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Ali:
Thanks for your thoughtful reply. I still do not see a great gulf =
between your thoughts and mine. A few additional comments may offer some =
clarification and, perhaps, serve to sharpen some minor differences.
1) I am as eager as you to avoid "a barren kind of nominalism" (as =
difficult as that may be at times). No political, sociological or =
economic analysis with practical significance can avoid broad =
generalizations. I realize the importance of even the broadest =
generalizations such as "the west," "civilizations," and "modernity." =
Even such a resolute nominalist as Hobbes deployed, and insisted on the =
value of, generalizing terms like "man and "reason." I only want to =
ensure that we use these generalizations with caution and exhibit a =
willingness to abandon them when they appear to have become empty =
verbiage.
Philosophy has a valuable role in policing our generalizations. I have =
long since abandoned my fascination with Whitehead's speculative =
cosmology, but I still like his notion that philosophy is "the criticism =
of abstractions" serving as a "restraint on specialists and an =
enlargement of their imaginations."=20
Furthermore, Foucault, among others, should have made us aware of the =
constitutive aspect of generalizations. They are not just descriptive or =
evaluative; they are power and identity generating when situated within =
disciplinary and other discursive practices. Consequently, we need to =
insist on reading "the west" and similar terms politically,
2) The main issue seems to be whether nationalism is "essentially" =
western. Posing this question does not require one to be an =
essentialist. All it requires is the notion that identities have =
elements that are detachable or non-detachable. (William Connolly, in =
"Identity/Difference" is good at showing that a contingent identities =
can have deeply engrained features that are not disposable at will.) =
That said, we can reformulate our problem: When nationalism transports =
from the west, does it come packaged with the western identity? If it =
does, you are right -- claiming that nationalism is western is not a =
species of the genetic fallacy. You are also right that this is an =
empirical question. I am skeptical that cases like Iran or China (maybe =
Japan) will support the empirical claim once the notion of westernness =
is mapped. I also think that Erik is correct in his response to you =
claiming that westerness is a more detachable package than many think, =
I.e., that a country can import some aspects of western life without =
adopting them all.
3) Imperialism (along with its invisible persistences and lingering =
effects) is certainly important. It also bears on questions of =
westernization. The only question I have is this: How intimately =
connected are imperialism and nationalism? Surely all imperialists are =
nationalists, but not all nationalists are pan-nationalists (to use =
Arendt's term). Do we want to confine imperialism to MODERN imperialism? =
That is the only way indissoluble connections among nationalism, =
imperialism and westernization can be maintained.
Here again, Russia is a fascinating case? Was the Soviet empire =
"western." Can Russian westernization (ever complete?) be understood on =
the model of imperial imposition?
4) I was far too hasty in equating nationalism with secular =
eschatology.Much of the history of nationalism is connected with =
chiliastic movements, but I am not sure there is an essential =
connection. One can be a partisan of a nation without dreaming of =
paradise. In any case, the debate over "the secularization thesis" =
(Blumenberg vs. Lowith, Voegelin, etc.) should give us pause with =
respect to hasty generalizations about the connection between secular =
eschatologies and historical development.=20
Thanks, again, for your comments.
Larry=20
----- Original Message -----=20
From: Ali Rizvi=20
To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=20
Cc: m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx=20
Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2001 5:56 PM
Subject: Re: Genetic Fallacy
Larry=20
Thanks for your interesting reply.
I will just add few comments beneath your observations whereever I =
feel I have something to say...
I do not think that I have any serious problem with what you say =
assuming your generalizations can be subjected to some careful =
qualifications. What I object to is positing "the west" as some sort of =
quasi-metaphysical construct that provides pseudo-explanations for =
almost any imaginable range of events.=20
I can not agree more.
I agree that nationalism (like nation states) is an 18th and 19th =
Century European invention. From that little follows. Nationalism is =
possible largely because a sense of collective identity ("imagined =
communities" in Anderson's term) can be combined with eschatological =
hopes about "progress" or "destiny."=20
I think it tells us a lot about nationalism without reducing =
explanation of nationalism to the fact that it was a 18th century =
European invention. It tells us about about nationalism's origins in and =
relation to Protestantism. It tells about nationalism's relation to =
capitalism and to European Enligthement. How one can understand modern =
natioanlism without relating it to the West's revolt against theology =
and Christianity? The eschatological hopes you are talking about only =
prosperd in a space desterted by Christianity and the notions of =
progress and destiny are secular 'reinterpretations' of Christian =
eschatology.=20
That hardly means that "nations" are either modern or necessarily =
European. Nor does it mean that nationalism is only available to =
European peoples. I doubt that it is in any sense "universal."=20
I think there is a very crucial difference between modern notion of =
'nation' and (say) medieval notions of 'nation'. The medieval 'nations' =
were based (primarily) on lineage while the modern 'nations' are =
primarily political constructs. 'Nations' are 'made' in modern times. In =
this sense for example strange nations like "Pakistan" and "India" were =
'made' in the second half of the last century. There are lot of people =
on both sides who belong to same 'nations' in the sense of lineage but =
they still are not one nation, they belong to two different nations. =
This is what Anderson calls 'imagined' communities (I think Anderson =
describes the above very well in his book).
