>In a message dated 03/02/2000 10:46:09 PM Eastern Standard Time,
>suannschafer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>
> > I'm cornfused as to how it is possible "to think outside discourse."
> > I think I can understand the desire to imagine/think outside
> > discursive structures, but isn't even this imbedded in some notion of
> > "discourse"?
>
>Philosophy before the late 20th century never enunciated an dialogical
>approach, that is, determined principles or categories on the basis that
>agreement determined validity.
Could you please enunciate for me the distinction between a
dialogical and a dialectical approach?
And while "philosophy" may never have enunciated a dialogical
approach, does that mean that one did not exist? Sounds like the old
forest/trees chestnut to me. And I fail to understand how a
dialogical approach determines principles/categories on the basis
that agreement constitutes validity.
>We have lived in an extremely stratified
>socio-historical context for all of history wherein powerful interests
>determined norms.
True.
>To open up questionable norms to dicursive processes of
>will formation is a relatively new form of democracy.
I think I take your point, but could you please elaborate on what you
mean by "will formation"?
>Tho brought up by Hegel and implied in Kant, legitimation by discourse is
>relatively new.
And hence is not "late 20th century." But, for example, does Hegel
really propose "legitimation by discourse"? Could you elaborate on
this notion?
>Philosophers typically determine the coherence and validity
>of their theories through a finely articulated but subjective logic wherein
>the rationality of the position is explained and only a few other well-versed
>colleagues could adequately critique.
Yes, that seems to be what's going on here :) But would "all"
philosophers concur that their logic is indeed "subjective"?
>
> >
> > >It was the
> > >traditionalists who
> > >attempted a metaphysics of subjectivity that analytically related
>concepts
> > to
> > >each other such that values appeared to be connected to generalizable
>norms
> > >and maxims, without undergoing any tests by discourse.
> >
> >
> > I'm afraid I've lost you above. Isn't there always a test by
> > discourse, even if the test isn't immanent? Are the exceptions to
> > which you point below a form of test by discourse? Is "dialogue"
> > below the same as "discourse"? And aren't "dialogical methods" (a
> > form of ) "discourse", indeed a discursive strategy/structure?
>
>Of course discourse is dialogue, but when was the last time you discussed
>norms with anyone??
I discuss "norms," indeed the "normative," all the time with EVERYone!
Best,
B
>suannschafer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>
> > I'm cornfused as to how it is possible "to think outside discourse."
> > I think I can understand the desire to imagine/think outside
> > discursive structures, but isn't even this imbedded in some notion of
> > "discourse"?
>
>Philosophy before the late 20th century never enunciated an dialogical
>approach, that is, determined principles or categories on the basis that
>agreement determined validity.
Could you please enunciate for me the distinction between a
dialogical and a dialectical approach?
And while "philosophy" may never have enunciated a dialogical
approach, does that mean that one did not exist? Sounds like the old
forest/trees chestnut to me. And I fail to understand how a
dialogical approach determines principles/categories on the basis
that agreement constitutes validity.
>We have lived in an extremely stratified
>socio-historical context for all of history wherein powerful interests
>determined norms.
True.
>To open up questionable norms to dicursive processes of
>will formation is a relatively new form of democracy.
I think I take your point, but could you please elaborate on what you
mean by "will formation"?
>Tho brought up by Hegel and implied in Kant, legitimation by discourse is
>relatively new.
And hence is not "late 20th century." But, for example, does Hegel
really propose "legitimation by discourse"? Could you elaborate on
this notion?
>Philosophers typically determine the coherence and validity
>of their theories through a finely articulated but subjective logic wherein
>the rationality of the position is explained and only a few other well-versed
>colleagues could adequately critique.
Yes, that seems to be what's going on here :) But would "all"
philosophers concur that their logic is indeed "subjective"?
>
> >
> > >It was the
> > >traditionalists who
> > >attempted a metaphysics of subjectivity that analytically related
>concepts
> > to
> > >each other such that values appeared to be connected to generalizable
>norms
> > >and maxims, without undergoing any tests by discourse.
> >
> >
> > I'm afraid I've lost you above. Isn't there always a test by
> > discourse, even if the test isn't immanent? Are the exceptions to
> > which you point below a form of test by discourse? Is "dialogue"
> > below the same as "discourse"? And aren't "dialogical methods" (a
> > form of ) "discourse", indeed a discursive strategy/structure?
>
>Of course discourse is dialogue, but when was the last time you discussed
>norms with anyone??
I discuss "norms," indeed the "normative," all the time with EVERYone!
Best,
B