>From a High school debating perspective, I think a good position might be
to relate Foucault to American pragmatism. When people institutionalize
freedom, nationally, or in their own heads, there is the obvious risk
that "freedom" can become a form of non-thought, a diminishment of
perceived alternatives.
Foucault's writings are not meant to solve the problem of free will vs.
determinism, of course, but to ask how practices, often portrayed via
such distinctions, effect present circumstances. Rather than shutting
down thought, in the form of a prefabricated solution, such analysis
attempts to engender a more fluid perception of events, perhaps opening
up spaces for inventing new, if always provisional "solutions."
In John Dewey's "How We Think" he talks about the importance of
suspending judgment, in order to let the naturalistic chaos, the shape of
the problem or disequalibrium, set in on one's nervous system, before the
'adventurous act' of generating responses. Like art, a narrative, which
suspends our heroic presumption of "saving the day" and highlights the
chaotic backdrop of a situation, can, though there is no guarantee,
foster new opportunities for invention. Perceiving and responding to
problems anew, might be the best definition of "freedom" one could
examine in Foucault's writings.
Regarding Bio-Power, the final chapter of History of Sexuality Vol. I is
a key reference. Compare, for example, Leni Reifenstahl's film of the
Nuremburg rallies, and the 1950s mental hygiene film's intended to teach
appropriate dating habits, and the "Be all you can be" television
commercials that the Army produced after Vietnam. How are "nation,"
"power," and "freedom" enacted in such contexts?
Isn't it our capacity to perceive alternatives to the prescribed
"solutions" for our bodies and brains that is arguably, a crucial problem
when we talk about freedom?
In other words, if you are using Foucault, and the argument turns to the
problem of freedom, I think you have a lot of ammunition.
to relate Foucault to American pragmatism. When people institutionalize
freedom, nationally, or in their own heads, there is the obvious risk
that "freedom" can become a form of non-thought, a diminishment of
perceived alternatives.
Foucault's writings are not meant to solve the problem of free will vs.
determinism, of course, but to ask how practices, often portrayed via
such distinctions, effect present circumstances. Rather than shutting
down thought, in the form of a prefabricated solution, such analysis
attempts to engender a more fluid perception of events, perhaps opening
up spaces for inventing new, if always provisional "solutions."
In John Dewey's "How We Think" he talks about the importance of
suspending judgment, in order to let the naturalistic chaos, the shape of
the problem or disequalibrium, set in on one's nervous system, before the
'adventurous act' of generating responses. Like art, a narrative, which
suspends our heroic presumption of "saving the day" and highlights the
chaotic backdrop of a situation, can, though there is no guarantee,
foster new opportunities for invention. Perceiving and responding to
problems anew, might be the best definition of "freedom" one could
examine in Foucault's writings.
Regarding Bio-Power, the final chapter of History of Sexuality Vol. I is
a key reference. Compare, for example, Leni Reifenstahl's film of the
Nuremburg rallies, and the 1950s mental hygiene film's intended to teach
appropriate dating habits, and the "Be all you can be" television
commercials that the Army produced after Vietnam. How are "nation,"
"power," and "freedom" enacted in such contexts?
Isn't it our capacity to perceive alternatives to the prescribed
"solutions" for our bodies and brains that is arguably, a crucial problem
when we talk about freedom?
In other words, if you are using Foucault, and the argument turns to the
problem of freedom, I think you have a lot of ammunition.