I say nationalism is 'universal' in the sense that it is =
unviersalisable. It is because nationalism is 'unviersalisable' that it =
is available to non European people as well. The only condition is that =
they must transform themselves according to notions that first =
originated in the West. That they transform themselves (for example) =
from the communities based on love and lineage to communites based =
(primarily) on 'self interest' (for example).
There are various peoples whose entire way of life would have to be =
transformed before they could imagine themselves in nationalistic terms =
(Maybe fewer than there once were with the invasion of rain forests and =
other "remote" territories.)=20
i can not agree more.
Knowing where nationalism came from tells us almost nothing about its =
configurations and how it will be adapted in cultures that are receptive =
to it. For instance, Michael Ignatieff distinguishes between "civic =
nationalism" and "ethnic nationalism." In civic nationalism the bonds of =
a political community are defined by a common creed and set of political =
institutions. In ethnic nationalism, the community is thought to belong =
to people marked by ethnic bonds.=20
Civic nationalism again can not be understood without reference to =
liberalism which is an idealogy which emanates from European =
Enligtenment. Simlarly ethnic nationalism is reinterpretation and =
reconstruction of lineage based communties on the basis of modern =
notions of nationalism. I would consider Nazism and Fascism as modern =
movements in the sense that although they are based on certain sense of =
'lineage' they incorporate that sense in typically modern notion of =
such communties as political entities.=20
Nothing about the origins of nationalism predicts which of these (or =
other) variations will prevail.=20
You are right but this is not because of any defiency of 'origin' =
based expalanations of nationalism, it is rather because it is an =
empirical question and can not be explained (solely) on the basis of =
general explanation of what nationalism is.=20
I am leery of thinking of "cultures" or "civilizations" as granite =
blocks. There identities are far more fluid than neat packages like "the =
west" allow. Foucault's insistence on attending to "the microphysics of =
power" is useful for avoiding these block conceptions.=20
I agree but this does not dispense with the need of using such broad =
cocnepts as civilisation and cultures otherwise we would end with most =
barren kind of nominalism. And Foucault is most appropriate example =
here. Nowhere, as far as I know him, in Foucault concrete and partucular =
and attention to details is opposed to the need for appropriate and =
cautious generalisation ( Panopticon was such a far reaching technolgoy =
according to Foucault because it combined this concrete character and =
generalisibility in it). One should not equate generalisation with =
abstraction. One would be amused to note that Foucault uses the =
expression 'the West" freely and without inhibition in even such a =
(presumably) 'regional' study as The Order of Things. So I think there =
is as much need to attend to commanalities as there is need to be =
attentive to differences.=20
To know how Japanese nationalism, or Kurdish nationalism differ from =
American nationalism, you need to know something about Japanese, Kurds =
and Americans (as well as how richly diverse all of these groups are). =
Going on about "the west" and its essential qualities invites laziness.=20
yes but one should also ask such questions as, why is it that the =
spread of nationalism in Kurdish people leads (invariably) to spread of =
Western values and life styles in them and leads them away from their =
Islamic heritage?. Or one should also ask why spread of nationalism in =
Japan makes her increasingly a country less and less recognisable as =
distinct society from Western societies? I would think that avoiding =
these question might also lead to laziness.
regards
ali=20
Cheers,=20
Larry=20
----- Original Message -----=20
From: Ali Rizvi=20
To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=20
Cc: m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx=20
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2001 7:02 PM=20
Subject: Re: Genetic Fallacy=20
Larry=20
Few comments come to mind concerning your last post on the abover =
subject. I will make my comments without necessarily taking position on =
other matters being discussed here..=20
I think one would commit genetic fallacy only if one considers West in =
geographical, territorial, or racial terms..if one considers West in =
value terms that is as a civilisation one does not necessarily commit a =
genetic fallacy by considering nationalism, liberalism, socialsim etc as =
Western...in this way one can consider natioanlism in modern political =
sense as a Western notion which can be implemented anywhere in the world =
but at the expense of transformation of that society in a manner that is =
dictated by Western history...this would be then termed as =
Westernisation..West in this sense is the bearer of universal values, of =
unviersal history and the rest as moments in that universal saga...=20
this is all hypthetical and not necessarily seconded by events=20
regards=20
ali=20
=
-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----=20
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at =
http://www.hotmail.com.=20
-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at =
http://www.hotmail.com.
