Re: Subjectivity

I'm not sure I agree with your premisses here.

Foucault never argues for the end of subjectivity. All of his interest
in ethics, technologies of the self, and an aesthetics of existence is
a consideration of what kinds of creative work may be done within the
supposed limitations of specific subject formations.

Subjectivity is not a transhistorical or metaphysically fixed "thing"
so much as a site and process of local formation that greatly
determines how individuals act, think, speak, etc. "Man" is the
product of a historically and culturally unique set of processes of
subjectivation that emerge in modern Europe, perhaps most prominently
under the labels of "Enlightenment" and "Humanism" (with all of the
specific practices and discourses they have deployed). It is a complex
often self contradictory historical formation that arose gradually and
is also likely to come to be replaced by something else. (Perhaps it
already has?)

Resistance is possible by first of all becoming critically aware of
those limitations that are historically and culturally conditioned and
imposed through forms of governance yet appear to be permanent,
natural, or fixed in some other way (e.g., "sexuality"). One key to
seeing how this may be possible is by recognizing that much of the work
of subjectivation is performed more or less freely by individuals upon
themselves (what Foucault calls "ethics" and studies as "technologies
of the self").

Trent

On Thursday, September 26, 2002, at 10:34 AM, John Patrick wrote:

> If Foucault argues for the end of Subjectivity (the death of Man) and
> that resistance to the dominant discourse or regime of truth does not
> exist, where does that leave Foucault?
>
> Is Foucault a Subject? Is his work a successful challenge to the
> dominant discourse of the age?
>
> I think the answer to both questions is yes, which pardoxically
> undermines his arguments.
>
>
>
>
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