Dear John and others,
John - thanks for the response. I'll get to that in a minute.
Firstly, I thought I'd mention that I just finished reading Barry Hindess'
book on "Discourses of power: From Hobbes to Foucault", and found it
excellent. Probably the first time I've read a social + political theory
book in one sitting!
In addition to the references which John suggests around these issues,
Hindess suggests McCarthy's chapter in Wartenberg's "Rethinking power"
(reprinted from Political Studies I think), Taylor's chapter in Hoy's
"Foucault", and articles by Taylor and Patton in Political Studies 1989,
v.37.
To John's comments:
> I discuss Fraser's article and other critics of Foucault in my book,
> _Foucault's Discipline_. The basic problem with Fraser's approach is that
> it does not confront what Foucault says. If individuals are created by
> power then norms -- in all senses of that word -- mutate and change with
> them.
Well, maybe she doesn't address what Foucault says. I'm not familiar
enough with Foucault first hand to say. However, accepting that norms
change as individuals and flows of power change, one might still want to
say something about the speed with which norms change - come sort of
comparative basis for analysis? In Geography for instance it is now common
to argue that the local and the global do not exist, and it's all networks
and flows. Fair enoughish, but some networks of social relations are still
bigger (and more or less significant in the way the world works) than
others aren't they?
(I read an article the other day that suggested that a battery operated
toy rabbit and capitalism ought to be considered on the same level, that
one wasn't more significant than the other. I was not convinced!)
> You say below that you feel the need for a strong normative framework, and
> Fraser also has a kind of emotional reaction to Foucault, doesn't she?
> Foucault doesn't just need, but desperately needs normative criteria. In
> order to do what? To say some kinds of power are good and some kinds of
> power are bad. But isn't that just silly? It's not power that's good or
> bad, but applications of power. A kind of power, say disciplinary power,
> can produce results we would consider "bad" (mindless workers on an
> assembly line) and results we would consider "good" (a group of Suzuki
> students learn to play the piano). The badness or the goodness isn't in
> the power, so coming up with an abstract and *a priori* categorization of
> good and bad kinds of power is a "bad" idea.
Certainly it's an emotional reaction. I don't have a problem with that and
carefully avoided claiming that I expected to find any fundamental basis
for (my) normative criteria. (although, if pressed, I would go for
communication).
I didn't think that Fraser, in the 1981 article at least, said that some
forms of power are good and some bad. She said, I thought, that
differentiating between forms of power is a necessary step in being
able to say what effects of power are bad and good. Maybe it isn't a
necessary step? What's the alternative then?
I'm sorry to ask this obvious and maybe tedious question but what do you
mean by "bad" in your phrase?
> Or take bureaucratic forms of power. Are we going to say, perhaps after a
> reading of Weber, that bureaucracies are "bad" forms of power? Instead of
> dividing up the world Mani-like into "good" and "bad", socialism versus
> capitalism, human versus inhuman, and so on, Foucault wants to talk about
> the reality of power configurations on the ground and the kinds of moves
> they permit, hinder, or disallow.
OK, this makes sense to me. But, couldn't one have the latter and the
former ways of talking about power? They don't seem obviously
contradictory to me, but then it is late in the day.
Thanks again for your response John. I might add that I'm actually
interested in this and am not out for a bit of Foucault bashing for the
sake of it. I very much hope that this conversation won't turn into that
sort of thing.
cheers,
alan
PS: John - what's your book called? I might check it out.
*****************************************************************************
Dr. Alan C. Hudson
University Assistant Lecturer
and
IB Director of Studies at Fitzwilliam College
Department of Geography, and Fitzwilliam College,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge,
CB2 3EN, CB3 0DG,
United Kingdom. United Kingdom.
Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333364 (Department - Direct line)
Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333399 (Department - General Office)
Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 358354 (Home + Answerphone)
Fax: + 44 (0) 1223 333392 (Department)
E-Mail: ach1005@xxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/achhome.htm
(Currently, a dull (lack of time), slow (not my fault!), but functional
(mainly luck), website!)