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<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Ali:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Thanks for your thoughtful reply. I still do not see =
a great=20
gulf between your thoughts and mine. A few additional comments may offer =
some=20
clarification and, perhaps, serve to sharpen some minor=20
differences.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>1) I am as eager as you to avoid "a barren kind of =
nominalism"=20
(as difficult as that may be at times). No political, sociological or =
economic=20
analysis with practical significance can avoid broad generalizations. I =
realize=20
the importance of even the broadest generalizations such as "the west,"=20
"civilizations," and "modernity." Even such a resolute nominalist as =
Hobbes=20
deployed, and insisted on the value of, generalizing terms like "man and =
"reason." I only want to ensure that we use these generalizations with =
caution=20
and exhibit a willingness to abandon them when they appear to have =
become empty=20
verbiage.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Philosophy has a valuable role in policing our=20
generalizations. I have long since abandoned my fascination with =
Whitehead's=20
speculative cosmology, but I still like his notion that philosophy is =
"the=20
criticism of abstractions" serving as a "restraint on specialists and an =
enlargement of their imaginations." </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Furthermore, Foucault, among others, should have =
made us aware=20
of the constitutive aspect of generalizations. They are not just =
descriptive or=20
evaluative; they are power and identity generating when situated within=20
disciplinary and other discursive practices. Consequently, we need to =
insist on=20
reading "the west" and similar terms politically,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>2) The main issue seems to be whether nationalism is =
"essentially" western. Posing this question does not require one to be =
an=20
essentialist. All it requires is the notion that identities have =
elements that=20
are detachable or non-detachable. (William Connolly, in =
"Identity/Difference" is=20
good at showing that a contingent identities can have deeply engrained =
features=20
that are not disposable at will.) That said, we can reformulate our =
problem:=20
When nationalism transports from the west, does it come packaged with =
the=20
western identity? If it does, you are right -- claiming that nationalism =
is=20
western is not a species of the genetic fallacy. You are also right that =
this is=20
an empirical question. I am skeptical that cases like Iran or China =
(maybe=20
Japan) will support the empirical claim once the notion of westernness =
is=20
mapped. I also think that Erik is correct in his response to you =
claiming that=20
westerness is a more detachable package than many think, I.e., that a =
country=20
can import some aspects of western life without adopting them =
all.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>3) Imperialism (along with its invisible =
persistences and=20
lingering effects) is certainly important. It also bears on questions of =
westernization. The only question I have is this: How intimately =
connected are=20
imperialism and nationalism? Surely all imperialists are nationalists, =
but not=20
all nationalists are pan-nationalists (to use Arendt's term). Do we want =
to=20
confine imperialism to MODERN imperialism? That is the only way =
indissoluble=20
connections among nationalism, imperialism and westernization can be=20
maintained.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Here again, Russia is a fascinating case? Was the =
Soviet=20
empire "western." Can Russian westernization (ever complete?) be =
understood on=20
the model of imperial imposition?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>4) I was far too hasty in equating nationalism with =
secular=20
eschatology.Much of the history of nationalism is connected with =
chiliastic=20
movements, but I am not sure there is an essential connection. One can =
be a=20
partisan of a nation without dreaming of paradise. In any case, the =
debate over=20
"the secularization thesis" (Blumenberg vs. Lowith, Voegelin, etc.) =
should give=20
us pause with respect to hasty generalizations about the connection =
between=20
secular eschatologies and historical development. </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Thanks, again, for your comments.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Larry</FONT> </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr=20
style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; =
BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: =
black"><B>From:</B>=20
<A title=3Dali_m_rizvi@xxxxxxxxxxx =
href=3D"mailto:ali_m_rizvi@xxxxxxxxxxx";>Ali=20
Rizvi</A> </DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A=20
title=3Dfoucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=20
=
href=3D"mailto:foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx";>foucault@lists.villag=
e.virginia.edu</A>=20
</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Cc:</B> <A title=3Dm_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx =
href=3D"mailto:m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx";>m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx</A> </DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, July 18, 2001 =
5:56=20
PM</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> Re: Genetic =
Fallacy</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT><FONT size=3D2></FONT><FONT =
size=3D2></FONT><FONT=20
size=3D2></FONT><FONT size=3D2></FONT><FONT size=3D2></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV>
<P>Larry </P>
<P>Thanks for your interesting reply.</P>
<P>I will just add few comments beneath your observations whereever I =
feel I=20
have something to say...</P>
<P>I do not think that I have any serious problem with what you say =
assuming=20
your generalizations can be subjected to some careful qualifications. =
What I=20
object to is positing "the west" as some sort of quasi-metaphysical =
construct=20
that provides pseudo-explanations for almost any imaginable range of =
events.=20
</P>
<P>I can not agree more.</P></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<P>I agree that nationalism (like nation states) is an 18th and 19th =
Century=20
European invention. From that little follows. Nationalism is possible =
largely=20
because a sense of collective identity ("imagined communities" in =
Anderson's=20
term) can be combined with eschatological hopes about "progress" or =
"destiny."=20
</P>
<P>I think it tells us a lot about nationalism without reducing=20
explanation of nationalism to the fact that it was a 18th century =
European=20
invention. It tells us about about nationalism's origins in and =
relation to=20
Protestantism. It tells about nationalism's relation to capitalism and =
to=20
European Enligthement. How one can understand modern natioanlism =
without=20
relating it to the West's revolt against theology and Christianity? =
The=20
eschatological hopes you are talking about only prosperd in a space =
desterted=20
by Christianity and the notions of progress and destiny are secular=20
'reinterpretations' of Christian eschatology. </P>
<P>That hardly means that "nations" are either modern or necessarily =
European.=20
Nor does it mean that nationalism is only available to European =
peoples. I=20
doubt that it is in any sense "universal." </P>
<P>I think there is a very crucial difference between modern notion of =
