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Donald:
Relativism is indeed a slippery term. More often than not it is a curse
word used by conservatives who do not share their transcendental
narcissism -- the view that they have a special pipeline to God or some
other transcendental authority that the rest of us benighted lowlifes
have failed to notice. Eliseo Vivas (a thoughtful conservative) observes
that relativism can function as an especially weak moral theory: "Every
society has its own morality and we should not impose our unique moral
values on them." One surely need not be a relativist in this sense
simply because one doubts the existence of a transcendental authority.
One can affirm an immanent source of moral authority such as human
nature (Aristotle) or some universal human aim such as happiness (Mill)
or the desire for security (Hobbes). One can also deny both moral
fouundationalism and moral universalism without abandoning one's moral
commitments. One can affirm moral "ethnocentrism" (Rorty) without
seeking a foundation for one's morality or affirming its universality.
I am not convinced that Kant is a foundationalist in the sense that
Aquinas and other "natural law" theorists are foundationlists (and
transcendentalists). Natural law theorists affirm standards of morality
(God, the order of things) discoverable by reason to which we owe our
allegiance.. Kant affirms no such source. Indeed, Kant's stress on
autonomy precludes a SOURCE of morality independent of the will. Kant
simply outlines the CONDITIONS for morality -- autonomy, consistency,
universality.
Contemporary Kantians are not committed to a transcendent source of
moral authority. Rawls slogan that justice as fairness is "political not
metaphysical" suffices to illustrate that point Whether Rawls is still a
universalist is an interesting and difficult question.
What most interests me is the possibility of retaining some Kantian
elements of moral and political thought while rejecting both
foundationalism and universalism. For instance, William Connolly
attempts to be resolutely Foucauldian in his moral and political theory
while affirming what he calls "agonistic respect." He has been quite
good at elaborating the "agon" while less forthcoming in clarifying the
conditions and meaning of "respect." I think a fresh look at Kant might
be quite useful in elaborating a theory like Connolly's to which I am
quite attracted.
One last (somewhat cryptic) note. I think one can be a transcendental
thinker without being a moral or epistemological foundationalist. I
develop this point at some length in a piece I wrote on Arendt.
Critiques of foundationalism usually blur the distinction between
foundational and transcendental thought. Jaspers is a good example of a
thinker who is transcendental without being foundational -- a
self-proclaimed Kantian to boot.
Cheers.
Larry
Donald E Van Duyse wrote:
> In recent postings, correct me if I'm wrong, I've heard Foucault
> associated with "moral relativism." I would like some qualification
> here. Isn't there a difference between "relativism" and "relativity?"
> Is
> Foucault best read in the latter sense?
>
> Definitions:
>
> Moral relativism argues that all moral assertions are equivocal, and
> one
> moral assertion will serve, arbitrarily, as well as the next. There
> are
> no grounds for choosing one perspective over another. Morality, in
> other
> words, is quite literally, an "ism," a flat, homogenous collection of
> sayings that lack inherent value, and bear no meaningful relationship
> to
> one another, except that which is imposed by individual bias or
> arbitrary
> variables.
>
> Moral relativity argues moral meanings are not fixed, nor are they
> arbitrary, but instead, are meaningful only in context. Moral
> assertions
> are appreciated as "relational." How do moral perspectives emerge in
> complex circumstances? How are moral meanings dynamically interrelated
> to
> other events?
>
> Relativism says blandly, "all meanings are equivocal." Relativity, on
> the
> other hand, says meanings are complicated by related events, that's
> how
> moral assertions arise. For relativity, the complexity of the whole is
> always greater than the putative sum of its parts. For relativism,
> it's
> the arbitrary naming of unrelated parts.
>
> "And is it not a plausible suspicion that if 'to be' were pointless
> and
> the universe void of meaning, we would never have achieved not only
> the
> ability to imagine otherwise but even the ability to think precisely
> this: that 'to be' is indeed pointless and the universe void of
> meaning."
> (Leszek Kolakowski, Metaphysical Horror, pg. 120)
>
> (Personally, I think if neo-Kantians stopped saving the world from the
> straw-man of "relativism," accepted the well-deserved kick in the butt
> from relativists like Foucault, and worked out their own explorations
> of
> "relativity," their arguments might be better served---e.g. what might
> Foucault, Chomsky, and the Critique of Pure Reason have to do with
> each
> other?)
>
> (Bryan, I don't know why you think homosexuality is immoral? It
> strikes
> me as an odd assertion to make on a Foucault list. Do you have a
> double
> ax to grind (Perhaps that of a Kantian and religious conservative?)
