Alan,
I discuss Fraser's article and other critics of Foucault in my book,
_Foucault's Discipline_. The basic problem with Fraser's approach is that
it does not confront what Foucault says. If individuals are created by
power then norms -- in all senses of that word -- mutate and change with
them.
You say below that you feel the need for a strong normative framework, and
Fraser also has a kind of emotional reaction to Foucault, doesn't she?
Foucault doesn't just need, but desperately needs normative criteria. In
order to do what? To say some kinds of power are good and some kinds of
power are bad. But isn't that just silly? It's not power that's good or
bad, but applications of power. A kind of power, say disciplinary power,
can produce results we would consider "bad" (mindless workers on an
assembly line) and results we would consider "good" (a group of Suzuki
students learn to play the piano). The badness or the goodness isn't in
the power, so coming up with an abstract and *a priori* categorization of
good and bad kinds of power is a "bad" idea.
Or take bureaucratic forms of power. Are we going to say, perhaps after a
reading of Weber, that bureaucracies are "bad" forms of power? Instead of
dividing up the world Mani-like into "good" and "bad", socialism versus
capitalism, human versus inhuman, and so on, Foucault wants to talk about
the reality of power configurations on the ground and the kinds of moves
they permit, hinder, or disallow.
There are a lot of other articles that make similar criticisms of
Foucault, if you're interested. See Thomas McCarthy's "Foucault and the
Frankfurt School" from _Political Theory_, 1990 I think. Habermas also has
something along these lines in his _Philosophical Discourse of Modernity_.
--John
On Wed, 16 Jul 1997, Alan C. Hudson wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> Despite having had a long-standing interest in issues of power and space,
> I've always hesitated before plunging into the literature around Foucault.
> Basically, I've *felt the need* for a strong normative framework, a
> framework which I find better supplied by critical theory in various
> versions. However, I have dabbled with Foucault and just read a very
> interesting, if oldish, article, and wondered whether I might start some
> more discussion.
>
> The article is by Nancy Fraser. It's called empirical insights and
> normative confusions. It's in vol.1 of Praxis International.
>
> Her basic argument is that although Foucault's "bracketing" of normative
> questions of legitimacy proves useful in his efforts to detail the
> practices of power(s), it also makes it impossible for him to say which
> practices of power are good and which are bad.
>
> She argues that the root of the problem is the fact tht Foucault fails to
> distinguish between different types/forms of power.
>
> At the end of the article she writes:
>
> "Phenomena which are capable of being distinguished ... are simply lumped
> together under his catch-all concept of power. As a result, the potential
> for a broad range of normative nuances is surrendered, and the result is a
> certain normative one-dimensionality" (p.286).
>
> and, more generally
>
> "Clearly what Foucault needs and needs desperately are normative criteria
> for distinguishin acceptable from unacceptable forms of power" (p.286).
>
> I tend to agree, but wondered if anyone on the list had any comments:
>
> - did Fraser's article produce much reaction?
>
> - are her points valid?
>
> - have they been answered? (If they have, I've not seen the answer - other
> than to suggest that they're not sensible/answerable/important questions).
>
> Anyway, what do you think?
>
> Oh, I'm well aware that this is a classic Foucault question, but I'd not
> seen the suggestion that Foucault's normative weakness is due to lumping
> too many practices together as power.
>
> I look forward to some responses.
>
> cheers,
> alan
>
> *****************************************************************************
> Dr. Alan C. Hudson
> University Assistant Lecturer
> and
> IB Director of Studies at Fitzwilliam College
>
> Department of Geography, and Fitzwilliam College,
> University of Cambridge, Cambridge,
> CB2 3EN, CB3 0DG,
> United Kingdom. United Kingdom.
>
> Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333364 (Department - Direct line)
> Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333399 (Department - General Office)
> Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 358354 (Home + Answerphone)
> Fax: + 44 (0) 1223 333392 (Department)
> E-Mail: ach1005@xxxxxxxxx
> Website: http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/achhome.htm
> (Currently, a dull (lack of time), slow (not my fault!), but functional
> (mainly luck), website!)