'nation' and (say) medieval notions of 'nation'.=20
The medieval 'nations' were based (primarily) on =
lineage while=20
the modern 'nations' are primarily political constructs. 'Nations' are =
'made'=20
in modern times. In this sense for example strange nations like =
"Pakistan" and=20
"India" were 'made' in the second half of the last century. There are =
lot of=20
people on both sides who belong to same 'nations' in the sense of =
lineage but=20
they still are not one nation, they belong to two different nations. =
This is=20
what Anderson calls 'imagined' communities (I think Anderson describes =
the=20
above very well in his book).</P>
<P>I say nationalism is 'universal' in the sense that it is =
unviersalisable.=20
It is because nationalism is 'unviersalisable' that it is available to =
non=20
European people as well. The only condition is that they must =
transform=20
themselves according to notions that first originated in the West. =
That they=20
transform themselves (for example) from the communities based on love =
and=20
lineage to communites based (primarily) on 'self interest' (for =
example).</P>
<P>There are various peoples whose entire way of life would have to be =
transformed before they could imagine themselves in nationalistic =
terms (Maybe=20
fewer than there once were with the invasion of rain forests and other =
"remote" territories.) </P>
<P>i can not agree more.</P>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<P>Knowing where nationalism came from tells us almost nothing about =
its=20
configurations and how it will be adapted in cultures that are =
receptive to=20
it. For instance, Michael Ignatieff distinguishes between "civic =
nationalism"=20
and "ethnic nationalism." In civic nationalism the bonds of a =
political=20
community are defined by a common creed and set of political =
institutions. In=20
ethnic nationalism, the community is thought to belong to people =
marked by=20
ethnic bonds. </P>
<P>Civic nationalism again can not be understood without reference to=20
liberalism which is an idealogy which emanates from European=20
Enligtenment. Simlarly ethnic nationalism is reinterpretation and=20
reconstruction of lineage based communties on the basis of modern =
notions=20
of nationalism. I would consider Nazism and Fascism as modern =
movements in the=20
sense that although they are based on certain sense of 'lineage'=20
they incorporate that sense in typically modern notion of =
such=20
communties as political entities. </P>
<P>Nothing about the origins of nationalism predicts which of these =
(or other)=20
variations will prevail. </P>
<P>You are right but this is not because of any defiency of 'origin' =
based=20
expalanations of nationalism, it is rather because it is an empirical =
question=20
and can not be explained (solely) on the basis of general explanation =
of what=20
nationalism is. </P>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<P>I am leery of thinking of "cultures" or "civilizations" as granite =
blocks.=20
There identities are far more fluid than neat packages like "the west" =
allow.=20
Foucault's insistence on attending to "the microphysics of power" is =
useful=20
for avoiding these block conceptions. </P>
<P>I agree but this does not dispense with the need of using such =
broad=20
cocnepts as civilisation and cultures otherwise we would end with =
most=20
barren kind of nominalism. And Foucault is most appropriate example =
here.=20
Nowhere, as far as I know him, in Foucault concrete and partucular and =
attention to details is opposed to the need for appropriate and =
cautious=20
generalisation ( Panopticon was such a far reaching technolgoy =
according=20
to Foucault because it combined this concrete character and =
generalisibility=20
in it). One should not equate generalisation with abstraction. One =
would be=20
amused to note that Foucault uses the expression 'the West" freely and =
without=20
inhibition in even such a (presumably) 'regional' study as The Order =
of=20
Things. So I think there is as much need to attend to commanalities as =
there=20
is need to be attentive to differences. </P>
<P><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </P>
<P>To know how Japanese nationalism, or Kurdish nationalism differ =
from=20
American nationalism, you need to know something about Japanese, Kurds =
and=20
Americans (as well as how richly diverse all of these groups are). =
Going on=20
about "the west" and its essential qualities invites laziness. </P>
<P>yes but one should also ask such questions as, why is it that the =
spread of=20
nationalism in Kurdish people leads (invariably) to spread of Western =
values=20
and life styles in them and leads them away from their Islamic =
heritage?.=20
Or one should also ask why spread of nationalism in Japan =
makes her=20
increasingly a country less and less recognisable as =
distinct=20
society from Western societies? I would think that avoiding=20
these question might also lead to laziness.</P>
<P>regards</P>
<P>ali </P>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Cheers,=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Larry=20
<DIV></DIV>----- Original Message -----=20
<DIV></DIV>From: Ali Rizvi=20
<DIV></DIV>To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=20
<DIV></DIV>Cc: m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx=20
<DIV></DIV>Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2001 7:02 PM=20
<DIV></DIV>Subject: Re: Genetic Fallacy=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Larry=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Few comments come to mind concerning your last post on the =
abover=20
subject. I will make my comments without necessarily taking position =
on other=20
matters being discussed here..=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>I think one would commit genetic fallacy only if one =
considers West=20
in geographical, territorial, or racial terms..if one considers West =
in value=20
terms that is as a civilisation one does not necessarily commit a =
genetic=20
fallacy by considering nationalism, liberalism, socialsim etc as =
Western...in=20
this way one can consider natioanlism in modern political sense as a =
Western=20
notion which can be implemented anywhere in the world but at the =
expense of=20
transformation of that society in a manner that is dictated by Western =
history...this would be then termed as Westernisation..West in this =
sense is=20
the bearer of universal values, of unviersal history and the rest as =
moments=20
in that universal saga...=20
<DIV></DIV>this is all hypthetical and not necessarily seconded by =
events=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>regards=20
<DIV></DIV>ali=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
=
<DIV></DIV>--------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------=20
<DIV></DIV>Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at=20
http://www.hotmail.com.=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV><BR clear=3Dall>
<HR>
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at <A=20
href=3D"http://www.hotmail.com";>http://www.hotmail.com</A>.<BR>
<P></P></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>
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------=_NextPart_000_0291_01C1102F.0BE5C740
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Ali:
Thanks for your thoughtful reply. I still do not see a great gulf =
between your thoughts and mine. A few additional comments may offer some =
clarification and, perhaps, serve to sharpen some minor differences.
