--0-1015580756-988848801=:51179
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi Nathan--
You ask a difficult question and I find that I am not certain how to respond. Your remark about criticizing something like gravity that cannot be gotten rid of suggests that you conceive heterosexuality and homosexuality in these terms as well. Here the claim would be that regardless of whether we criticize heterosexuality and homosexuality, men and women will continue to sleep with one another and men and men and women and women will continue to sleep together. Am I correct in drawing this inference?
If this inference is fair, then I would like to suggest that Foucault is not talking about whether men and women, men and men, and women and women sleep together, but rather about a structure of DISCOURSE that groups a set of practices together and then normalizes/essentializes a particular form of practice. Here it seems important to carefully distinguish matters of fact from forms of discourse. Forms of discourse assemble together various matters of fact into a structure of mutual inherence (a relation of parts and wholes, and well formed wholes against ill formed wholes) in such a way that a moral heirarchialization of practices can be effected and particular practices can be treated as normal against those of the abnormal (which are nonetheless defined by the heirarchialization). The assemblage thus effected by the discourse therefore becomes a way both of precomprehending various practices (epistemologization) and of understanding ourselves in terms of our own practices (subjectivization).
Now, in english the term "critique" is ambiguous. In day to day speech we tend to understand the term critique as a way of delegitimating some position or activity, of showing that it is wrong or mistaken. Consequently, under this understanding, to critique the contemporary structure of sexuality would be to show that it is somehow fallacious. Foucault seems neutral with respect to this sense of critique insofar as to it implies a sort of essentialism and naturalization of the sexual... Furthermore, Foucault is also interested in unfolding the sense of various forms of struggle surrounding certain discourses. In this respect, Foucault must at least strive for some sort of neutrality insofar as the competing sides in a struggle often (though not essentially) share the same discourse on particular practices in their grounding assumptions... A scalpel can be used to both heal and cut, unfolding a discourse keeps this dimension of sense, it's ambiguity, its strange neutrality, always before itself. In other words, we can only show that something is mistaken if we hold that an alternative practice would be more authentic, more true, more fitting of the essence of the sexual.
By contrast, it seems more fruitful to understand critique in Kantian and philosophical terms, where critique is understood as the practice of determining the conditions under which something is possible and the limits of that form of practice. (Foucault shed quite a bit of ink on the Kantian notion of critique and the project of enlightenment that often seems ignored). Under this interpretation, to critique the modern conception of sexuality would be to unfold the discourse, structure or assemblage that renders this practice possible. Such an activity has both positive and negative consequences. Positively it allows us to understand why our understanding of sexuality takes this particular form and not others, where others have indeed been practiced throughout the history of sexuality. Negatively it allows us to see that naturalistic conceptions of sexuality are based on a sort of transcendental illusion whereby we essentialize and naturalize historically contingent forms of practice.
So, you ask, is it legitimate to critique a position without offering an alternative to that position. Here I would suggest that the denaturalization of practices like sexuality opens up a space of possibilities in which we can conceive new self relations to our own sexualities otherwise. As such, the denaturalization of sexuality opens a free space for new forms of practices. What these practices might be we cannot say in advance because they themselves must be brought into being through actual practice and engagement... To say otherwise would be to claim that the field of possibility is already delimited, which would be to fall back into the old essentialism. This answer is perhaps less than satisfying, but it does at least suggest that political practice is also political experimentation... Has it ever been otherwise where the social is concerned?
Best Regards,
Paul
Nathan Goralnik <rhizome85@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Paul
I totally follow you're argument, I'm just curious how you'd respond to the claim that criticizing one structure without any idea of what an alternative to that structure might be is just like criticizing something we can't get rid of, like gravity?
I suppose it's not a good analogy because there are no lines of flight from the forces of gravity, but I'm still interested ;)
Nate
----- Original Message -----
From: Paul Bryant
To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 12:44 AM
Subject: Re: Foucault and pragmatism, q&a
The claim that heterosexuality is a social construction and that it is involved in a certain structure of power does not itself imply the OPPOSITE: that we should all become homosexuals. In fact, a careful reading of Foucault will reveal that homosexuality is no less a construction of the nineteenth century episteme. We must always hold in mind that the negation or criticism of a position does not imply that one should adopt the contrary position. To do so would be to be no less defined by the structure of power in question. This is a common mistake made where criticism is concerned. For instance, one often assumes that any criticism made against capitalism entails that one is automatically a supporter of socialism. This happens all the more often now that the soviet union has fallen. Yet is it not possible that capitalism has the resources for criticizing itself from within, without yet entailing the opposite position? Oppositional thinking seems to indicate a rather slavish turn of mind.
