Hi John,
I believe part of the answer lies in Focault's notion of power. I won't
explain Foucault's idea of power it in detail since I've never posted to
this list before so I don't know what kinda of rules you guys have
established (even considering Foucault's ideas and their implications for
that last statement). But..
Foucault's notion of truth, of course, cannot be separated from his notion
of power. If you examine his theory of power, and substitute the word power
with truth, you'll see what I mean. What I'm specifically referring to is
what I believe are Foucault's thoughts on how ideas are created, the
legitimization thereafter that takes place through the creation of power
relations, and the resulting genealogical creation of hegemonic truth.
I don't have an intimate knowledge of Focault's idea of power. For
instance I'm not sure if Foucault has any answer at all that can save us
from relativism, the death of objectivity, or the growing disdain of
transcendental or privileged knowledge.
For instance, in _The History of Sexuality, Volume 1_, I believe Foucault
offers a brilliant account of the creation of our sexuality, but if you
consider sexuality as a discourse of truth and power, I don't think
Foucault really offers any way for us to really know what truth is. I
mean, is there really any privileged position from which we can say
something is true or power is truly legitimate? I think Foucault believes
that there isn't. Even the ethnocentric legitimacy that knowledge
establishes through hegemony doesn't constitute truth per se, as it does
hegemonic power within a specific domain.
At the same time, existing as marginal or in opposition to hegemonic power,
also does not necessarily constitute truth. While being in a position of
the "other" may give you certain knowledge that's not possible from the
position of subject, hence the claims of standpoint epistemology, it is
still not any indicator of truth or privileged knowledge. If you consider
the hyper-dialectical relationship been "subject" (bourgeois hegemony) and
"other" (the marginal), Foucault's idea of power would suggest that any one
idea (let's say heterosexuality) may be "subject" or "object", true or
false, and its specific value is only a matter of position. For example
heterosexuality and it's correlation with normality (or truth) is currently
very high today. But from the position of the Greeks, its correlation value
differs greatly. And as the post-industrialism of sexuality, the
proliferation of porn, changes in the age that people think it proper to
engage in sex, and so forth
heterosexuality as truth will be very different many years from now. It is
even imaginable that there may be worlds or contexts that consider
heterosexuality polymorphously perverse.
Therefore, the subject can become object, and vice versa. The location of
an idea within this subject/object domain is no indicator of it's truth,
and in fact, loses meaning outside of it. Only when we think of an idea
from a specific non-trancendental location, does it gain any meaning or
truth. Indeed as Baurillard would say, "the map precedes the territory."
So I think Focault's pre-occupation with Niezsche denotes a common
incredulity towards absolutism. I'm never read anything from Heidegger,
but mentions of him from various critical essays on Foucault lead me to
believe that Foucault's view of Heidigger is that his methods don't really
get us any closer to truth, god, and such, but merely represent a movement
from object to subject, and vice versa.
Gary
At 02:19 AM 8/14/97 -0400, John Ransom wrote:
>In his "Letter on Humanism" (November, 1946) Heidegger comments to his
>interlocutor, Jean Beaufret as follows:
>
>You ask: *Comment redonner un sens au mot 'Humanisme'?* This question
>proceeds from your intention to retain the word 'humanism.' I wonder
>whether this is necessary. Or is the damage caused by all such terms still
>not sufficiently obvious? True, "-isms" have for a long time now been
>suspect. But the market of public opinion continually demands new ones. We
>are always prepared to supply the demand. Even such names as "logic,"
>"ethics," and "physics" begin to flourish only when original thinking
>comes to an end. [See "Letter on Humanism" in _Martin Heidegger: Basic
>Writings_, Harper & Row, 1977, p. 195.]
>
>[end quotation from Heidegger]
>
>At one point -- can't find the darn reference -- Foucault comments that
>his two favorite thinkers are Nietzsche and Heidegger, and that reading
>Nietzsche alone was bad enough, but that reading the two together was a
>real shock. My real question is what list colleagues make of the
>connection between H and F, and why F refers to his reading of H as
>producing a "shock." What kind of shock was it? The quotation above is
>employed as it mirrors similar comments Foucault makes in other places,
>such as "What is Enlightenment" and one or two other places where he
>criticizes the commitment to humanism.
>
>I wonder if anyone has any thoughts on the loosely-formed question above?
>If not, I'll certainly understand.
>
>Thanks!