1) I am as eager as you to avoid "a barren kind of nominalism" (as =
difficult as that may be at times). No political, sociological or =
economic analysis with practical significance can avoid broad =
generalizations. I realize the importance of even the broadest =
generalizations such as "the west," "civilizations," and "modernity." =
Even such a resolute nominalist as Hobbes deployed, and insisted on the =
value of, generalizing terms like "man and "reason." I only want to =
ensure that we use these generalizations with caution and exhibit a =
willingness to abandon them when they appear to have become empty =
verbiage.
Philosophy has a valuable role in policing our generalizations. I have =
long since abandoned my fascination with Whitehead's speculative =
cosmology, but I still like his notion that philosophy is "the criticism =
of abstractions" serving as a "restraint on specialists and an =
enlargement of their imaginations."=20
Furthermore, Foucault, among others, should have made us aware of the =
constitutive aspect of generalizations. They are not just descriptive or =
evaluative; they are power and identity generating when situated within =
disciplinary and other discursive practices. Consequently, we need to =
insist on reading "the west" and similar terms politically,
2) The main issue seems to be whether nationalism is "essentially" =
western. Posing this question does not require one to be an =
essentialist. All it requires is the notion that identities have =
elements that are detachable or non-detachable. (William Connolly, in =
"Identity/Difference" is good at showing that a contingent identities =
can have deeply engrained features that are not disposable at will.) =
That said, we can reformulate our problem: When nationalism transports =
from the west, does it come packaged with the western identity? If it =
does, you are right -- claiming that nationalism is western is not a =
species of the genetic fallacy. You are also right that this is an =
empirical question. I am skeptical that cases like Iran or China (maybe =
Japan) will support the empirical claim once the notion of westernness =
is mapped. I also think that Erik is correct in his response to you =
claiming that westerness is a more detachable package than many think, =
I.e., that a country can import some aspects of western life without =
adopting them all.
3) Imperialism (along with its invisible persistences and lingering =
effects) is certainly important. It also bears on questions of =
westernization. The only question I have is this: How intimately =
connected are imperialism and nationalism? Surely all imperialists are =
nationalists, but not all nationalists are pan-nationalists (to use =
Arendt's term). Do we want to confine imperialism to MODERN imperialism? =
That is the only way indissoluble connections among nationalism, =
imperialism and westernization can be maintained.
Here again, Russia is a fascinating case? Was the Soviet empire =
"western." Can Russian westernization (ever complete?) be understood on =
the model of imperial imposition?
4) I was far too hasty in equating nationalism with secular =
eschatology.Much of the history of nationalism is connected with =
chiliastic movements, but I am not sure there is an essential =
connection. One can be a partisan of a nation without dreaming of =
paradise. In any case, the debate over "the secularization thesis" =
(Blumenberg vs. Lowith, Voegelin, etc.) should give us pause with =
respect to hasty generalizations about the connection between secular =
eschatologies and historical development.=20
Thanks, again, for your comments.
Larry=20
----- Original Message -----=20
From: Ali Rizvi=20
To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=20
Cc: m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx=20
Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2001 5:56 PM
Subject: Re: Genetic Fallacy
Larry=20
Thanks for your interesting reply.
I will just add few comments beneath your observations whereever I =
feel I have something to say...
I do not think that I have any serious problem with what you say =
assuming your generalizations can be subjected to some careful =
qualifications. What I object to is positing "the west" as some sort of =
quasi-metaphysical construct that provides pseudo-explanations for =
almost any imaginable range of events.=20
I can not agree more.
I agree that nationalism (like nation states) is an 18th and 19th =
Century European invention. From that little follows. Nationalism is =
possible largely because a sense of collective identity ("imagined =
communities" in Anderson's term) can be combined with eschatological =
hopes about "progress" or "destiny."=20
I think it tells us a lot about nationalism without reducing =
explanation of nationalism to the fact that it was a 18th century =
European invention. It tells us about about nationalism's origins in and =
relation to Protestantism. It tells about nationalism's relation to =
capitalism and to European Enligthement. How one can understand modern =
natioanlism without relating it to the West's revolt against theology =
and Christianity? The eschatological hopes you are talking about only =
prosperd in a space desterted by Christianity and the notions of =
progress and destiny are secular 'reinterpretations' of Christian =
eschatology.=20
That hardly means that "nations" are either modern or necessarily =
European. Nor does it mean that nationalism is only available to =
European peoples. I doubt that it is in any sense "universal."=20
I think there is a very crucial difference between modern notion of =
'nation' and (say) medieval notions of 'nation'. The medieval 'nations' =
were based (primarily) on lineage while the modern 'nations' are =
primarily political constructs. 'Nations' are 'made' in modern times. In =
this sense for example strange nations like "Pakistan" and "India" were =
'made' in the second half of the last century. There are lot of people =
on both sides who belong to same 'nations' in the sense of lineage but =
they still are not one nation, they belong to two different nations. =
This is what Anderson calls 'imagined' communities (I think Anderson =
describes the above very well in his book).
I say nationalism is 'universal' in the sense that it is =
unviersalisable. It is because nationalism is 'unviersalisable' that it =
is available to non European people as well. The only condition is that =
they must transform themselves according to notions that first =
originated in the West. That they transform themselves (for example) =
from the communities based on love and lineage to communites based =
(primarily) on 'self interest' (for example).
