Re: Foucault and Iran

<bold>Rather, the process of resistance itself must look forward

</bold>which direction is this forward for Foucualt? does he believe in
ant direction at all?

<bold>>Unfortunately, all three of these reasons, and especially the
third,>ceased to be true within weeks of the Shah's fall.

</bold>and what was khomeyni, if not politician? so this reason was out
to begin with.

<bold>

he was saying nothing I except a >"no" to the shah;

</bold>this is not true either! he was saying all according to islam. he
was saying republic <italic><underline>islamic.

</underline></italic>

<bold>I would frame the lesson as follows:

</bold>this is your lesson. did he ever concluded
anything?<italic><underline> </underline></italic>his debate with
<underline>Le Matin</underline> never took place although he promised
it!? and he refused to speak to any Iranian after the revolution
regarding his position on the mov.!!!??? he excused himself: "Pour
l'instant, je suis occupe avec la question polonaise"


and to bring all these to the present situation in Kosovo, I would say
that Fouault would back KLA and he would be "embarasse" to back up NATO,
although by his logic, NATO is resisting the Serbian ...... as he did
feel "embarasse" to back Khomeyni, but he never ever changed his position
in Iran.

Have you read his reply to Mme Atoussa?


I am afraid that foucladien social theory ( if such think existed) is not
capable to deal with mass mov. can not explain the phenomenon of
leadership except in vague terms . Some Blanchot style literature yes,
but analysis? no!






At 02:04 PM 5/19/1999 -0400, you wrote:

>On Tue, 18 May 1999 Matthew King <<making@xxxxxxxx> wrote:

>>On Tue, 18 May 1999 aoliai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

>>

>>> what was to be admired about Khomeyni?

>>

>>I don't know. You have the text, I don't; what else does he say?
But

>>perhaps a certain steadfastness against "the tide of history", a

>>willingness to make a "rupture in history", as Foucault says in "Is
it

>>Useless to Revolt?" Not, for the most part, a good one, as it turns

>>out--hence not to be *supported*, but perhaps still to be *admired*.

>>

>>> Beside it is not just Khomeyni, he believed that Islam will
establish

>>> democratic institution in the society!

>>

>>Really? Does he say that? For that matter, was there never a moment

>>when

>>the Islamic revolutionaries *could have* established democratic

>>institutions? Did Puritan revolutionaries not help to establish

>>democratic institutions in the UK? (And if those institutions had

>>failed

>>to take root, would we not now scoff at the idea that they ever could

>>have?)

>

>Matthew King raises some interesting questions, which sent me back to

>the text. A few notes:

>

>In 1978 and '79, as many of you know, Foucault engaged in a series of

>"reportages" in Iran for the Italian newspaper Corriere della sera,

>which examined the Iranian revolution as it developed. In sum, he
wrote

>9 articles for Corriere della sera, as well as four major pieces that

>appeared in various French publications and a few brief responses to

>critics. (All of these, of course, are available in Dits et Ecrits,
vol.

>3; only two have been translated into English: "Iran: the spirit of a

>world without spirit" L. Kritzman, ed., _Politics, philosophy,
culture_

>(Routledge, 1988), pp. 211-224, and "Is it useless to revolt?"

>_Philosophy and social criticism_ 8:1 (Spring 1981), pp. 1-9. By the

>way, I think that these pieces would make for a very interesting small

>volume of translations, if they aren't included in the third volume of

>the so-called _Essential Foucault_.)

>

>Francois Ewald, Foucault's research assistant at the College de
France,

>notes that MF's interest in Iran illustrates his interest in the
history

>of the present, of "actualiti". (Ewald makes this point in "Foucault

>and the contemporary scene" in the latest issue of _Philosophy and

>social criticism_ 25:3 (May 1999), pp. 81-91, cf. p. 86.) Foucault
says

>as much himself in the 8th of his installments for Corriere della
sera,

>"I don't know how to do the history of the future. And I'm clumsy at

>foreseeing the past. Nevertheless, I would like to try to grasp *what

>is happening now* (ce qui est en train de passer), because in our day

>nothing is set in stone and the dice are still rolling." (DE 3:714)
So

>he looked to Iran, where "what is happening now" was happening.

>

>What he found was paradoxical: a "perfectly unified collective will"

>that rejects the Shah's regime, but the absence of any person, party,
or

>ideology who was capable of taking the leadership of this popular
will.

>(The situation seems to me remarkably similar to the state of affairs
in

>East Germany in the summer and fall of 1989, before the Wall was
opened

>in November. The opening of the Wall shattered the unity of the
popular

>will and enabled Kohl to step in and assume the position of leader.)

>Foucault found this popular will disconcerting, precisely because it

>focused on the depart of the shah, without any vision of what kind of

>regime would follow. And so, according to Foucault's analysis,
Khomeini

>became a mythical figure, an "anti-Shah" if you will, and became the

>focal point of this popular will. He was able to take on this
mythical,

>focusing role, on Foucault's analysis, for 3 reasons: (1) he was not

>there -- he was living in exile in France for 15 years and wouldn't

>return until the Shah had left; (2) he was saying nothing -- except a

>"no" to the shah; and (3) he was not a politician, so "there won't be
a

>Khomeini party, there won't be a Khomeini government". (all of this
from

>DE 3:715-716)

>

>(By the way, this article was titled "The mythical leader of the
Iranian

>revolt", but Foucault had originally proposed the title "The madness
of

>Iran".)

>

>Unfortunately, all three of these reasons, and especially the third,

>ceased to be true within weeks of the Shah's fall. I think Foucault
was

>right to find the situation that led to the mythification of Khomeini

>"disconcerting" as its subsequent consequences made clear and I

>hope that we can extract a lesson from this for any Foucauldian
ethical

>or political analysis. I would frame the lesson as follows:

>"Transgression" of or "resistance" to a state of domination is not in

>and of itself sufficient. Rather, the process of resistance itself
must

>look forward and try to imagine possibilities that can be achieved, so

>that the resistance can be aimed toward some goal or improvement (even

>if this goal, too, is imperfect, dangerous), lest it discover after
the

>fact that the resistance has only created a vacuum filled by a greater

>evil than the one resisted.

>

>To bring all this back to our current ongoing discussion of Kosovo, I

>would say only that it seems to me that NATO needs to be sure to heed

>this lesson.

>

>Richard

>

>Richard A. Lynch

>Dept. of Philosophy

>Boston College

>Chestnut HIll, MA 02467 USA

>lynchrb@xxxxxx

>

>

<bold><italic>The foucaldien ethos has already reached his/her eternal
utopia in the "present". No need for further move!

</italic></bold>



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