In a message dated 1/29/01 11:35:46 AM Eastern Standard Time,
Patrick.Krueger@xxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> aren't "fundamental principles" just as deterministic
> as anything else?
The concept of principles requires a certain degree or competency of
understanding. Obviously, if a person does not understand the purpose of a
principle, then it might seem to be merely an edict without reason.
As for the problem of meaning, I would like to direct your attention to the
problem which Heidegger and the more recent postmodernists raise. Heidegger
felt that the traditional understanding of meaning was wrong because things
that were referred to in discourse were assumed to be present.
The assumption of present-at-hand of things referred completely ignored the
problem of how they got there, or how they get to be present. Therefore, we
are in all actuality immersed into an extreme ambiguity about the meaning of
the words we use: if the wrods refer to things that are present, how did they
become present, if we are referring to things that are not present, how do
they become present.
The postmodernists, including Baudrillard, Lyotard, Foucault, Lacan, Derrida,
etc.,
ech in their own way, find a major problem with meaning. All of them took
part in the linguistic turn which climaxed in the 1950's, but which began
befroe Suassaure, circa 1914; in this linguistic turn, a slow change in
meaning took place from the idea of reference to the notion of signification
until the hold of linguistics took over in which all term refer merely to
other terms and do not have any other reference. Of course, the common
person is still stuck in a context of referentiality. As I said, it all
depends upon your level of competency. For Lacan, all phenomena refer only
to words and those to other words, ad infinitum; for Derrida, the meaning of
a term is polyvalent, as was the meaing of a sign for Pierce. The selection
of a meaning, just like the selection of a lexical item in everday discourse
was not merely arbitrary and capricious, or local and conventional, as
Foucault might have us believe. But, language serves as our link to Being,
as the mode in which Being is revealed, for Heidegger. As I am greatly
simplifying, I just want to point out that there was a significant change in
the understanding of meaning from reference to things to signification within
language.
Language seems to have a unique power to signify that human being is the
vehicle.
Fwelfare@xxxxxxx
Patrick.Krueger@xxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> aren't "fundamental principles" just as deterministic
> as anything else?
The concept of principles requires a certain degree or competency of
understanding. Obviously, if a person does not understand the purpose of a
principle, then it might seem to be merely an edict without reason.
As for the problem of meaning, I would like to direct your attention to the
problem which Heidegger and the more recent postmodernists raise. Heidegger
felt that the traditional understanding of meaning was wrong because things
that were referred to in discourse were assumed to be present.
The assumption of present-at-hand of things referred completely ignored the
problem of how they got there, or how they get to be present. Therefore, we
are in all actuality immersed into an extreme ambiguity about the meaning of
the words we use: if the wrods refer to things that are present, how did they
become present, if we are referring to things that are not present, how do
they become present.
The postmodernists, including Baudrillard, Lyotard, Foucault, Lacan, Derrida,
etc.,
ech in their own way, find a major problem with meaning. All of them took
part in the linguistic turn which climaxed in the 1950's, but which began
befroe Suassaure, circa 1914; in this linguistic turn, a slow change in
meaning took place from the idea of reference to the notion of signification
until the hold of linguistics took over in which all term refer merely to
other terms and do not have any other reference. Of course, the common
person is still stuck in a context of referentiality. As I said, it all
depends upon your level of competency. For Lacan, all phenomena refer only
to words and those to other words, ad infinitum; for Derrida, the meaning of
a term is polyvalent, as was the meaing of a sign for Pierce. The selection
of a meaning, just like the selection of a lexical item in everday discourse
was not merely arbitrary and capricious, or local and conventional, as
Foucault might have us believe. But, language serves as our link to Being,
as the mode in which Being is revealed, for Heidegger. As I am greatly
simplifying, I just want to point out that there was a significant change in
the understanding of meaning from reference to things to signification within
language.
Language seems to have a unique power to signify that human being is the
vehicle.
Fwelfare@xxxxxxx