There are various peoples whose entire way of life would have to be =
transformed before they could imagine themselves in nationalistic terms =
(Maybe fewer than there once were with the invasion of rain forests and =
other "remote" territories.)=20
i can not agree more.
Knowing where nationalism came from tells us almost nothing about its =
configurations and how it will be adapted in cultures that are receptive =
to it. For instance, Michael Ignatieff distinguishes between "civic =
nationalism" and "ethnic nationalism." In civic nationalism the bonds of =
a political community are defined by a common creed and set of political =
institutions. In ethnic nationalism, the community is thought to belong =
to people marked by ethnic bonds.=20
Civic nationalism again can not be understood without reference to =
liberalism which is an idealogy which emanates from European =
Enligtenment. Simlarly ethnic nationalism is reinterpretation and =
reconstruction of lineage based communties on the basis of modern =
notions of nationalism. I would consider Nazism and Fascism as modern =
movements in the sense that although they are based on certain sense of =
'lineage' they incorporate that sense in typically modern notion of =
such communties as political entities.=20
Nothing about the origins of nationalism predicts which of these (or =
other) variations will prevail.=20
You are right but this is not because of any defiency of 'origin' =
based expalanations of nationalism, it is rather because it is an =
empirical question and can not be explained (solely) on the basis of =
general explanation of what nationalism is.=20
I am leery of thinking of "cultures" or "civilizations" as granite =
blocks. There identities are far more fluid than neat packages like "the =
west" allow. Foucault's insistence on attending to "the microphysics of =
power" is useful for avoiding these block conceptions.=20
I agree but this does not dispense with the need of using such broad =
cocnepts as civilisation and cultures otherwise we would end with most =
barren kind of nominalism. And Foucault is most appropriate example =
here. Nowhere, as far as I know him, in Foucault concrete and partucular =
and attention to details is opposed to the need for appropriate and =
cautious generalisation ( Panopticon was such a far reaching technolgoy =
according to Foucault because it combined this concrete character and =
generalisibility in it). One should not equate generalisation with =
abstraction. One would be amused to note that Foucault uses the =
expression 'the West" freely and without inhibition in even such a =
(presumably) 'regional' study as The Order of Things. So I think there =
is as much need to attend to commanalities as there is need to be =
attentive to differences.=20
To know how Japanese nationalism, or Kurdish nationalism differ from =
American nationalism, you need to know something about Japanese, Kurds =
and Americans (as well as how richly diverse all of these groups are). =
Going on about "the west" and its essential qualities invites laziness.=20
yes but one should also ask such questions as, why is it that the =
spread of nationalism in Kurdish people leads (invariably) to spread of =
Western values and life styles in them and leads them away from their =
Islamic heritage?. Or one should also ask why spread of nationalism in =
Japan makes her increasingly a country less and less recognisable as =
distinct society from Western societies? I would think that avoiding =
these question might also lead to laziness.
regards
ali=20
Cheers,=20
Larry=20
----- Original Message -----=20
From: Ali Rizvi=20
To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=20
Cc: m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx=20
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2001 7:02 PM=20
Subject: Re: Genetic Fallacy=20
Larry=20
Few comments come to mind concerning your last post on the abover =
subject. I will make my comments without necessarily taking position on =
other matters being discussed here..=20
I think one would commit genetic fallacy only if one considers West in =
geographical, territorial, or racial terms..if one considers West in =
value terms that is as a civilisation one does not necessarily commit a =
genetic fallacy by considering nationalism, liberalism, socialsim etc as =
Western...in this way one can consider natioanlism in modern political =
sense as a Western notion which can be implemented anywhere in the world =
but at the expense of transformation of that society in a manner that is =
dictated by Western history...this would be then termed as =
Westernisation..West in this sense is the bearer of universal values, of =
unviersal history and the rest as moments in that universal saga...=20
this is all hypthetical and not necessarily seconded by events=20
regards=20
ali=20
=
-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----=20
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at =
http://www.hotmail.com.=20
-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at =
http://www.hotmail.com.
