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Dear Nate (and listers)!
Thank you for a succinct, pointed and one hopes conclusive rebuttal of this
line of critique expressed by Giddens and Habermas among others. This
critique is typically among the first that one comes across when first
exploring Foucault's works, and you are right to indicate that it is
thoroughly repudiated in Foucault's later works. It certainly doesn't hurt
however, to see this neat rehearsal of Foucault's position. One hopes that
this will clarify for all on the list what is ultimately a fairly
straight-forward argument. So I thank you for taking the time to elucidate
this point with such clarity!
I'm also glad to see the list returning to some of the core themes from
Foucault's later works. Considering recent events around the world, one
can't help but hope that these works offer us a way forward.
Kind Regards,
Cameron Duff
-----Original Message-----
From: Nathaniel Roberts [mailto:npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 November 2002 4:45 AM
To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: foucault and agency
Thank you Francois. I don't know why people keep repeating the idea that
there is no possibility for "agency" in Foucault --though I do not blame the
person who asked this question since it is hard to get good information when
so much poor interpretation of Foucault is constantly being circulated by
those who we woudl expect to know better. In any case, this has to be one
of the biggest misconceptions imaginable, probably traceable to early
polemics against Foucault by people who didn't understand him.
For what is perhaps the clearest statement by Foucault on this issue, see
Foucault's "The Subject and Power" first published in Dreyfus and Rabinow's
Michel Foucault (also appearing in one of the volumes edited by Rabinow).
On pp. 220-1 (of the original version) Foucault defines power as operating
on the actions of another NEITHER by means of total compulsion (which is
based on violence, think of the slave in chains) NOR by merely securing
their free consent:
Power is not CONSENT; "power is not a function of consent. It is not a
renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights. . . . [although] the
relationship of power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent. . .
it is not by nature the manifestation of consensus," (219-20; my emphasis).
On the other hand, power is not VIOLENCE either; although violence. . .
"must have been its primitive form, its permanent secret and its last
resource. . . . what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of
action which does not act directly or immediately on others. Instead it
acts upon their actions. . . . A relationship of violence [on the other
hand] acts upon the body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on
the wheel, it destroys or closes the door on all possibilities. Its
opposite pole can only be passivity," (220).
So, to summarize, while "consensus and violence are the instruments of the
results, they do not constitute the principle or basic nature of power,"
(220). Rather, "it is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon
possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or
more difficult; . . . it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an
acting subject or acting subjects," (220; my emphasis). And again: "Power
is exercised only over free subjects, only insofar as they are free. By
this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of
possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and
diverse comportments may be realized. Where determining factors saturate
the whole there is no relation of power; slaver is not a power relation when
a man is in chains. . . . [W]ithout the possibility of recalcitrance, power
would be equivalent to a physical determination," (221; my emphasis).
And here is the CRUCIAL part: "there is no relation of power without the
means of escape or possible flight. Every power relationship implies, at
least in potentia, the strategy of struggle, in which the two forces are not
superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become
confused. Each creates for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of
possible reversal," (225).
-Nate
At 12:08 PM 11/19/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Indeed, his whole conceptualisation of power relies on the possibility for
the
"subjects" (for lack of another appropriate word) to act on the actions of
those who exercice power on them! His 'analytique' was one (it became
especially clear in his later writings) of liberal government, that is of a
mode of governement that conceives of its 'subjects' as capable and
legitimate
to participate in it through their engagement in the governing of self
and/or
others. That is not what one would call a denial of agency. Of the
subject,
probably - and it is debatable. I would say though that this does not
exlude
the impression, reading Foucault, that "it doesn't matter who act" and
therefore that his analysis are affect-less, focusing rather on impersonal
rationalities of government that somewhat lack their 'human' incorporation.
But it is not clear to me what this implies nor how one can resolve the
ambiguity.
Francois Gagnon
Selon suannschafer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx:
> >Foucault's critics as a routine confuse his rejection of subject
> >with the rejection of agency. It is not the same thing to dney
> >agency and subject. One can believe in agency without believing in
> >the notion of subject as understood in Cartesian and Enlightenment
> >tradtion.
>
> That's interesting. Can you elaborate? Thanks in advance!
