Re: foucault/derrida

Joe--

Derrida need not know what the true experience of
madness is in order to point out that Foucault is
caught up within a performative contradiction with
respect to his *early* project. He need only
demonstrate that Foucault believes he can identify or
point to the true experience of madness despite the
fact that the true experience of madness is exactly
that which cannot be identified by reason.

Paul Bryant
Department of Philosophy
Loyola University of Chicago

--- JBCM2@xxxxxxx wrote:
> In a message dated 10/22/99 10:46:12 AM Eastern
> Daylight Time,
> levi_bryant@xxxxxxxxx writes:
>
> << If Foucault is in some sense claiming that
> identities such as madness are discursive
> formations
> molded from a field of forces, then the evocation
> of a
> true or authentic madness can only represent one
> more
> rationalization of madness in a series of other
> rationalizations. In other words, Foucault,
> according
> to Derrida, falls prey to precisely the same
> fallacy
> that he accuses psychology of... >>
>
> wouldn't this same reasoning also hold true for
> Derrida?
>
>
> joe brennan....
>


=====

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