Paul
Larry Chappell <larchap@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The idea that treating "heterosexuality" as a social construction (i.e.,
calling it what it is) will stop people from breeding is a jaw dropping
claim. Not all societies generate identities out of 19th century
psychological categories, but they all seem to figure out how to make
babies.
Vunch. Do you have a citation for Taylor criticizing Foucault as an advocate
of universal homosexuality? I spent a summer at an Institute where Taylor
did a series of talks. I have also read a lot of his stuff. I do not recall
any arguments quite this bizarre coming from him. Indeed, he is usually
quite careful.
Larry
----- Original Message -----
From:
To:
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 1:40 AM
Subject: Re: Foucault and pragmatism, q&a
> In a message dated 4/30/01 1:28:28 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
> rhizome85@xxxxxxxx writes:
>
> > Besides, Vunch, is Foucault REALLY saying we should all be gay? Is he
REALLY
> > saying that heterosexuality should disappear?
> >
> > Of course not.
>
> Unfortunately, he IS saying that it should, that it is merely a social
> construction!!
>
> Vunch
>
e
---------------------------------
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices
---------------------------------
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices
--0-1015580756-988848801=:51179
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
<P>Hi Nathan--</P><BR>
<P>You ask a difficult question and I find that I am not certain how to respond. Your remark about criticizing something like gravity that cannot be gotten rid of suggests that you conceive heterosexuality and homosexuality in these terms as well. Here the claim would be that regardless of whether we criticize heterosexuality and homosexuality, men and women will continue to sleep with one another and men and men and women and women will continue to sleep together. Am I correct in drawing this inference?</P>If this inference is fair, then I would like to suggest that Foucault is not talking about whether men and women, men and men, and women and women sleep together, but rather about a structure of DISCOURSE that groups a set of practices together and then normalizes/essentializes a particular form of practice. Here it seems important to carefully distinguish matters of fact from forms of discourse. Forms of discourse assemble together various matters of fact into a structure of mutual inherence (a relation of parts and wholes, and well formed wholes against ill formed wholes) in such a way that a moral heirarchialization of practices can be effected and particular practices can be treated as normal against those of the abnormal (which are nonetheless defined by the heirarchialization). The assemblage thus effected by the discourse therefore becomes a way both of precomprehending various practices (epistemologization) and of understanding ourselves in terms of our own practices (subjectivization).
<P>Now, in english the term "critique" is ambiguous. In day to day speech we tend to understand the term critique as a way of delegitimating some position or activity, of showing that it is wrong or mistaken. Consequently, under this understanding, to critique the contemporary structure of sexuality would be to show that it is somehow fallacious. Foucault seems neutral with respect to this sense of critique insofar as to it implies a sort of essentialism and naturalization of the sexual... Furthermore, Foucault is also interested in unfolding the sense of various forms of struggle surrounding certain discourses. In this respect, Foucault must at least strive for some sort of neutrality insofar as the competing sides in a struggle often (though not essentially) share the same discourse on particular practices in their grounding assumptions... A scalpel can be used to both heal and cut, unfolding a discourse keeps this dimension of sense, it's ambiguity, its strange neutrality, always before itself. In other words, we can only show that something is mistaken if we hold that an alternative practice would be more authentic, more true, more fitting of the essence of the sexual. </P>
<P>By contrast, it seems more fruitful to understand critique in Kantian and philosophical terms, where critique is understood as the practice of determining the conditions under which something is possible and the limits of that form of practice. (Foucault shed quite a bit of ink on the Kantian notion of critique and the project of enlightenment that often seems ignored). Under this interpretation, to critique the modern conception of sexuality would be to unfold the discourse, structure or assemblage that renders this practice possible. Such an activity has both positive and negative consequences. Positively it allows us to understand why our understanding of sexuality takes this particular form and not others, where others have indeed been practiced throughout the history of sexuality. Negatively it allows us to see that naturalistic conceptions of sexuality are based on a sort of transcendental illusion whereby we essentialize and naturalize historically contingent forms of practice.</P>
