A couple of comments on recent threads:
First, with regard to what Deleuze called Foucault's concern about "the
indignity of speaking for others" (which I think Darren Smith wrote
about), the question that cries out to be asked is how it is possible, on
Foucault's own terms, to speak for oneself. Obviously, whatever words we
use are not wholly our own; however we define ourselves, we do not do so
independently of how others define us. Rorty rather crudely makes more
or less this point, that there is no "language of the oppressed", because
to be oppressed is to be forced to describe yourself in someone else's
terms. Once you can describe yourself in your own terms--but again, what
does that mean?--you're no longer oppressed. We often hear about how
Foucault and the GIP tried to enable prisoners to speak for themselves,
but unfortunately the words of the prisoners don't seem to have been
translated ... I'd be interested to hear if anyone knows what exactly they
said, given the opportunity to speak for themselves. (The Canadian
newspaper columnist Rick Salutin has made the point that whenever
"ordinary Canadians" are called upon by the media to "speak for
themselves" on political matters, they always wind up sounding just like
the pundits. Maybe it's inevitable.)
At any rate, it is true that Foucault never did say that social workers
and other do-gooders should quit what they're doing ... he said he wanted
to make things *difficult* for them, to make it so that they would *pay
attention* to what they were doing, rather than blithely doing their jobs
in a state of anaesthesia (or tranquillization, to use Heidegger's
term--as I've said before, Foucault's thought here is strikingly
Heideggerian).
Secondly, with regard to the question of nihilism: the meaning of the
word is very slippery in a Nietzschean-Heideggerian context. Much of
Nietzsche's work was directed against nihilism, where nihilism is defined
as the feeling of vertigo and anomie experienced when the death of God is
discovered. One might say that much of Nietzsche's work was directed
against his *own* nihilism. But Heidegger makes much of a little passage
in The Will to Power suggesting that for Nietzsche nihilism is inescapble,
and the thing to do is to "complete" it by inserting the overman into the
position vacated by God. For Heidegger, the idea that *something* must
occupy the position of God--i.e. the position from which all values
issue--is at the heart of nihilism. Nihilism stems from the view that
value is not here among us in the world, but somewhere else; the things of
the world are not valuable in themselves, but must be *made* valuable by
something else. To overcome nihilism is to stop asking how the things
around us can be made valuable, and how our actions can be made worthwile.
The Foucault of "Is it Useless to Revolt?" might be an example of
overcoming nihilism, in that sense. (It is also Foucault at his most
existentialist, and one might wonder whether what one is left with at this
point is just Sartrean commitment. Perhaps one only wonders this because
one has not read enough Sartre, which this one hasn't.:)
Matthew
---Matthew A. King---Department of Philosophy---York University, Toronto---
"Yes - Kilgore Trout is back again. He could not make it on the outside.
That is no disgrace. A lot of good people can't make it on the outside."
-----------------------------(Kurt Vonnegut)-------------------------------
First, with regard to what Deleuze called Foucault's concern about "the
indignity of speaking for others" (which I think Darren Smith wrote
about), the question that cries out to be asked is how it is possible, on
Foucault's own terms, to speak for oneself. Obviously, whatever words we
use are not wholly our own; however we define ourselves, we do not do so
independently of how others define us. Rorty rather crudely makes more
or less this point, that there is no "language of the oppressed", because
to be oppressed is to be forced to describe yourself in someone else's
terms. Once you can describe yourself in your own terms--but again, what
does that mean?--you're no longer oppressed. We often hear about how
Foucault and the GIP tried to enable prisoners to speak for themselves,
but unfortunately the words of the prisoners don't seem to have been
translated ... I'd be interested to hear if anyone knows what exactly they
said, given the opportunity to speak for themselves. (The Canadian
newspaper columnist Rick Salutin has made the point that whenever
"ordinary Canadians" are called upon by the media to "speak for
themselves" on political matters, they always wind up sounding just like
the pundits. Maybe it's inevitable.)
At any rate, it is true that Foucault never did say that social workers
and other do-gooders should quit what they're doing ... he said he wanted
to make things *difficult* for them, to make it so that they would *pay
attention* to what they were doing, rather than blithely doing their jobs
in a state of anaesthesia (or tranquillization, to use Heidegger's
term--as I've said before, Foucault's thought here is strikingly
Heideggerian).
Secondly, with regard to the question of nihilism: the meaning of the
word is very slippery in a Nietzschean-Heideggerian context. Much of
Nietzsche's work was directed against nihilism, where nihilism is defined
as the feeling of vertigo and anomie experienced when the death of God is
discovered. One might say that much of Nietzsche's work was directed
against his *own* nihilism. But Heidegger makes much of a little passage
in The Will to Power suggesting that for Nietzsche nihilism is inescapble,
and the thing to do is to "complete" it by inserting the overman into the
position vacated by God. For Heidegger, the idea that *something* must
occupy the position of God--i.e. the position from which all values
issue--is at the heart of nihilism. Nihilism stems from the view that
value is not here among us in the world, but somewhere else; the things of
the world are not valuable in themselves, but must be *made* valuable by
something else. To overcome nihilism is to stop asking how the things
around us can be made valuable, and how our actions can be made worthwile.
The Foucault of "Is it Useless to Revolt?" might be an example of
overcoming nihilism, in that sense. (It is also Foucault at his most
existentialist, and one might wonder whether what one is left with at this
point is just Sartrean commitment. Perhaps one only wonders this because
one has not read enough Sartre, which this one hasn't.:)
Matthew
---Matthew A. King---Department of Philosophy---York University, Toronto---
"Yes - Kilgore Trout is back again. He could not make it on the outside.
That is no disgrace. A lot of good people can't make it on the outside."
-----------------------------(Kurt Vonnegut)-------------------------------