Thanks for the clarification.
I really appreciate this point you made: "by Foucauldian definition, power
governs the behaviour of people by making them "freely" choose to do
certain things." Very clear--thank you.
But I have to wonder: are "power" and "bio-power" such similar concepts
that the definition of one is, in some way, a definition of the other? I
mean, it seems you're asserting that Foucault's definition of "power," if
it doesn't match his definition of "bio-power," then there's a
contradiction, as if power and bio-power are the same concepts, the same
types of power that operate on the same levels and produce the same
effects.
In short, it seems you're saying that there's only one type of Foucauldian
power? I don't know if this is true or not.
But I do know of a distinction that might help: "power," since--as you
pointed out--operates at the level of the individual since it functions as
an internalized mode of "power" in the manifestation of the right to
"freely" choose; but "bio-power" operates on the level above the
individual, on the level of a whole population, since (sorry, don't have
the book in front of me) it is that set of regulatory operations that moves
a whole population of bodies into accordance, in terms of discipline, with
societal forces, as in modes of production.
Perhaps "power" on the level of the individual is a cooperating force with
"bio-power" on the level of society, so that we have two seperate powers
here, niether one excluding or contradicting the other?
Mitch
>On Wed, 19 May 1999, Mitch Wilson wrote:
>
>> In Ian's point below, about the nature of biopower being a domain "ends
>> where killing begins," isn't your premise, that biopower has/or should have
>> an eternal nature, antithetical to Foucault's concept of power?
>
>I don't think that's my premise.... I haven't given a great deal of
>thought to "biopower" (I've only recently started paying attention to the
>last part of HS1--which Foucault said was the most important part of the
>book--because I've taken up a project on genocide), but my take on it is
>that "biopower" is the name Foucault gives to the form of governmentality
>growing out of the rise of biology and medicine--hence biopower is a
>relatively recent phenomenon, perhaps a transient phase in Western
>government.
>
>> I mean, shouldn't biopower, as a domain, be flexible and mutable
>> according/in response to the struggles of the times in which it
>> operates, so that in one era it may, at first, not include killing as
>> a technique on the body but then, in another era, come to include
>> killing as a technique?
>
>I guess so--but again, for Foucault, genocide seems to be the paradigm
>case for biopower: the excision of foreign bodies from the body politic.
>
>> Isn't that an aspect of Foucault's theory of power--that strategies
>> aren't innate, that they don't have/function by an internal
>> perpetuity?
>
>Right, but I think that once he starts talking about biopower, he's no
>longer talking about "Foucault's theory of power" (i.e. what held sway
>through D&P and up until the last part of HS1) ... or at least it has been
>modified. At any rate, "biopower" is a certain kind of power; it is not,
>for Foucault, coextensive with power in general.
>
>> Could this "shift" that Ian spoke of--a very good point which is going to
>> send me running back, soon as I get off work, to read the last section of
>> HS1--couldn't this shift not be a contradiction in Foucault's account of
>> power relations, but rather a very good example of the transient "nature"
>> of power?
>
>I don't think so, because by Foucauldian definition, power governs the
>behaviour of people by making them "freely" choose to do certain things.
>F. makes this clear in one of the interviews with Dreyfus and Rabinow, I
>think (unfortunately I don't have the texts at hand)--which, come to think
>of it, seems to show that this may be an actual contradiction and not a
>transition, since those interviews were conducted in the early '80s.
>Perhaps he changed his mind and changed it back again :).
>
>Matthew
>
> ---Matthew A. King---Department of Philosophy---York University, Toronto---
> dear readers, my apologies.
> I'm drifting in and out of sleep.
> ---------------------------------(R.E.M.)----------------------------------
I really appreciate this point you made: "by Foucauldian definition, power
governs the behaviour of people by making them "freely" choose to do
certain things." Very clear--thank you.
But I have to wonder: are "power" and "bio-power" such similar concepts
that the definition of one is, in some way, a definition of the other? I
mean, it seems you're asserting that Foucault's definition of "power," if
it doesn't match his definition of "bio-power," then there's a
contradiction, as if power and bio-power are the same concepts, the same
types of power that operate on the same levels and produce the same
effects.
In short, it seems you're saying that there's only one type of Foucauldian
power? I don't know if this is true or not.
But I do know of a distinction that might help: "power," since--as you
pointed out--operates at the level of the individual since it functions as
an internalized mode of "power" in the manifestation of the right to
"freely" choose; but "bio-power" operates on the level above the
individual, on the level of a whole population, since (sorry, don't have
the book in front of me) it is that set of regulatory operations that moves
a whole population of bodies into accordance, in terms of discipline, with
societal forces, as in modes of production.
Perhaps "power" on the level of the individual is a cooperating force with
"bio-power" on the level of society, so that we have two seperate powers
here, niether one excluding or contradicting the other?
Mitch
>On Wed, 19 May 1999, Mitch Wilson wrote:
>
>> In Ian's point below, about the nature of biopower being a domain "ends
>> where killing begins," isn't your premise, that biopower has/or should have
>> an eternal nature, antithetical to Foucault's concept of power?
>
>I don't think that's my premise.... I haven't given a great deal of
>thought to "biopower" (I've only recently started paying attention to the
>last part of HS1--which Foucault said was the most important part of the
>book--because I've taken up a project on genocide), but my take on it is
>that "biopower" is the name Foucault gives to the form of governmentality
>growing out of the rise of biology and medicine--hence biopower is a
>relatively recent phenomenon, perhaps a transient phase in Western
>government.
>
>> I mean, shouldn't biopower, as a domain, be flexible and mutable
>> according/in response to the struggles of the times in which it
>> operates, so that in one era it may, at first, not include killing as
>> a technique on the body but then, in another era, come to include
>> killing as a technique?
>
>I guess so--but again, for Foucault, genocide seems to be the paradigm
>case for biopower: the excision of foreign bodies from the body politic.
>
>> Isn't that an aspect of Foucault's theory of power--that strategies
>> aren't innate, that they don't have/function by an internal
>> perpetuity?
>
>Right, but I think that once he starts talking about biopower, he's no
>longer talking about "Foucault's theory of power" (i.e. what held sway
>through D&P and up until the last part of HS1) ... or at least it has been
>modified. At any rate, "biopower" is a certain kind of power; it is not,
>for Foucault, coextensive with power in general.
>
>> Could this "shift" that Ian spoke of--a very good point which is going to
>> send me running back, soon as I get off work, to read the last section of
>> HS1--couldn't this shift not be a contradiction in Foucault's account of
>> power relations, but rather a very good example of the transient "nature"
>> of power?
>
>I don't think so, because by Foucauldian definition, power governs the
>behaviour of people by making them "freely" choose to do certain things.
>F. makes this clear in one of the interviews with Dreyfus and Rabinow, I
>think (unfortunately I don't have the texts at hand)--which, come to think
>of it, seems to show that this may be an actual contradiction and not a
>transition, since those interviews were conducted in the early '80s.
>Perhaps he changed his mind and changed it back again :).
>
>Matthew
>
> ---Matthew A. King---Department of Philosophy---York University, Toronto---
> dear readers, my apologies.
> I'm drifting in and out of sleep.
> ---------------------------------(R.E.M.)----------------------------------