<P>So, you ask, is it legitimate to critique a position without offering an alternative to that position. Here I would suggest that the denaturalization of practices like sexuality opens up a space of possibilities in which we can conceive new self relations to our own sexualities otherwise. As such, the denaturalization of sexuality opens a free space for new forms of practices. What these practices might be we cannot say in advance because they themselves must be brought into being through actual practice and engagement... To say otherwise would be to claim that the field of possibility is already delimited, which would be to fall back into the old essentialism. This answer is perhaps less than satisfying, but it does at least suggest that political practice is also political experimentation... Has it ever been otherwise where the social is concerned?</P>
<P>Best Regards,</P>
<P>Paul <BR></P><BR>
<P> <B><I>Nathan Goralnik <rhizome85@xxxxxxxx></I></B> wrote: <BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px"><!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"><BR><BR>
<META content="MSHTML 5.50.4134.600" name=GENERATOR><BR><BR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
<BR><BR><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Paul</FONT></DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> I totally follow you're argument, I'm just curious how you'd respond to the claim that criticizing one structure without any idea of what an alternative to that structure might be is just like criticizing something we can't get rid of, like gravity?</FONT></DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> I suppose it's not a good analogy because there are no lines of flight from the forces of gravity, but I'm still interested ;)</FONT></DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> Nate</FONT></DIV><BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-RIGHT: 0px"><BR><BR>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV style="BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: black"><B>From:</B> <A href="mailto:levi_bryant@xxxxxxxxx" title=levi_bryant@xxxxxxxxx>Paul Bryant</A> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A href="mailto:foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" title=foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</A> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, May 02, 2001 12:44 AM</DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> Re: Foucault and pragmatism, q&a</DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><BR></DIV><BR><BR>
<P><BR>The claim that heterosexuality is a social construction and that it is involved in a certain structure of power does not itself imply the OPPOSITE: that we should all become homosexuals. In fact, a careful reading of Foucault will reveal that homosexuality is no less a construction of the nineteenth century episteme. We must always hold in mind that the negation or criticism of a position does not imply that one should adopt the contrary position. To do so would be to be no less defined by the structure of power in question. This is a common mistake made where criticism is concerned. For instance, one often assumes that any criticism made against capitalism entails that one is automatically a supporter of socialism. This happens all the more often now that the soviet union has fallen. Yet is it not possible that capitalism has the resources for criticizing itself from within, without yet entailing the opposite position? Oppositional thinking seems to indicate a rather slavish turn of mind. <BR><BR>
<P>Paul <BR><BR>
<P> <B><I>Larry Chappell <larchap@xxxxxxxxxxx></I></B> wrote: <BR><BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px">The idea that treating "heterosexuality" as a social construction (i.e.,<BR>calling it what it is) will stop people from breeding is a jaw dropping<BR>claim. Not all societies generate identities out of 19th century<BR>psychological categories, but they all seem to figure out how to make<BR>babies.<BR><BR>Vunch. Do you have a citation for Taylor criticizing Foucault as an advocate<BR>of universal homosexuality? I spent a summer at an Institute where Taylor<BR>did a series of talks. I have also read a lot of his stuff. I do not recall<BR>any arguments quite this bizarre coming from him. Indeed, he is usually<BR>quite careful.<BR><BR>Larry<BR>----- Original Message -----<BR>From: <VUNCH@xxxxxxx><BR>To: <FOUCAULT@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx><BR>Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 1:40 AM<BR>Subject: Re: Foucault and pragmatism, q&a<BR><BR><BR>> In a message dated 4/30/01 1:28:28 AM Eastern Daylight Time,<BR>> rhizome85@xxxxxxxx writes:<BR>><BR>> > Besides, Vunch, is Foucault REALLY saying we should all be gay? Is he<BR>REALLY<BR>> > saying that heterosexuality should disappear?<BR>> ><BR>> > Of course not.<BR>><BR>> Unfortunately, he IS saying that it should, that it is merely a social<BR>> construction!!<BR>><BR>> Vunch<BR>><BR></BLOCKQUOTE>e <BR><BR>
<P><BR><BR><BR>
<HR SIZE=1>
<BR><BR><B>Do You Yahoo!?</B><BR><A href="http://auctions.yahoo.com/">Yahoo! Auctions</A> - buy the things you want at great prices</BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE><p><br><hr size=1><b>Do You Yahoo!?</b><br>
<a href="http://auctions.yahoo.com/">Yahoo! Auctions</a> - buy the things you want at great prices
--0-1015580756-988848801=:51179--
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Hi Nathan--
You ask a difficult question and I find that I am not certain how to respond. Your remark about criticizing something like gravity that cannot be gotten rid of suggests that you conceive heterosexuality and homosexuality in these terms as well. Here the claim would be that regardless of whether we criticize heterosexuality and homosexuality, men and women will continue to sleep with one another and men and men and women and women will continue to sleep together. Am I correct in drawing this inference?
