Hello All,
I am a Ph.D. student in economics/public policy and I am
currently writing my thesis. My research project seeks to use Foucault's
concept of productive power to develop a rational model of institutional
choice.
Economists have for very long been puzzled with respect to why
hierarchies exist as an economic form of organization. Is there any
rational that may explain why it is sometimes better for individuals to
transact within a hierarchy where the actions, the choices of some
individuals are conducted by others rather than within a market where no
individuals exercise any power, any (direct) influence on the choices
and actions made by others?
Thus far, the most popular answer to this question has been provided by
the transaction cost approach that claims that some market transactions
are beset by transaction costs. Transaction costs are attributes of the
goods that are transacted that have the effect of creating opportunistic
(unwanted) behavior on the part of certain transactors. In this context,
exercising power over an individual is seen as a means to mitigate
opportunistic behavior on the part of this individual.
Hence, as one can see, this rational ascribe to the exercise of power a
negative function. The exercise of power over some individuals part of a
given transaction serves the function of repressing opportunistic
behavior from their part. Hence, the exercise of power has clearly a
negative function in this rational.
For my part, I am trying to develop an alternative model of
institutional choice that would not see the exercise of power as a way
to mitigate opportunistic behavior created by transaction costs but as
way for an individual to use his own knowledge, his own standards, to
guide the actions of certain individuals with whom he transacts. The
fundamental reason that explain why power relationships arise in such a
context would be that a transactor will choose to exercise power over
another transactor whenever he will feel that it would be better if this
other transactor would conform to his standards and guidelines rather
than his own standards and guidelines when he produce the goods and
services that he seeks to acquire from him. Transactors will be reputed
to ascribe a certain positive value to their own knowledge -their own
way of doing things- and exercising power will be a way for them to reap
the positive value associated with their knowledge since exercising
power will allow this knowledge not only to inform and mold their
actions with respect to how to perform certain tasks but the actions of
others as well.
Therefore, exercising power will allow a transactor to benefit from his
knowledge on a larger scale than he alone could attain if only he would
follow his own standards and guidelines to perform certain tasks. More
generally, we can say that a power relationship is an exchange but,
unlike a market exchange, a transactor sees his utility rise not when
others transfer resources in his favor but when he himself is able to
transfer his knowledge on others through the conduct of their actions.
In this respect, a fundamental assumption of this model will be that it
is not always possible to find, on the marketplace, an agent that will
perform tasks according to standards that will satisfy the requirements
of a given transactor.
But to which extent and in which circumstances might we believe that it
will be possible for a transactor to convince some other transactors to
let themselves be conducted by him so that he may obtain from them goods
and services that will be produced according to his own standards? Like
in all rational choice models, it is the specification of the
constraints -in this case how can power be acquired- that will heavily
influence the inferences of the model. From a general standpoint, the
constraint to the acquisition of the exercise of power is simply that
one must find someone else upon whom to exercise his power if he wants
to benefits from the value associated with his knowledge. This
constraint can be satisfied, I believe, in two different ways in a
rational choice context. The exercise of authority can be acquired
either by making better off those who will accept to let their actions
being conducted by oneself or it can be acquired by making worse off
those who would refuse to let their actions being conducted by oneself.
I plan to use game theory to modelize how transactors will be able to
acquire power over others and hence to predict how power will be
allocated and how it will shift among transactors. In this respect, I
define institutions as being particular allocations of power among
transactors.
The reason why I am exposing the basic idea upon which my research
project is built to the subscribers of this list is that I have never
encountered before anyone who tried to use Foucault insights on power to
inform a rational choice theory of institutional choice. In economics,
Foucault's work is completely unknown. In Econlit, the major database of
all academic publications in economics, Foucault is the object of only
one paper -a brief exposé of Foucault's views on disciplinary power-
that was published in the 1980s. In the same vein, I do not of any
non-economist who has tried to use Foucault to revisit, to analyze
rational choice literature on institutions such as transaction cost
economics.
So what I would want to know is this: Does anybody know about any person
or any work that has tried to confront rational choice theories of
institutional choice with Foucault's views on productive power? Are
there any fundamental objections to use Foucault's insights on
productive power in a rational choice context? Is there any interest
among the community of scholars that study and use Foucault's work for
such a confrontation?