> *****************************************************************************
>
I discuss Fraser's article and other critics of Foucault in my book,
_Foucault's Discipline_. The basic problem with Fraser's approach is that
it does not confront what Foucault says. If individuals are created by
power then norms -- in all senses of that word -- mutate and change with
them.
You say below that you feel the need for a strong normative framework, and
Fraser also has a kind of emotional reaction to Foucault, doesn't she?
Foucault doesn't just need, but desperately needs normative criteria. In
order to do what? To say some kinds of power are good and some kinds of
power are bad. But isn't that just silly? It's not power that's good or
bad, but applications of power. A kind of power, say disciplinary power,
can produce results we would consider "bad" (mindless workers on an
assembly line) and results we would consider "good" (a group of Suzuki
students learn to play the piano). The badness or the goodness isn't in
the power, so coming up with an abstract and *a priori* categorization of
good and bad kinds of power is a "bad" idea.
Or take bureaucratic forms of power. Are we going to say, perhaps after a
reading of Weber, that bureaucracies are "bad" forms of power? Instead of
dividing up the world Mani-like into "good" and "bad", socialism versus
capitalism, human versus inhuman, and so on, Foucault wants to talk about
the reality of power configurations on the ground and the kinds of moves
they permit, hinder, or disallow.
There are a lot of other articles that make similar criticisms of
Foucault, if you're interested. See Thomas McCarthy's "Foucault and the
Frankfurt School" from _Political Theory_, 1990 I think. Habermas also has
something along these lines in his _Philosophical Discourse of Modernity_.
--John
On Wed, 16 Jul 1997, Alan C. Hudson wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> Despite having had a long-standing interest in issues of power and space,
> I've always hesitated before plunging into the literature around Foucault.
> Basically, I've *felt the need* for a strong normative framework, a
> framework which I find better supplied by critical theory in various
> versions. However, I have dabbled with Foucault and just read a very
> interesting, if oldish, article, and wondered whether I might start some
> more discussion.
>
> The article is by Nancy Fraser. It's called empirical insights and
> normative confusions. It's in vol.1 of Praxis International.
>
> Her basic argument is that although Foucault's "bracketing" of normative
> questions of legitimacy proves useful in his efforts to detail the
> practices of power(s), it also makes it impossible for him to say which
> practices of power are good and which are bad.
>
> She argues that the root of the problem is the fact tht Foucault fails to
> distinguish between different types/forms of power.
>
> At the end of the article she writes:
>
> "Phenomena which are capable of being distinguished ... are simply lumped
> together under his catch-all concept of power. As a result, the potential
> for a broad range of normative nuances is surrendered, and the result is a
> certain normative one-dimensionality" (p.286).
>
> and, more generally
>
> "Clearly what Foucault needs and needs desperately are normative criteria
> for distinguishin acceptable from unacceptable forms of power" (p.286).
>
> I tend to agree, but wondered if anyone on the list had any comments:
>
> - did Fraser's article produce much reaction?
>
> - are her points valid?
>
> - have they been answered? (If they have, I've not seen the answer - other
> than to suggest that they're not sensible/answerable/important questions).
>
> Anyway, what do you think?
>
> Oh, I'm well aware that this is a classic Foucault question, but I'd not
> seen the suggestion that Foucault's normative weakness is due to lumping
> too many practices together as power.
>
> I look forward to some responses.
>
> cheers,
> alan
>
> *****************************************************************************
> Dr. Alan C. Hudson
> University Assistant Lecturer
> and
> IB Director of Studies at Fitzwilliam College
>
> Department of Geography, and Fitzwilliam College,
> University of Cambridge, Cambridge,
> CB2 3EN, CB3 0DG,
> United Kingdom. United Kingdom.
>
> Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333364 (Department - Direct line)
> Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333399 (Department - General Office)
> Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 358354 (Home + Answerphone)
> Fax: + 44 (0) 1223 333392 (Department)
> E-Mail: ach1005@xxxxxxxxx
> Website: http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/achhome.htm
> (Currently, a dull (lack of time), slow (not my fault!), but functional
> (mainly luck), website!)
> *****************************************************************************
>