>
>
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Donald:
<p>Relativism is indeed a slippery term. More often than not it is a curse
word used by conservatives who do not share their transcendental narcissism
-- the view that they have a special pipeline to God or some other transcendental
authority that the rest of us benighted lowlifes have failed to notice.
Eliseo Vivas (a thoughtful conservative) observes that relativism can function
as an especially weak moral theory: "Every society has its own morality
and we should not impose our unique moral values on them." One surely need
not be a relativist in this sense simply because one doubts the existence
of a transcendental authority.
<p>One can affirm an immanent source of moral authority such as human nature
(Aristotle) or some universal human aim such as happiness (Mill) or the
desire for security (Hobbes). One can also deny both moral fouundationalism
and moral universalism without abandoning one's moral commitments. One
can affirm moral "ethnocentrism" (Rorty) without seeking a foundation for
one's morality or affirming its universality.
<p>I am not convinced that Kant is a foundationalist in the sense that
Aquinas and other "natural law" theorists are foundationlists (and transcendentalists).
Natural law theorists affirm standards of morality (God, the order of things)
discoverable by reason to which we owe our allegiance.. Kant affirms no
such source. Indeed, Kant's stress on autonomy precludes a SOURCE of morality
independent of the will. Kant simply outlines the CONDITIONS for morality
-- autonomy, consistency, universality.
<p>Contemporary Kantians are not committed to a transcendent source of
moral authority. Rawls slogan that justice as fairness is "political not
metaphysical" suffices to illustrate that point Whether Rawls is still
a universalist is an interesting and difficult question.
<p>What most interests me is the possibility of retaining some Kantian
elements of moral and political thought while rejecting both foundationalism
and universalism. For instance, William Connolly attempts to be resolutely
Foucauldian in his moral and political theory while affirming what he calls
"agonistic respect." He has been quite good at elaborating the "agon" while
less forthcoming in clarifying the conditions and meaning of "respect."
I think a fresh look at Kant might be quite useful in elaborating a theory
like Connolly's to which I am quite attracted.
<p>One last (somewhat cryptic) note. I think one can be a transcendental
thinker without being a moral or epistemological foundationalist. I develop
this point at some length in a piece I wrote on Arendt. Critiques of foundationalism
usually blur the distinction between foundational and transcendental thought.
Jaspers is a good example of a thinker who is transcendental without being
foundational -- a self-proclaimed Kantian to boot.
<br>Cheers.
<p>Larry
<p>Donald E Van Duyse wrote:
<blockquote TYPE=CITE>
<pre WRAP>In recent postings, correct me if I'm wrong, I've heard Foucault
associated with "moral relativism." I would like some qualification
here. Isn't there a difference between "relativism" and "relativity?" Is
Foucault best read in the latter sense?
Definitions:
Moral relativism argues that all moral assertions are equivocal, and one
moral assertion will serve, arbitrarily, as well as the next. There are
no grounds for choosing one perspective over another. Morality, in other
words, is quite literally, an "ism," a flat, homogenous collection of
sayings that lack inherent value, and bear no meaningful relationship to
one another, except that which is imposed by individual bias or arbitrary
variables.
Moral relativity argues moral meanings are not fixed, nor are they
arbitrary, but instead, are meaningful only in context. Moral assertions
are appreciated as "relational." How do moral perspectives emerge in
complex circumstances? How are moral meanings dynamically interrelated to
other events?
Relativism says blandly, "all meanings are equivocal." Relativity, on the
other hand, says meanings are complicated by related events, that's how
moral assertions arise. For relativity, the complexity of the whole is
always greater than the putative sum of its parts. For relativism, it's
the arbitrary naming of unrelated parts.
"And is it not a plausible suspicion that if 'to be' were pointless and
the universe void of meaning, we would never have achieved not only the
ability to imagine otherwise but even the ability to think precisely
this: that 'to be' is indeed pointless and the universe void of meaning."
(Leszek Kolakowski, Metaphysical Horror, pg. 120)
(Personally, I think if neo-Kantians stopped saving the world from the
straw-man of "relativism," accepted the well-deserved kick in the butt
from relativists like Foucault, and worked out their own explorations of
"relativity," their arguments might be better served---e.g. what might
Foucault, Chomsky, and the Critique of Pure Reason have to do with each
other?)
(Bryan, I don't know why you think homosexuality is immoral? It strikes
me as an odd assertion to make on a Foucault list. Do you have a double
ax to grind (Perhaps that of a Kantian and religious conservative?)
</pre>
</blockquote>
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