If this inference is fair, then I would like to suggest that Foucault is not talking about whether men and women, men and men, and women and women sleep together, but rather about a structure of DISCOURSE that groups a set of practices together and then normalizes/essentializes a particular form of practice. Here it seems important to carefully distinguish matters of fact from forms of discourse. Forms of discourse assemble together various matters of fact into a structure of mutual inherence (a relation of parts and wholes, and well formed wholes against ill formed wholes) in such a way that a moral heirarchialization of practices can be effected and particular practices can be treated as normal against those of the abnormal (which are nonetheless defined by the heirarchialization). The assemblage thus effected by the discourse therefore becomes a way both of precomprehending various practices (epistemologization) and of understanding ourselves in terms of our own practices (subjectivization).
Now, in english the term "critique" is ambiguous. In day to day speech we tend to understand the term critique as a way of delegitimating some position or activity, of showing that it is wrong or mistaken. Consequently, under this understanding, to critique the contemporary structure of sexuality would be to show that it is somehow fallacious. Foucault seems neutral with respect to this sense of critique insofar as to it implies a sort of essentialism and naturalization of the sexual... Furthermore, Foucault is also interested in unfolding the sense of various forms of struggle surrounding certain discourses. In this respect, Foucault must at least strive for some sort of neutrality insofar as the competing sides in a struggle often (though not essentially) share the same discourse on particular practices in their grounding assumptions... A scalpel can be used to both heal and cut, unfolding a discourse keeps this dimension of sense, it's ambiguity, its strange neutrality, always before itself. In other words, we can only show that something is mistaken if we hold that an alternative practice would be more authentic, more true, more fitting of the essence of the sexual.
By contrast, it seems more fruitful to understand critique in Kantian and philosophical terms, where critique is understood as the practice of determining the conditions under which something is possible and the limits of that form of practice. (Foucault shed quite a bit of ink on the Kantian notion of critique and the project of enlightenment that often seems ignored). Under this interpretation, to critique the modern conception of sexuality would be to unfold the discourse, structure or assemblage that renders this practice possible. Such an activity has both positive and negative consequences. Positively it allows us to understand why our understanding of sexuality takes this particular form and not others, where others have indeed been practiced throughout the history of sexuality. Negatively it allows us to see that naturalistic conceptions of sexuality are based on a sort of transcendental illusion whereby we essentialize and naturalize historically contingent forms of practice.
So, you ask, is it legitimate to critique a position without offering an alternative to that position. Here I would suggest that the denaturalization of practices like sexuality opens up a space of possibilities in which we can conceive new self relations to our own sexualities otherwise. As such, the denaturalization of sexuality opens a free space for new forms of practices. What these practices might be we cannot say in advance because they themselves must be brought into being through actual practice and engagement... To say otherwise would be to claim that the field of possibility is already delimited, which would be to fall back into the old essentialism. This answer is perhaps less than satisfying, but it does at least suggest that political practice is also political experimentation... Has it ever been otherwise where the social is concerned?
Best Regards,
Paul
Nathan Goralnik <rhizome85@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Paul
I totally follow you're argument, I'm just curious how you'd respond to the claim that criticizing one structure without any idea of what an alternative to that structure might be is just like criticizing something we can't get rid of, like gravity?
I suppose it's not a good analogy because there are no lines of flight from the forces of gravity, but I'm still interested ;)
Nate
----- Original Message -----
From: Paul Bryant
To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 12:44 AM
Subject: Re: Foucault and pragmatism, q&a
The claim that heterosexuality is a social construction and that it is involved in a certain structure of power does not itself imply the OPPOSITE: that we should all become homosexuals. In fact, a careful reading of Foucault will reveal that homosexuality is no less a construction of the nineteenth century episteme. We must always hold in mind that the negation or criticism of a position does not imply that one should adopt the contrary position. To do so would be to be no less defined by the structure of power in question. This is a common mistake made where criticism is concerned. For instance, one often assumes that any criticism made against capitalism entails that one is automatically a supporter of socialism. This happens all the more often now that the soviet union has fallen. Yet is it not possible that capitalism has the resources for criticizing itself from within, without yet entailing the opposite position? Oppositional thinking seems to indicate a rather slavish turn of mind.
