won't use my cat as an example, because I know there
>are some people on this list with an irrational hatred of cats.) The
>psycho-normative-institutional circuit of power-knowledge, at a certain
>point, says: "Here's what a homosexual person is like: a certain set of
>voice patterns, hand gestures, this and that psychological profile." That
>is a truth, but a "produced" truth.
Of course it is not, it is an imposed description of a a certain group of
people, but it is not true. I have many homosexual friends who do not behave
in this manner.
It's produced in the sense that a
>determinate P/K circuit came up with it. It's true in the sense that it
>does "correspond" to the behavior of significant numbers of individuals.
Yes but the claim is not about significant numbers, it is a truth claim
about homosexual persons.
>nontrivially and usefully true (where "true" in this context means "an
>account of the phenomena productive of rich insights into their features
>and dynamics")
Well i certainly liked this last point, because it implies a non-negotiable
commitment to a realist metaphysics: account of the phenomena...their
features (note not their decribed features). Actulayy I have a theory that
all forms of idealsim secrete an unthematised realist ontology, and
generally its an empiricist one.
>I don't see why we're finished. Finished doing what? Certainly not
>finished criticizing, fighting back, agreeing, negotiating -- everything
>we've done before, we can do now!
Sorry, John, fight for what? Although, the fighting bit is quite striking
because as far as I can see that is exactly the politics Foucauklt
advocates: Machivellian, Hobbesian, Kissingerian power politics. If power is
a necessary condition of possibilty for truth go Real Politik. Problem is,
we have played this game for centuries. Some of us doubt there is anything
new here.
>
>Is it possible that we're miscommunicating over the word "ontological"?
>(Or perhaps this is just my problem.)
This could well be the problem.
>
>You say that if ontological truth is merely a function of power plays, we
>will elide the distinction between lies and truth. But notice with the
>example of the treatment of the homosexual: the battle there isn't between
>lies and truth. And the fact that the battle there isn't between lies and
>truth does not lead, as a consequence, to no one being able to say
>anything critical or do anything oppositional.
But the battle could well have been descxribed as one between lies and
truth. After, all the powerful have often good reason to present a lie as a
truth. But what makes it either. And certainly if you want to keep
homosexuals out of certain parts of society, the Army for example, it is a
useful weapon to describe them as effeminate and present this as a 'truth'.
>>
>> Oh good, but again I think you are again guilty of overextending, are all
>> realist critics of postmodernism vulgar realists?
>
>I must tell you honestly, they all read pretty vulgar to me.
And I must be equally honest and tell you that many, well most, postmoderns
actually look pretty silly, absurd even. But I don't worry about this
because eventually they all get serious and have to deal with their
absurdities. Even good old Stanley Fish has not had to admit that yes there
is a mind-independent reality.
>Have you noticed that Habermas has completely given up on a radical
>critique of Western society? He's basically turned himself into a German
>Rawls. And I know there are a lot of people who will say, "Well, if
>Habermas has managed that, good for him! 'Bout time!" But for me, this
>turn toward liberalism in Continental thought by one of its most starred
>representatives reveals the futility of a reliance on the opposition
>between "truth" and "falsity" for critical thought.
I have written on Habermas's recent work, and your reading is simply not
correct, or should I say true. Interesting point here is I can marshall
textual support to prove your assertion false. You in denying the
distinction seem to have nowhere to go for support apart from a rampant
subjectivism. The world, much like Habermas's writings I presume are simply
as you say they are. If this is indeed your position no wonder the realist
critics of postmodernism have to get vulgar, after all what they are
attacking would be rejected by my four year old. But, of course, I am sure
your postmodern hubris will find this no problem. After all, you know the
truth about truth and my four year old is simply wrong.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------