Right, but there is a Neo-Kantian tradition represented by the likes of Ernst Cassirer that sought to historicize Kant's categories. While Foucault would not sympathize with Cassirer's humanism, there is nonetheless more than a passing resemblance between their projects. Ultimately, Foucault's genealogical project is much more radical, but it still sets up certain transcendental categories and asks about the conditions of possibility for certain discrete formations of power and knowledge.
>>> Vunch@xxxxxxx 02/04/01 22:16 PM >>>
In a message dated 2/4/01 12:57:12 AM Eastern Standard Time,
thegreatfandincke@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> You seem to misunderstand my point. I was not arguing that Kant had
> Foucault's ethical perspective, simply that Foucault took things like
> considerations of power and knowledge and made these the ever present
> transcendental conditions for moralities and all kinds of practices in
> society. My point is that in this transcendental move he is following in a
> distinctively Kantian pattern, despite widely diverging in his applications
> of transcendental thinking. My point about our always knowing that morals
> were sometimes influenced by power/knowledge structures was simply an
> allusion to the age old threat of the corrupt manipulating morals through
> power or knowledge systems, this threat is at least as old as the New
> Testament critique of Phariseism. My point was that if Foucault was simply
> saying that sometimes corrupt uses of power/knowledge corrupt morality, he
> would be saying nothing new.
Kant proposes a purely transcendental system which means that it holds for
all time and places. Kant's proposal for a science of man, anthropology, now
called philosophical anthropology, is cnsidered by Foucault to be an
insidious form of disciplinary power. Foucault opposes Kantianism as a
universally valid knowledge behind which is hidden the facticity of
domination. The Kantian will-to-knowledge is a modern power formation.
Foucault contrasts the criticism of power with the analysis of truth, in this
effort, he is unyielding in his criticism of modernity.
As for Foucault's notion of transcendental, it is not clear whether science
is universally insidious. I tend to think that it is not. Even Foucault says
that there are are meaningful differences in the kinds of society we can have
and there are meaningful ways of being human worth opposing and worth
strengthening. Kant's point was to question reason and to accept limits to
reason. So, when Foucault states that we should relinquish our dependency
upon the authority of law, religion, and science as well as the formal
universal claims of philosophers, he seems to be without any justification,
within his own contradiction, and exercising a pure decisionism.
Vunch
>>> Vunch@xxxxxxx 02/04/01 22:16 PM >>>
In a message dated 2/4/01 12:57:12 AM Eastern Standard Time,
thegreatfandincke@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> You seem to misunderstand my point. I was not arguing that Kant had
> Foucault's ethical perspective, simply that Foucault took things like
> considerations of power and knowledge and made these the ever present
> transcendental conditions for moralities and all kinds of practices in
> society. My point is that in this transcendental move he is following in a
> distinctively Kantian pattern, despite widely diverging in his applications
> of transcendental thinking. My point about our always knowing that morals
> were sometimes influenced by power/knowledge structures was simply an
> allusion to the age old threat of the corrupt manipulating morals through
> power or knowledge systems, this threat is at least as old as the New
> Testament critique of Phariseism. My point was that if Foucault was simply
> saying that sometimes corrupt uses of power/knowledge corrupt morality, he
> would be saying nothing new.
Kant proposes a purely transcendental system which means that it holds for
all time and places. Kant's proposal for a science of man, anthropology, now
called philosophical anthropology, is cnsidered by Foucault to be an
insidious form of disciplinary power. Foucault opposes Kantianism as a
universally valid knowledge behind which is hidden the facticity of
domination. The Kantian will-to-knowledge is a modern power formation.
Foucault contrasts the criticism of power with the analysis of truth, in this
effort, he is unyielding in his criticism of modernity.
As for Foucault's notion of transcendental, it is not clear whether science
is universally insidious. I tend to think that it is not. Even Foucault says
that there are are meaningful differences in the kinds of society we can have
and there are meaningful ways of being human worth opposing and worth
strengthening. Kant's point was to question reason and to accept limits to
reason. So, when Foucault states that we should relinquish our dependency
upon the authority of law, religion, and science as well as the formal
universal claims of philosophers, he seems to be without any justification,
within his own contradiction, and exercising a pure decisionism.
Vunch