*****************************************************************************
John - thanks for the response. I'll get to that in a minute.
Firstly, I thought I'd mention that I just finished reading Barry Hindess'
book on "Discourses of power: From Hobbes to Foucault", and found it
excellent. Probably the first time I've read a social + political theory
book in one sitting!
In addition to the references which John suggests around these issues,
Hindess suggests McCarthy's chapter in Wartenberg's "Rethinking power"
(reprinted from Political Studies I think), Taylor's chapter in Hoy's
"Foucault", and articles by Taylor and Patton in Political Studies 1989,
v.37.
To John's comments:
> I discuss Fraser's article and other critics of Foucault in my book,
> _Foucault's Discipline_. The basic problem with Fraser's approach is that
> it does not confront what Foucault says. If individuals are created by
> power then norms -- in all senses of that word -- mutate and change with
> them.
Well, maybe she doesn't address what Foucault says. I'm not familiar
enough with Foucault first hand to say. However, accepting that norms
change as individuals and flows of power change, one might still want to
say something about the speed with which norms change - come sort of
comparative basis for analysis? In Geography for instance it is now common
to argue that the local and the global do not exist, and it's all networks
and flows. Fair enoughish, but some networks of social relations are still
bigger (and more or less significant in the way the world works) than
others aren't they?
(I read an article the other day that suggested that a battery operated
toy rabbit and capitalism ought to be considered on the same level, that
one wasn't more significant than the other. I was not convinced!)
> You say below that you feel the need for a strong normative framework, and
> Fraser also has a kind of emotional reaction to Foucault, doesn't she?
> Foucault doesn't just need, but desperately needs normative criteria. In
> order to do what? To say some kinds of power are good and some kinds of
> power are bad. But isn't that just silly? It's not power that's good or
> bad, but applications of power. A kind of power, say disciplinary power,
> can produce results we would consider "bad" (mindless workers on an
> assembly line) and results we would consider "good" (a group of Suzuki
> students learn to play the piano). The badness or the goodness isn't in
> the power, so coming up with an abstract and *a priori* categorization of
> good and bad kinds of power is a "bad" idea.
Certainly it's an emotional reaction. I don't have a problem with that and
carefully avoided claiming that I expected to find any fundamental basis
for (my) normative criteria. (although, if pressed, I would go for
communication).
I didn't think that Fraser, in the 1981 article at least, said that some
forms of power are good and some bad. She said, I thought, that
differentiating between forms of power is a necessary step in being
able to say what effects of power are bad and good. Maybe it isn't a
necessary step? What's the alternative then?
I'm sorry to ask this obvious and maybe tedious question but what do you
mean by "bad" in your phrase?
> Or take bureaucratic forms of power. Are we going to say, perhaps after a
> reading of Weber, that bureaucracies are "bad" forms of power? Instead of
> dividing up the world Mani-like into "good" and "bad", socialism versus
> capitalism, human versus inhuman, and so on, Foucault wants to talk about
> the reality of power configurations on the ground and the kinds of moves
> they permit, hinder, or disallow.
OK, this makes sense to me. But, couldn't one have the latter and the
former ways of talking about power? They don't seem obviously
contradictory to me, but then it is late in the day.
Thanks again for your response John. I might add that I'm actually
interested in this and am not out for a bit of Foucault bashing for the
sake of it. I very much hope that this conversation won't turn into that
sort of thing.
cheers,
alan
PS: John - what's your book called? I might check it out.
*****************************************************************************
Dr. Alan C. Hudson
University Assistant Lecturer
and
IB Director of Studies at Fitzwilliam College
Department of Geography, and Fitzwilliam College,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge,
CB2 3EN, CB3 0DG,
United Kingdom. United Kingdom.
Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333364 (Department - Direct line)
Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333399 (Department - General Office)
Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 358354 (Home + Answerphone)
Fax: + 44 (0) 1223 333392 (Department)
E-Mail: ach1005@xxxxxxxxx
Website: http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/achhome.htm
(Currently, a dull (lack of time), slow (not my fault!), but functional
(mainly luck), website!)
*****************************************************************************