------=_NextPart_000_0291_01C1102F.0BE5C740
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 5.50.4611.1300" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Ali:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Thanks for your thoughtful reply. I still do not see =
a great=20
gulf between your thoughts and mine. A few additional comments may offer =
some=20
clarification and, perhaps, serve to sharpen some minor=20
differences.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>1) I am as eager as you to avoid "a barren kind of =
nominalism"=20
(as difficult as that may be at times). No political, sociological or =
economic=20
analysis with practical significance can avoid broad generalizations. I =
realize=20
the importance of even the broadest generalizations such as "the west,"=20
"civilizations," and "modernity." Even such a resolute nominalist as =
Hobbes=20
deployed, and insisted on the value of, generalizing terms like "man and =
"reason." I only want to ensure that we use these generalizations with =
caution=20
and exhibit a willingness to abandon them when they appear to have =
become empty=20
verbiage.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Philosophy has a valuable role in policing our=20
generalizations. I have long since abandoned my fascination with =
Whitehead's=20
speculative cosmology, but I still like his notion that philosophy is =
"the=20
criticism of abstractions" serving as a "restraint on specialists and an =
enlargement of their imaginations." </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Furthermore, Foucault, among others, should have =
made us aware=20
of the constitutive aspect of generalizations. They are not just =
descriptive or=20
evaluative; they are power and identity generating when situated within=20
disciplinary and other discursive practices. Consequently, we need to =
insist on=20
reading "the west" and similar terms politically,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>2) The main issue seems to be whether nationalism is =
"essentially" western. Posing this question does not require one to be =
an=20
essentialist. All it requires is the notion that identities have =
elements that=20
are detachable or non-detachable. (William Connolly, in =
"Identity/Difference" is=20
good at showing that a contingent identities can have deeply engrained =
features=20
that are not disposable at will.) That said, we can reformulate our =
problem:=20
When nationalism transports from the west, does it come packaged with =
the=20
western identity? If it does, you are right -- claiming that nationalism =
is=20
western is not a species of the genetic fallacy. You are also right that =
this is=20
an empirical question. I am skeptical that cases like Iran or China =
(maybe=20
Japan) will support the empirical claim once the notion of westernness =
is=20
mapped. I also think that Erik is correct in his response to you =
claiming that=20
westerness is a more detachable package than many think, I.e., that a =
country=20
can import some aspects of western life without adopting them =
all.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>3) Imperialism (along with its invisible =
persistences and=20
lingering effects) is certainly important. It also bears on questions of =
westernization. The only question I have is this: How intimately =
connected are=20
imperialism and nationalism? Surely all imperialists are nationalists, =
but not=20
all nationalists are pan-nationalists (to use Arendt's term). Do we want =
to=20
confine imperialism to MODERN imperialism? That is the only way =
indissoluble=20
connections among nationalism, imperialism and westernization can be=20
maintained.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Here again, Russia is a fascinating case? Was the =
Soviet=20
empire "western." Can Russian westernization (ever complete?) be =
understood on=20
the model of imperial imposition?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>4) I was far too hasty in equating nationalism with =
secular=20
eschatology.Much of the history of nationalism is connected with =
chiliastic=20
movements, but I am not sure there is an essential connection. One can =
be a=20
partisan of a nation without dreaming of paradise. In any case, the =
debate over=20
"the secularization thesis" (Blumenberg vs. Lowith, Voegelin, etc.) =
should give=20
us pause with respect to hasty generalizations about the connection =
between=20
secular eschatologies and historical development. </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Thanks, again, for your comments.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2>Larry</FONT> </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr=20
style=3D"PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; =
BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D"BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; FONT: 10pt arial; font-color: =
black"><B>From:</B>=20
<A title=3Dali_m_rizvi@xxxxxxxxxxx =
href=3D"mailto:ali_m_rizvi@xxxxxxxxxxx";>Ali=20
Rizvi</A> </DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A=20
title=3Dfoucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=20
=
href=3D"mailto:foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx";>foucault@lists.villag=
e.virginia.edu</A>=20
</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Cc:</B> <A title=3Dm_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx =
href=3D"mailto:m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx";>m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx</A> </DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, July 18, 2001 =
5:56=20
PM</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> Re: Genetic =
Fallacy</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT><FONT size=3D2></FONT><FONT =
size=3D2></FONT><FONT=20
size=3D2></FONT><FONT size=3D2></FONT><FONT size=3D2></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV>
<P>Larry </P>
<P>Thanks for your interesting reply.</P>
<P>I will just add few comments beneath your observations whereever I =
feel I=20
have something to say...</P>
<P>I do not think that I have any serious problem with what you say =
assuming=20
your generalizations can be subjected to some careful qualifications. =
What I=20
object to is positing "the west" as some sort of quasi-metaphysical =
construct=20
that provides pseudo-explanations for almost any imaginable range of =
events.=20
</P>
<P>I can not agree more.</P></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<P>I agree that nationalism (like nation states) is an 18th and 19th =
Century=20
European invention. From that little follows. Nationalism is possible =
largely=20
because a sense of collective identity ("imagined communities" in =
Anderson's=20
term) can be combined with eschatological hopes about "progress" or =
"destiny."=20
</P>
<P>I think it tells us a lot about nationalism without reducing=20
explanation of nationalism to the fact that it was a 18th century =
European=20
invention. It tells us about about nationalism's origins in and =
relation to=20
Protestantism. It tells about nationalism's relation to capitalism and =
to=20
European Enligthement. How one can understand modern natioanlism =
without=20
relating it to the West's revolt against theology and Christianity? =
The=20
eschatological hopes you are talking about only prosperd in a space =
desterted=20
by Christianity and the notions of progress and destiny are secular=20