Paul
Larry Chappell <larchap@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The idea that treating "heterosexuality" as a social construction (i.e.,
calling it what it is) will stop people from breeding is a jaw dropping
claim. Not all societies generate identities out of 19th century
psychological categories, but they all seem to figure out how to make
babies.
Vunch. Do you have a citation for Taylor criticizing Foucault as an advocate
of universal homosexuality? I spent a summer at an Institute where Taylor
did a series of talks. I have also read a lot of his stuff. I do not recall
any arguments quite this bizarre coming from him. Indeed, he is usually
quite careful.
Larry
----- Original Message -----
From:
To:
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 1:40 AM
Subject: Re: Foucault and pragmatism, q&a
> In a message dated 4/30/01 1:28:28 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
> rhizome85@xxxxxxxx writes:
>
> > Besides, Vunch, is Foucault REALLY saying we should all be gay? Is he
REALLY
> > saying that heterosexuality should disappear?
> >
> > Of course not.
>
> Unfortunately, he IS saying that it should, that it is merely a social
> construction!!
>
> Vunch
>
e
---------------------------------
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices
---------------------------------
Do You Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices
--0-1015580756-988848801=:51179
Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
<P>Hi Nathan--</P><BR>
<P>You ask a difficult question and I find that I am not certain how to respond. Your remark about criticizing something like gravity that cannot be gotten rid of suggests that you conceive heterosexuality and homosexuality in these terms as well. Here the claim would be that regardless of whether we criticize heterosexuality and homosexuality, men and women will continue to sleep with one another and men and men and women and women will continue to sleep together. Am I correct in drawing this inference?</P>If this inference is fair, then I would like to suggest that Foucault is not talking about whether men and women, men and men, and women and women sleep together, but rather about a structure of DISCOURSE that groups a set of practices together and then normalizes/essentializes a particular form of practice. Here it seems important to carefully distinguish matters of fact from forms of discourse. Forms of discourse assemble together various matters of fact into a structure of mutual inherence (a relation of parts and wholes, and well formed wholes against ill formed wholes) in such a way that a moral heirarchialization of practices can be effected and particular practices can be treated as normal against those of the abnormal (which are nonetheless defined by the heirarchialization). The assemblage thus effected by the discourse therefore becomes a way both of precomprehending various practices (epistemologization) and of understanding ourselves in terms of our own practices (subjectivization).
<P>Now, in english the term "critique" is ambiguous. In day to day speech we tend to understand the term critique as a way of delegitimating some position or activity, of showing that it is wrong or mistaken. Consequently, under this understanding, to critique the contemporary structure of sexuality would be to show that it is somehow fallacious. Foucault seems neutral with respect to this sense of critique insofar as to it implies a sort of essentialism and naturalization of the sexual... Furthermore, Foucault is also interested in unfolding the sense of various forms of struggle surrounding certain discourses. In this respect, Foucault must at least strive for some sort of neutrality insofar as the competing sides in a struggle often (though not essentially) share the same discourse on particular practices in their grounding assumptions... A scalpel can be used to both heal and cut, unfolding a discourse keeps this dimension of sense, it's ambiguity, its strange neutrality, always before itself. In other words, we can only show that something is mistaken if we hold that an alternative practice would be more authentic, more true, more fitting of the essence of the sexual. </P>
<P>By contrast, it seems more fruitful to understand critique in Kantian and philosophical terms, where critique is understood as the practice of determining the conditions under which something is possible and the limits of that form of practice. (Foucault shed quite a bit of ink on the Kantian notion of critique and the project of enlightenment that often seems ignored). Under this interpretation, to critique the modern conception of sexuality would be to unfold the discourse, structure or assemblage that renders this practice possible. Such an activity has both positive and negative consequences. Positively it allows us to understand why our understanding of sexuality takes this particular form and not others, where others have indeed been practiced throughout the history of sexuality. Negatively it allows us to see that naturalistic conceptions of sexuality are based on a sort of transcendental illusion whereby we essentialize and naturalize historically contingent forms of practice.</P>
