"The case against inaction [in Kosovo]" strikes a peculiar note. Chomsky
was recently interviewed in Canada re Kosovo and he made a few interesting
points:
* If we talk about ethnic cleansing and a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo,
then we should be talking about these things in relation to many other
countries - for example, Columbia and Turkey where the US supports regimes
(financially, military training, arms) which are oppressive, and engaging
in ethnic cleansing.
* What makes something a "humanitarian crisis"? Chomsky basically says that
the technical meaning of this phrase is that it affects the rich and
powerful - ie, Europe and therefore America.
* Ethnic cleansing is not only going on in Kosovo. I live in Australia, and
when I ask myself: Why am I here and not the original inhabitants, they
couldn't have just walked away. Ethnic cleansing is something that occurs
around the world, even in the US.
* Why is NATO intervening?
Firstly, to control what could be a potential threat to the stability of
Western Europe. Secondly, the reassert its credibility, and when we are
talking about the credibility of NATO, we are not talking about the
credibility of Denmark or Belgium, but the US.
* This article below ignores the fact that the NATO bombing has denied any
possible chance the Serbian Democratic Party had of countering Milosovic.
Nationalist fervour in response to the bombing has underswept the
democratic movement there. The article also denies that just before the
onset of bombing on 23 March, the Serbian Parliament were in the process of
deciding that UN peace-keeping troops could be allowed to enter Kosovo.
At 14:26 15/04/99 EDT, you wrote:
>The Nation, April 26, 1999
>
> The Case Against Inaction
>
> Sadly, some on the left are angrier about NATO's bombing
> than they are about the Serbian forces' atrocities, even though
> Milosevic's men have killed more in one Kosovan village than
> have all the airstrikes. Those who want an immediate NATO
> cease-fire owe the world an explanation of how they propose
> to stop and reverse the massive ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, in
> light of Milosevic's history as a serial ethnic cleanser and
> promise-breaker. Arguments that the NATO action diminishes
> the stature of the United Nations are, to say the least, highly
> questionable. What could diminish the UN's stature more than
> Milosevic's successful defiance of more than fifty Security
> Council resolutions? Only last September, Resolution 1199,
> invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, ordered Belgrade to
> "cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian
> population and order the withdrawal of security units used for
> civilian repression" in Kosovo. Only last October, Milosevic
> promised to reduce troop numbers in Kosovo, and his pledge
> was endorsed and given the force of international law by
> Security Council Resolution 1203. By the time the
> Rambouillet negotiations had started, he had more troops in
> Kosovo than ever before, and they had already begun their
> well-prepared campaign of ethnic cleansing.
>
> Real internationalists can hardly use the dubious rights of
> "national sovereignty" to oppose action to stop massacres.
> Opposition to US military intervention is an understandable
> rule of thumb, but it shouldn't become obsessive dogma. After
> all, most Europeans were happy with US intervention in
> World War II. The British court decisions on Gen. Augusto
> Pinochet show that, at last, politicians who murder cannot
> expect amnesty afterwards. Why should Slobodan Milosevic
> expect impunity as he carries out crimes against humanity?
>
> Ideally, there should have been a UN Security Council vote
> endorsing military action, but China and Russia had made it
> plain that no matter what barbarities Milosevic committed
> they would veto any such resolution. Happily, most of the
> Council agreed that ethnic cleansing was not something that
> could be shielded behind a dubious claim of national
> sovereignty and soundly defeated, 12 votes to 3, a Russian
> draft resolution condemning the bombing. Only Namibia
> joined Beijing and Moscow. NATO, most of whose
> governments are members of the Socialist International,
> agreed on a military response.
>
> In short, the court of international public opinion has
> implicitly, resoundingly, endorsed military action. Milosevic
> is clearly counting on past experience that the international
> community will compromise, accept the results of ethnic
> cleansing and leave him in power. We hope that this time he
> has miscalculated. Three of the major European
> players--Britain, France and Germany--under like-minded
> left-of-center governments have united in their determination
> to stop him, and they have popular majorities for doing so.