>
>--John
>
>
>
I believe part of the answer lies in Focault's notion of power. I won't
explain Foucault's idea of power it in detail since I've never posted to
this list before so I don't know what kinda of rules you guys have
established (even considering Foucault's ideas and their implications for
that last statement). But..
Foucault's notion of truth, of course, cannot be separated from his notion
of power. If you examine his theory of power, and substitute the word power
with truth, you'll see what I mean. What I'm specifically referring to is
what I believe are Foucault's thoughts on how ideas are created, the
legitimization thereafter that takes place through the creation of power
relations, and the resulting genealogical creation of hegemonic truth.
I don't have an intimate knowledge of Focault's idea of power. For
instance I'm not sure if Foucault has any answer at all that can save us
from relativism, the death of objectivity, or the growing disdain of
transcendental or privileged knowledge.
For instance, in _The History of Sexuality, Volume 1_, I believe Foucault
offers a brilliant account of the creation of our sexuality, but if you
consider sexuality as a discourse of truth and power, I don't think
Foucault really offers any way for us to really know what truth is. I
mean, is there really any privileged position from which we can say
something is true or power is truly legitimate? I think Foucault believes
that there isn't. Even the ethnocentric legitimacy that knowledge
establishes through hegemony doesn't constitute truth per se, as it does
hegemonic power within a specific domain.
At the same time, existing as marginal or in opposition to hegemonic power,
also does not necessarily constitute truth. While being in a position of
the "other" may give you certain knowledge that's not possible from the
position of subject, hence the claims of standpoint epistemology, it is
still not any indicator of truth or privileged knowledge. If you consider
the hyper-dialectical relationship been "subject" (bourgeois hegemony) and
"other" (the marginal), Foucault's idea of power would suggest that any one
idea (let's say heterosexuality) may be "subject" or "object", true or
false, and its specific value is only a matter of position. For example
heterosexuality and it's correlation with normality (or truth) is currently
very high today. But from the position of the Greeks, its correlation value
differs greatly. And as the post-industrialism of sexuality, the
proliferation of porn, changes in the age that people think it proper to
engage in sex, and so forth
heterosexuality as truth will be very different many years from now. It is
even imaginable that there may be worlds or contexts that consider
heterosexuality polymorphously perverse.
Therefore, the subject can become object, and vice versa. The location of
an idea within this subject/object domain is no indicator of it's truth,
and in fact, loses meaning outside of it. Only when we think of an idea
from a specific non-trancendental location, does it gain any meaning or
truth. Indeed as Baurillard would say, "the map precedes the territory."
So I think Focault's pre-occupation with Niezsche denotes a common
incredulity towards absolutism. I'm never read anything from Heidegger,
but mentions of him from various critical essays on Foucault lead me to
believe that Foucault's view of Heidigger is that his methods don't really
get us any closer to truth, god, and such, but merely represent a movement
from object to subject, and vice versa.
Gary
At 02:19 AM 8/14/97 -0400, John Ransom wrote:
>In his "Letter on Humanism" (November, 1946) Heidegger comments to his
>interlocutor, Jean Beaufret as follows:
>
>You ask: *Comment redonner un sens au mot 'Humanisme'?* This question
>proceeds from your intention to retain the word 'humanism.' I wonder
>whether this is necessary. Or is the damage caused by all such terms still
>not sufficiently obvious? True, "-isms" have for a long time now been
>suspect. But the market of public opinion continually demands new ones. We
>are always prepared to supply the demand. Even such names as "logic,"
>"ethics," and "physics" begin to flourish only when original thinking
>comes to an end. [See "Letter on Humanism" in _Martin Heidegger: Basic
>Writings_, Harper & Row, 1977, p. 195.]
>
>[end quotation from Heidegger]
>
>At one point -- can't find the darn reference -- Foucault comments that
>his two favorite thinkers are Nietzsche and Heidegger, and that reading
>Nietzsche alone was bad enough, but that reading the two together was a
>real shock. My real question is what list colleagues make of the
>connection between H and F, and why F refers to his reading of H as
>producing a "shock." What kind of shock was it? The quotation above is
>employed as it mirrors similar comments Foucault makes in other places,
>such as "What is Enlightenment" and one or two other places where he
>criticizes the commitment to humanism.
>
>I wonder if anyone has any thoughts on the loosely-formed question above?
>If not, I'll certainly understand.
>
>Thanks!
>
>--John
>
>
>