'reinterpretations' of Christian eschatology. </P>
<P>That hardly means that "nations" are either modern or necessarily =
European.=20
Nor does it mean that nationalism is only available to European =
peoples. I=20
doubt that it is in any sense "universal." </P>
<P>I think there is a very crucial difference between modern notion of =
'nation' and (say) medieval notions of 'nation'.=20
The medieval 'nations' were based (primarily) on =
lineage while=20
the modern 'nations' are primarily political constructs. 'Nations' are =
'made'=20
in modern times. In this sense for example strange nations like =
"Pakistan" and=20
"India" were 'made' in the second half of the last century. There are =
lot of=20
people on both sides who belong to same 'nations' in the sense of =
lineage but=20
they still are not one nation, they belong to two different nations. =
This is=20
what Anderson calls 'imagined' communities (I think Anderson describes =
the=20
above very well in his book).</P>
<P>I say nationalism is 'universal' in the sense that it is =
unviersalisable.=20
It is because nationalism is 'unviersalisable' that it is available to =
non=20
European people as well. The only condition is that they must =
transform=20
themselves according to notions that first originated in the West. =
That they=20
transform themselves (for example) from the communities based on love =
and=20
lineage to communites based (primarily) on 'self interest' (for =
example).</P>
<P>There are various peoples whose entire way of life would have to be =
transformed before they could imagine themselves in nationalistic =
terms (Maybe=20
fewer than there once were with the invasion of rain forests and other =
"remote" territories.) </P>
<P>i can not agree more.</P>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<P>Knowing where nationalism came from tells us almost nothing about =
its=20
configurations and how it will be adapted in cultures that are =
receptive to=20
it. For instance, Michael Ignatieff distinguishes between "civic =
nationalism"=20
and "ethnic nationalism." In civic nationalism the bonds of a =
political=20
community are defined by a common creed and set of political =
institutions. In=20
ethnic nationalism, the community is thought to belong to people =
marked by=20
ethnic bonds. </P>
<P>Civic nationalism again can not be understood without reference to=20
liberalism which is an idealogy which emanates from European=20
Enligtenment. Simlarly ethnic nationalism is reinterpretation and=20
reconstruction of lineage based communties on the basis of modern =
notions=20
of nationalism. I would consider Nazism and Fascism as modern =
movements in the=20
sense that although they are based on certain sense of 'lineage'=20
they incorporate that sense in typically modern notion of =
such=20
communties as political entities. </P>
<P>Nothing about the origins of nationalism predicts which of these =
(or other)=20
variations will prevail. </P>
<P>You are right but this is not because of any defiency of 'origin' =
based=20
expalanations of nationalism, it is rather because it is an empirical =
question=20
and can not be explained (solely) on the basis of general explanation =
of what=20
nationalism is. </P>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<P>I am leery of thinking of "cultures" or "civilizations" as granite =
blocks.=20
There identities are far more fluid than neat packages like "the west" =
allow.=20
Foucault's insistence on attending to "the microphysics of power" is =
useful=20
for avoiding these block conceptions. </P>
<P>I agree but this does not dispense with the need of using such =
broad=20
cocnepts as civilisation and cultures otherwise we would end with =
most=20
barren kind of nominalism. And Foucault is most appropriate example =
here.=20
Nowhere, as far as I know him, in Foucault concrete and partucular and =
attention to details is opposed to the need for appropriate and =
cautious=20
generalisation ( Panopticon was such a far reaching technolgoy =
according=20
to Foucault because it combined this concrete character and =
generalisibility=20
in it). One should not equate generalisation with abstraction. One =
would be=20
amused to note that Foucault uses the expression 'the West" freely and =
without=20
inhibition in even such a (presumably) 'regional' study as The Order =
of=20
Things. So I think there is as much need to attend to commanalities as =
there=20
is need to be attentive to differences. </P>
<P><FONT size=3D2></FONT> </P>
<P>To know how Japanese nationalism, or Kurdish nationalism differ =
from=20
American nationalism, you need to know something about Japanese, Kurds =
and=20
Americans (as well as how richly diverse all of these groups are). =
Going on=20
about "the west" and its essential qualities invites laziness. </P>
<P>yes but one should also ask such questions as, why is it that the =
spread of=20
nationalism in Kurdish people leads (invariably) to spread of Western =
values=20
and life styles in them and leads them away from their Islamic =
heritage?.=20
Or one should also ask why spread of nationalism in Japan =
makes her=20
increasingly a country less and less recognisable as =
distinct=20
society from Western societies? I would think that avoiding=20
these question might also lead to laziness.</P>
<P>regards</P>
<P>ali </P>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Cheers,=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Larry=20
<DIV></DIV>----- Original Message -----=20
<DIV></DIV>From: Ali Rizvi=20
<DIV></DIV>To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx=20
<DIV></DIV>Cc: m_pbr@xxxxxxxxxx=20
<DIV></DIV>Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2001 7:02 PM=20
<DIV></DIV>Subject: Re: Genetic Fallacy=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Larry=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Few comments come to mind concerning your last post on the =
abover=20
subject. I will make my comments without necessarily taking position =
on other=20
matters being discussed here..=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>I think one would commit genetic fallacy only if one =
considers West=20
in geographical, territorial, or racial terms..if one considers West =
in value=20
terms that is as a civilisation one does not necessarily commit a =
genetic=20
fallacy by considering nationalism, liberalism, socialsim etc as =
Western...in=20
this way one can consider natioanlism in modern political sense as a =
Western=20
notion which can be implemented anywhere in the world but at the =
expense of=20
transformation of that society in a manner that is dictated by Western =
history...this would be then termed as Westernisation..West in this =
sense is=20
the bearer of universal values, of unviersal history and the rest as =
moments=20
in that universal saga...=20
<DIV></DIV>this is all hypthetical and not necessarily seconded by =
events=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>regards=20
<DIV></DIV>ali=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
=
<DIV></DIV>--------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------=20
<DIV></DIV>Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at=20
http://www.hotmail.com.=20
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV><BR clear=3Dall>
<HR>
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at <A=20
href=3D"http://www.hotmail.com";>http://www.hotmail.com</A>.<BR>
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