<P>So, you ask, is it legitimate to critique a position without offering an alternative to that position. Here I would suggest that the denaturalization of practices like sexuality opens up a space of possibilities in which we can conceive new self relations to our own sexualities otherwise. As such, the denaturalization of sexuality opens a free space for new forms of practices. What these practices might be we cannot say in advance because they themselves must be brought into being through actual practice and engagement... To say otherwise would be to claim that the field of possibility is already delimited, which would be to fall back into the old essentialism. This answer is perhaps less than satisfying, but it does at least suggest that political practice is also political experimentation... Has it ever been otherwise where the social is concerned?</P>
<P>Best Regards,</P>
<P>Paul <BR></P><BR>
<P> <B><I>Nathan Goralnik <rhizome85@xxxxxxxx></I></B> wrote: <BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px"><!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"><BR><BR>
<META content="MSHTML 5.50.4134.600" name=GENERATOR><BR><BR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
<BR><BR><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2>Paul</FONT></DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> I totally follow you're argument, I'm just curious how you'd respond to the claim that criticizing one structure without any idea of what an alternative to that structure might be is just like criticizing something we can't get rid of, like gravity?</FONT></DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> I suppose it's not a good analogy because there are no lines of flight from the forces of gravity, but I'm still interested ;)</FONT></DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2></FONT> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2> Nate</FONT></DIV><BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-RIGHT: 0px"><BR><BR>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV style="BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: black"><B>From:</B> <A href="mailto:levi_bryant@xxxxxxxxx" title=levi_bryant@xxxxxxxxx>Paul Bryant</A> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A href="mailto:foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" title=foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</A> </DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, May 02, 2001 12:44 AM</DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV style="FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> Re: Foucault and pragmatism, q&a</DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV><BR></DIV><BR><BR>
<P><BR>The claim that heterosexuality is a social construction and that it is involved in a certain structure of power does not itself imply the OPPOSITE: that we should all become homosexuals. In fact, a careful reading of Foucault will reveal that homosexuality is no less a construction of the nineteenth century episteme. We must always hold in mind that the negation or criticism of a position does not imply that one should adopt the contrary position. To do so would be to be no less defined by the structure of power in question. This is a common mistake made where criticism is concerned. For instance, one often assumes that any criticism made against capitalism entails that one is automatically a supporter of socialism. This happens all the more often now that the soviet union has fallen. Yet is it not possible that capitalism has the resources for criticizing itself from within, without yet entailing the opposite position? Oppositional thinking seems to indicate a rather slavish turn of mind. <BR><BR>
<P>Paul <BR><BR>
<P> <B><I>Larry Chappell <larchap@xxxxxxxxxxx></I></B> wrote: <BR><BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px">The idea that treating "heterosexuality" as a social construction (i.e.,<BR>calling it what it is) will stop people from breeding is a jaw dropping<BR>claim. Not all societies generate identities out of 19th century<BR>psychological categories, but they all seem to figure out how to make<BR>babies.<BR><BR>Vunch. Do you have a citation for Taylor criticizing Foucault as an advocate<BR>of universal homosexuality? I spent a summer at an Institute where Taylor<BR>did a series of talks. I have also read a lot of his stuff. I do not recall<BR>any arguments quite this bizarre coming from him. Indeed, he is usually<BR>quite careful.<BR><BR>Larry<BR>----- Original Message -----<BR>From: <VUNCH@xxxxxxx><BR>To: <FOUCAULT@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx><BR>Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 1:40 AM<BR>Subject: Re: Foucault and pragmatism, q&a<BR><BR><BR>> In a message dated 4/30/01 1:28:28 AM Eastern Daylight Time,<BR>> rhizome85@xxxxxxxx writes:<BR>><BR>> > Besides, Vunch, is Foucault REALLY saying we should all be gay? Is he<BR>REALLY<BR>> > saying that heterosexuality should disappear?<BR>> ><BR>> > Of course not.<BR>><BR>> Unfortunately, he IS saying that it should, that it is merely a social<BR>> construction!!<BR>><BR>> Vunch<BR>><BR></BLOCKQUOTE>e <BR><BR>
<P><BR><BR><BR>
<HR SIZE=1>
<BR><BR><B>Do You Yahoo!?</B><BR><A href="http://auctions.yahoo.com/">Yahoo! Auctions</A> - buy the things you want at great prices</BLOCKQUOTE></BLOCKQUOTE><p><br><hr size=1><b>Do You Yahoo!?</b><br>
<a href="http://auctions.yahoo.com/">Yahoo! Auctions</a> - buy the things you want at great prices
--0-1015580756-988848801=:51179--