Thanks to Jesper, and Andrew and to all others for helpful comments.
I realised a while ago parallels in Veyne's comments with comments by
another major contemporary influence on Foucalt. I mean Pierre Hadot. In the
last of his writings Foucault investigates ancient texts, especially Greek
and Roman texts. Foucault uses many new concepts derived from these
traditions in subtle way to give new life and new vigour and new strategic
depth to essentially modern and postmodern pursuits. One such concept is the
concept of Philosophy as spiritual exercise, which he borrows from Pierre
Hadot (Hadot 1987). Foucault explicates this in a famous passage from his
The Use of Pleasure:
?. . . what is philosophy today-philosophical activity I mean-if it is not
the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it
consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to what extent it might be
possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already
known? There is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when
it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their
truth is and how to find it, or when it works up a case against them in the
language of naïve positivity. But it is entitled to explore what might be
changed, in its own thought, through the practice of a knowledge that is
foreign to it. The ?essay?-which should be understood as the assay or test
by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the
simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication-is the
living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is
still what it was in times past, i.e; an ?ascesis?, askesis, an exercise of
oneself in the activity of thought? (8-9)
Now on the face of it there is a very considerable difference between
Foucault?s philosophy of difference and his notion of thought one the one
hand and the notion of spiritual exercises or askesis on the other. In his
later essay on Foucault, Hadot analyses some of the misinterpretations
carried out by Foucault while attributing the idea of exercise of self in
thought to ancients. Hadot specifically mentions the following misconstrual
of Greek thought. Firstly Hadot questions Foucault?s attribution of the
notion of the joy of ?another pleasure? to Seneca or Stoics in general. The
reason being the fact that ?if the Stoics set store by the word gaudium, the
word ?joy?, this was precisely because they refused to introduce the
principle of pleasure into moral life. For them happiness did not consist in
pleasure but in virtue itself, which is seen as being its own reward? (Hadot
1992 p. 226). Second reason Hadot gives for doubting Foucault?s
interpretation is that according to Hadot, Foucault?s conception of self is
quite different (and at loggerheads with) the Stoic conception of self. For
?Stoics did not find joy in the ?self? but, as Seneca says, ?in the best
part of the self?? and ?the ?best part? of the self is ultimately a
transcendent self. Seneca does not find joy just in ?Seneca?, but by
transcending Seneca, by discovering that he has a reason in himself, a part
of the universal Reason which is within all men and the cosmos itself?
(ibid. translation amended). Now this conception of self, attributed to
Seneca by Hadot would have been anathema to Foucault. However after
mentioning these ?misinterpretations?, Hadot makes the following comment,
which sums up the issue very aptly:
?I understand Foucault?s motive in glossing over these aspects very well,
though he was well aware of them. His description of practices of the self
(like, moreover, my description of spiritual exercises) is not only a
historical study; it was meant also to offer contemporary man a model of
life (which Foucault calls the ?aesthetic of existence?). Now, according to
a very general tendency in modern thought-a tendency, which is perhaps
rather more, instinctive then considered-the notions of ?universal Reason?
and ?universal Nature? are no longer seen as having much meaning. It was
therefore expedient to parenthesise them? (ibid. pp. 26-27,).
Hadot?s comment that it was ?expedient to parenthesise them? correspond to
Veyne?s comments on about ?strategic reasons (to avoid words which might
shock . . .)? and his comments about ?for reasons of hygiene?. Does this
parallel cast any fresh light on Veyne's quotes?
Any other comments related to these issue are greatly appreciated.
best regards
ali
References:
Pierre Hadot (1987) Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris:
Études augustiniennes, second edition).
Pierre Hadot (1992) ?Reflections on the notion of ?the cultivation of the
self??, in Armstrong ed. (1992).Michel Foucault Philosopher trans. Timothy
J. Armstrong (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf).
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