>
> Soon NATO will be faced with two alternatives: stop the
> bombing and "negotiate," or commit ground troops. The
> bombing should stop only when Belgrade agrees to pull out or
> is pushed out of Kosovo, if necessary by ground troops. For
> most of this decade Milosevic has used negotiations as a cover
> to consolidate the gains of ethnic cleansing.
>
> The precondition for a cease-fire must be the withdrawal of
> Serbian troops and police from Kosovo and their replacement
> by an international force, mostly NATO but including
> Russians if they want to become involved--and can afford to.
> (No one who saw the UN in inaction in Bosnia could wish UN
> forces on the long-suffering Kosovars.) Of course, the present
> campaign carries risks. To exorcise its frustration and put off
> the inevitable involvement on the ground, the White House
> will be increasingly tempted to escalate attacks on civilian and
> economic targets. The sooner ground troops are committed to
> clear Kosovo of Serbian forces and allow the refugees to
> return, the less temptation there will be, and the more likely
> that Milosevic will withdraw. Successful military action
> would also strengthen the prospects for democracy in Serbia.
> Much of the Serbian opposition argues that airstrikes weaken
> their position. In fact, it would be impossible to weaken their
> position on Kosovo: Even fewer of them explicitly oppose the
> repression there than resisted the war in Bosnia. In reality,
> Serbia cannot have democracy and Kosovo.
>
> There will be casualties, but the Serbian army and police,
> although fearsome against unarmed civilians, will be far from
> home, in hostile territory without air cover. The alternative is
> a terminal weakening of all the precarious advances in
> international humanitarian law that have been achieved over
> the past decade--not to mention the deaths and exile of
> hundreds of thousands of Kosovars.
>
> Bogdan Denitch and Ian Williams
>
> Bogdan Denitch, director of the Institute for Transitions to
> Democracy, which operates in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, is
> the author of Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of
> Yugoslavia (Minnesota). Ian Williams is The Nation's
> United Nations correspondent.
>
>
>
was recently interviewed in Canada re Kosovo and he made a few interesting
points:
* If we talk about ethnic cleansing and a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo,
then we should be talking about these things in relation to many other
countries - for example, Columbia and Turkey where the US supports regimes
(financially, military training, arms) which are oppressive, and engaging
in ethnic cleansing.
* What makes something a "humanitarian crisis"? Chomsky basically says that
the technical meaning of this phrase is that it affects the rich and
powerful - ie, Europe and therefore America.
* Ethnic cleansing is not only going on in Kosovo. I live in Australia, and
when I ask myself: Why am I here and not the original inhabitants, they
couldn't have just walked away. Ethnic cleansing is something that occurs
around the world, even in the US.
* Why is NATO intervening?
Firstly, to control what could be a potential threat to the stability of
Western Europe. Secondly, the reassert its credibility, and when we are
talking about the credibility of NATO, we are not talking about the
credibility of Denmark or Belgium, but the US.
* This article below ignores the fact that the NATO bombing has denied any
possible chance the Serbian Democratic Party had of countering Milosovic.
Nationalist fervour in response to the bombing has underswept the
democratic movement there. The article also denies that just before the
onset of bombing on 23 March, the Serbian Parliament were in the process of
deciding that UN peace-keeping troops could be allowed to enter Kosovo.
At 14:26 15/04/99 EDT, you wrote:
>The Nation, April 26, 1999
>
> The Case Against Inaction
>
> Sadly, some on the left are angrier about NATO's bombing
> than they are about the Serbian forces' atrocities, even though
> Milosevic's men have killed more in one Kosovan village than
> have all the airstrikes. Those who want an immediate NATO
> cease-fire owe the world an explanation of how they propose
> to stop and reverse the massive ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, in
> light of Milosevic's history as a serial ethnic cleanser and
> promise-breaker. Arguments that the NATO action diminishes
> the stature of the United Nations are, to say the least, highly
> questionable. What could diminish the UN's stature more than
> Milosevic's successful defiance of more than fifty Security
> Council resolutions? Only last September, Resolution 1199,
> invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, ordered Belgrade to
> "cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian
> population and order the withdrawal of security units used for
> civilian repression" in Kosovo. Only last October, Milosevic
> promised to reduce troop numbers in Kosovo, and his pledge
> was endorsed and given the force of international law by
> Security Council Resolution 1203. By the time the
> Rambouillet negotiations had started, he had more troops in
> Kosovo than ever before, and they had already begun their
> well-prepared campaign of ethnic cleansing.