Any comments and advice will be appreciated. Thanks^Å
Richard Levesque
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
I am a Ph.D. student in economics/public policy and I am
currently writing my thesis. My research project seeks to use Foucault's
concept of productive power to develop a rational model of institutional
choice.
Economists have for very long been puzzled with respect to why
hierarchies exist as an economic form of organization. Is there any
rational that may explain why it is sometimes better for individuals to
transact within a hierarchy where the actions, the choices of some
individuals are conducted by others rather than within a market where no
individuals exercise any power, any (direct) influence on the choices
and actions made by others?
Thus far, the most popular answer to this question has been provided by
the transaction cost approach that claims that some market transactions
are beset by transaction costs. Transaction costs are attributes of the
goods that are transacted that have the effect of creating opportunistic
(unwanted) behavior on the part of certain transactors. In this context,
exercising power over an individual is seen as a means to mitigate
opportunistic behavior on the part of this individual.
Hence, as one can see, this rational ascribe to the exercise of power a
negative function. The exercise of power over some individuals part of a
given transaction serves the function of repressing opportunistic
behavior from their part. Hence, the exercise of power has clearly a
negative function in this rational.
For my part, I am trying to develop an alternative model of
institutional choice that would not see the exercise of power as a way
to mitigate opportunistic behavior created by transaction costs but as
way for an individual to use his own knowledge, his own standards, to
guide the actions of certain individuals with whom he transacts. The
fundamental reason that explain why power relationships arise in such a
context would be that a transactor will choose to exercise power over
another transactor whenever he will feel that it would be better if this
other transactor would conform to his standards and guidelines rather
than his own standards and guidelines when he produce the goods and
services that he seeks to acquire from him. Transactors will be reputed
to ascribe a certain positive value to their own knowledge -their own
way of doing things- and exercising power will be a way for them to reap
the positive value associated with their knowledge since exercising
power will allow this knowledge not only to inform and mold their
actions with respect to how to perform certain tasks but the actions of
others as well.
Therefore, exercising power will allow a transactor to benefit from his
knowledge on a larger scale than he alone could attain if only he would
follow his own standards and guidelines to perform certain tasks. More
generally, we can say that a power relationship is an exchange but,
unlike a market exchange, a transactor sees his utility rise not when
others transfer resources in his favor but when he himself is able to
transfer his knowledge on others through the conduct of their actions.
In this respect, a fundamental assumption of this model will be that it
is not always possible to find, on the marketplace, an agent that will
perform tasks according to standards that will satisfy the requirements
of a given transactor.
But to which extent and in which circumstances might we believe that it
will be possible for a transactor to convince some other transactors to
let themselves be conducted by him so that he may obtain from them goods
and services that will be produced according to his own standards? Like
in all rational choice models, it is the specification of the
constraints -in this case how can power be acquired- that will heavily
influence the inferences of the model. From a general standpoint, the
constraint to the acquisition of the exercise of power is simply that
one must find someone else upon whom to exercise his power if he wants
to benefits from the value associated with his knowledge. This
constraint can be satisfied, I believe, in two different ways in a
rational choice context. The exercise of authority can be acquired
either by making better off those who will accept to let their actions
being conducted by oneself or it can be acquired by making worse off
those who would refuse to let their actions being conducted by oneself.
I plan to use game theory to modelize how transactors will be able to
acquire power over others and hence to predict how power will be
allocated and how it will shift among transactors. In this respect, I
define institutions as being particular allocations of power among
transactors.
The reason why I am exposing the basic idea upon which my research
project is built to the subscribers of this list is that I have never
encountered before anyone who tried to use Foucault insights on power to
inform a rational choice theory of institutional choice. In economics,
Foucault's work is completely unknown. In Econlit, the major database of
all academic publications in economics, Foucault is the object of only
one paper -a brief exposé of Foucault's views on disciplinary power-
that was published in the 1980s. In the same vein, I do not of any
non-economist who has tried to use Foucault to revisit, to analyze
rational choice literature on institutions such as transaction cost
economics.
So what I would want to know is this: Does anybody know about any person
or any work that has tried to confront rational choice theories of
institutional choice with Foucault's views on productive power? Are
there any fundamental objections to use Foucault's insights on
productive power in a rational choice context? Is there any interest
among the community of scholars that study and use Foucault's work for
such a confrontation?
Any comments and advice will be appreciated. Thanks^Å
Richard Levesque
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.