Re: foucault and agency

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Thank you Francois. I don't know why people keep repeating the idea that
there is no possibility for "agency" in Foucault --though I do not blame
the person who asked this question since it is hard to get good information
when so much poor interpretation of Foucault is constantly being circulated
by those who we woudl expect to know better. In any case, this has to be
one of the biggest misconceptions imaginable, probably traceable to early
polemics against Foucault by people who didn't understand him.

For what is perhaps the clearest statement by Foucault on this issue, see
Foucault's "The Subject and Power" first published in Dreyfus and Rabinow's
Michel Foucault (also appearing in one of the volumes edited by
Rabinow). On pp. 220-1 (of the original version) Foucault defines power as
operating on the actions of another NEITHER by means of total compulsion
(which is based on violence, think of the slave in chains) NOR by merely
securing their free consent:

Power is not CONSENT; "power is not a function of consent. It is not a
renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights. . . . [although] the
relationship of power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent. .
. it is not by nature the manifestation of consensus," (219-20; my emphasis).

On the other hand, power is not VIOLENCE either; although violence. . .

"must have been its primitive form, its permanent secret and its last
resource. . . . what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode
of action which does not act directly or immediately on others. Instead it
acts upon their actions. . . . A relationship of violence [on the other
hand] acts upon the body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on
the wheel, it destroys or closes the door on all possibilities. Its
opposite pole can only be passivity," (220).

So, to summarize, while "consensus and violence are the instruments of the
results, they do not constitute the principle or basic nature of power,"
(220). Rather, "it is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon
possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or
more difficult; . . . it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an
acting subject or acting subjects," (220; my emphasis). And again: "Power
is exercised only over free subjects, only insofar as they are free. By
this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field
of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and
diverse comportments may be realized. Where determining factors saturate
the whole there is no relation of power; slaver is not a power relation
when a man is in chains. . . . [W]ithout the possibility of recalcitrance,
power would be equivalent to a physical determination," (221; my emphasis).

And here is the CRUCIAL part: "there is no relation of power without the
means of escape or possible flight. Every power relationship implies, at
least in potentia, the strategy of struggle, in which the two forces are
not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally
become confused. Each creates for the other a kind of permanent limit, a
point of possible reversal," (225).

-Nate

At 12:08 PM 11/19/2002 -0500, you wrote:
>Indeed, his whole conceptualisation of power relies on the possibility for
>the
>"subjects" (for lack of another appropriate word) to act on the actions of
>those who exercice power on them! His 'analytique' was one (it became
>especially clear in his later writings) of liberal government, that is of a
>mode of governement that conceives of its 'subjects' as capable and
>legitimate
>to participate in it through their engagement in the governing of self and/or
>others. That is not what one would call a denial of agency. Of the subject,
>probably - and it is debatable. I would say though that this does not exlude
>the impression, reading Foucault, that "it doesn't matter who act" and
>therefore that his analysis are affect-less, focusing rather on impersonal
>rationalities of government that somewhat lack their 'human' incorporation.
>
>But it is not clear to me what this implies nor how one can resolve the
>ambiguity.
>
>Francois Gagnon
>
>
>
>
>Selon suannschafer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx:
>
> > >Foucault's critics as a routine confuse his rejection of subject
> > >with the rejection of agency. It is not the same thing to dney
> > >agency and subject. One can believe in agency without believing in
> > >the notion of subject as understood in Cartesian and Enlightenment
> > >tradtion.
> >
> > That's interesting. Can you elaborate? Thanks in advance!
> >
>
>
>Franois Gagnon
>tudiant au Doctorat
>Dpartement de Communication
>Universit de Montral
>(514)343-6111 poste 1464

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Thank you Francois.  I don't know why people keep repeating the idea
that there is no possibility for "agency" in Foucault --though
I do not blame the person who asked this question since it is hard to get
good information when so much poor interpretation of Foucault is
constantly being circulated by those who we woudl expect to know
better.  In any case, this has to be one of the biggest
misconceptions imaginable, probably traceable to early polemics against
Foucault by people who didn't understand him.  
For what is perhaps the clearest statement by Foucault on this issue, see
Foucault's "The Subject and Power" first published in Dreyfus
and Rabinow's Michel Foucault (also appearing in one of the volumes
edited by Rabinow).  On pp. 220-1 (of the original version) Foucault
defines power as operating on the actions of another NEITHER by means of
total compulsion (which is based on violence, think of the slave in
chains) NOR by merely securing their free consent: 
Power is not CONSENT; "power is not a function of consent.  It
is not a renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights. . . .
[although] the relationship of power can be the result of a prior or
permanent consent. . . it is not by nature the manifestation of
consensus," (219-20; my emphasis). 
On the other hand, power is not VIOLENCE either; although violence. . .
 
"must have been its primitive form, its permanent secret and its
last resource. . . . what defines a relationship of power is that it is a
mode of action which does not act directly or immediately on
others.  Instead it acts upon their actions. . . . A relationship of
violence [on the other hand] acts upon the body or upon things; it
forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys or closes the door
on all possibilities.  Its opposite pole can only be
passivity," (220). 
So, to summarize, while "consensus and violence are the instruments
of the results, they do not constitute the principle or basic nature of
power," (220).  Rather, "it is a total structure of
actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it
seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; . . . it is nevertheless
always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects,"
(220; my emphasis).  And again: "Power is exercised only over
free subjects, only insofar as they are free.  By this we mean
individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of
possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and
diverse comportments may be realized.  Where determining factors
saturate the whole there is no relation of power; slaver is not a power
relation when a man is in chains. . . . [W]ithout the possibility of
recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical
determination," (221; my emphasis). 
And here is the CRUCIAL part: "there is no relation of power without
the means of escape or possible flight.  Every power relationship
implies, at least in potentia, the strategy of struggle, in which the two
forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not
finally become confused.  Each creates for the other a kind of
permanent limit, a point of possible reversal," (225). 
-Nate 
 
At 12:08 PM 11/19/2002 -0500, you wrote: 
<blockquote type=3Dcite class=3Dcite cite>Indeed, his whole conceptualisatio=
n
of power relies on the possibility for the 
"subjects" (for lack of another appropriate word) to act on the
actions of 
those who exercice power on them!  His 'analytique' was one (it
became 
especially clear in his later writings) of liberal government, that is of
a 
mode of governement that conceives of its 'subjects' as capable and
legitimate 
to participate in it through their engagement in the governing of self
and/or 
others.  That is not what one would call a denial of agency. 
Of the subject, 
probably - and it is debatable.  I would say though that this does
not exlude 
the impression, reading Foucault, that "it doesn't matter who
act" and 
therefore that his analysis are affect-less, focusing rather on
impersonal 
rationalities of government that somewhat lack their 'human'
incorporation. 
But it is not clear to me what this implies nor how one can resolve the
 
ambiguity. 
Francois Gagnon 
 
 
Selon suannschafer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx: 
> >Foucault's critics as a routine confuse his rejection of subject
 
> >with the rejection of agency. It is not the same thing to dney
 
> >agency and subject. One can believe in agency without believing
in 
> >the notion of subject as understood in Cartesian and
Enlightenment 
> >tradtion. 
> 
> That's interesting.  Can you elaborate?  Thanks in
advance! 
> 
 
Franois Gagnon 
tudiant au Doctorat 
Dpartement de Communication 
Universit de Montral 
(514)343-6111 poste 1464 </blockquote> 
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