>
> Real internationalists can hardly use the dubious rights of
> "national sovereignty" to oppose action to stop massacres.
> Opposition to US military intervention is an understandable
> rule of thumb, but it shouldn't become obsessive dogma. After
> all, most Europeans were happy with US intervention in
> World War II. The British court decisions on Gen. Augusto
> Pinochet show that, at last, politicians who murder cannot
> expect amnesty afterwards. Why should Slobodan Milosevic
> expect impunity as he carries out crimes against humanity?
>
> Ideally, there should have been a UN Security Council vote
> endorsing military action, but China and Russia had made it
> plain that no matter what barbarities Milosevic committed
> they would veto any such resolution. Happily, most of the
> Council agreed that ethnic cleansing was not something that
> could be shielded behind a dubious claim of national
> sovereignty and soundly defeated, 12 votes to 3, a Russian
> draft resolution condemning the bombing. Only Namibia
> joined Beijing and Moscow. NATO, most of whose
> governments are members of the Socialist International,
> agreed on a military response.
>
> In short, the court of international public opinion has
> implicitly, resoundingly, endorsed military action. Milosevic
> is clearly counting on past experience that the international
> community will compromise, accept the results of ethnic
> cleansing and leave him in power. We hope that this time he
> has miscalculated. Three of the major European
> players--Britain, France and Germany--under like-minded
> left-of-center governments have united in their determination
> to stop him, and they have popular majorities for doing so.
>
> Soon NATO will be faced with two alternatives: stop the
> bombing and "negotiate," or commit ground troops. The
> bombing should stop only when Belgrade agrees to pull out or
> is pushed out of Kosovo, if necessary by ground troops. For
> most of this decade Milosevic has used negotiations as a cover
> to consolidate the gains of ethnic cleansing.
>
> The precondition for a cease-fire must be the withdrawal of
> Serbian troops and police from Kosovo and their replacement
> by an international force, mostly NATO but including
> Russians if they want to become involved--and can afford to.
> (No one who saw the UN in inaction in Bosnia could wish UN
> forces on the long-suffering Kosovars.) Of course, the present
> campaign carries risks. To exorcise its frustration and put off
> the inevitable involvement on the ground, the White House
> will be increasingly tempted to escalate attacks on civilian and
> economic targets. The sooner ground troops are committed to
> clear Kosovo of Serbian forces and allow the refugees to
> return, the less temptation there will be, and the more likely
> that Milosevic will withdraw. Successful military action
> would also strengthen the prospects for democracy in Serbia.
> Much of the Serbian opposition argues that airstrikes weaken
> their position. In fact, it would be impossible to weaken their
> position on Kosovo: Even fewer of them explicitly oppose the
> repression there than resisted the war in Bosnia. In reality,
> Serbia cannot have democracy and Kosovo.
>
> There will be casualties, but the Serbian army and police,
> although fearsome against unarmed civilians, will be far from
> home, in hostile territory without air cover. The alternative is
> a terminal weakening of all the precarious advances in
> international humanitarian law that have been achieved over
> the past decade--not to mention the deaths and exile of
> hundreds of thousands of Kosovars.
>
> Bogdan Denitch and Ian Williams
>
> Bogdan Denitch, director of the Institute for Transitions to
> Democracy, which operates in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, is
> the author of Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of
> Yugoslavia (Minnesota). Ian Williams is The Nation's
> United Nations correspondent.
>
>
>