>
Franois Gagnon
tudiant au Doctorat
Dpartement de Communication
Universit de Montral
(514)343-6111 poste 1464
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<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Dear
Nate (and listers)!</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Thank
you for a succinct, pointed and one hopes conclusive rebuttal of this line of
critique expressed by Giddens and Habermas among others. This critique
is typically among the first that one comes across when first exploring
Foucault's works, and you are right to indicate that it is thoroughly repudiated
in Foucault's later works. It certainly doesn't hurt however, to
see this neat rehearsal of Foucault's position. One hopes that this
will clarify for all on the list what is ultimately a fairly straight-forward
argument. So I thank you for taking the time to elucidate this point with such
clarity!</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>I'm
also glad to see the list returning to some of the core themes from Foucault's
later works. Considering recent events around the world, one can't help but hope
that these works offer us a way forward. </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Kind
Regards, </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff
size=2>Cameron Duff</FONT> </SPAN></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader lang=en-us dir=ltr align=left><FONT
face=Tahoma size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Nathaniel
Roberts [mailto:npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx] <BR><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, 20 November
2002 4:45 AM<BR><B>To:</B>
foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: foucault and
agency<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>Thank you Francois. I don't know why people
keep repeating the idea that there is no possibility for "agency" in Foucault
--though I do not blame the person who asked this question since it is hard to
get good information when so much poor interpretation of Foucault is
constantly being circulated by those who we woudl expect to know better.
In any case, this has to be one of the biggest misconceptions imaginable,
probably traceable to early polemics against Foucault by people who didn't
understand him. <BR><BR>For what is perhaps the clearest statement by
Foucault on this issue, see Foucault's "The Subject and Power" first published
in Dreyfus and Rabinow's Michel Foucault (also appearing in one of the volumes
edited by Rabinow). On pp. 220-1 (of the original version) Foucault
defines power as operating on the actions of another NEITHER by means of total
compulsion (which is based on violence, think of the slave in chains) NOR by
merely securing their free consent:<BR><BR>Power is not CONSENT; "power is not
a function of consent. It is not a renunciation of freedom, a
transference of rights. . . . [although] the relationship of power can be the
result of a prior or permanent consent. . . it is not by nature the
manifestation of consensus," (219-20; my emphasis).<BR><BR>On the other hand,
power is not VIOLENCE either; although violence. . . <BR><BR>"must have been
its primitive form, its permanent secret and its last resource. . . . what
defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not
act directly or immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their
actions. . . . A relationship of violence [on the other hand] acts upon the
body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys
or closes the door on all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be
passivity," (220).<BR><BR>So, to summarize, while "consensus and violence are
the instruments of the results, they do not constitute the principle or basic
nature of power," (220). Rather, "it is a total structure of actions
brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it
makes easier or more difficult; . . . it is nevertheless always a way of
acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects," (220; my emphasis).
And again: "Power is exercised only over free subjects, only insofar as they
are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are
faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several
reactions and diverse comportments may be realized. Where determining
factors saturate the whole there is no relation of power; slaver is not a
power relation when a man is in chains. . . . [W]ithout the possibility of
recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination," (221;
my emphasis).<BR><BR>And here is the CRUCIAL part: "there is no relation of
power without the means of escape or possible flight. Every power
relationship implies, at least in potentia, the strategy of struggle, in which
the two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do
not finally become confused. Each creates for the other a kind of
permanent limit, a point of possible reversal,"
(225).<BR><BR>-Nate<BR><BR><BR>At 12:08 PM 11/19/2002 -0500, you wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE class=cite cite="" type="cite">Indeed, his whole
conceptualisation of power relies on the possibility for the <BR>"subjects"
(for lack of another appropriate word) to act on the actions of <BR>those
who exercice power on them! His 'analytique' was one (it became
<BR>especially clear in his later writings) of liberal government, that is
of a <BR>mode of governement that conceives of its 'subjects' as capable and
legitimate <BR>to participate in it through their engagement in the
governing of self and/or <BR>others. That is not what one would call a
denial of agency. Of the subject, <BR>probably - and it is
debatable. I would say though that this does not exlude <BR>the
impression, reading Foucault, that "it doesn't matter who act" and
<BR>therefore that his analysis are affect-less, focusing rather on
impersonal <BR>rationalities of government that somewhat lack their 'human'
incorporation.<BR><BR>But it is not clear to me what this implies nor how
one can resolve the <BR>ambiguity.<BR><BR>Francois
Gagnon<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR>Selon suannschafer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx:<BR><BR>>
>Foucault's critics as a routine confuse his rejection of subject
<BR>> >with the rejection of agency. It is not the same thing to dney
<BR>> >agency and subject. One can believe in agency without believing
in <BR>> >the notion of subject as understood in Cartesian and
Enlightenment <BR>> >tradtion.<BR>> <BR>> That's
interesting. Can you elaborate? Thanks in advance!<BR>>
<BR><BR><BR>Franois Gagnon<BR>tudiant au Doctorat<BR>Dpartement de
Communication<BR>Universit de Montral<BR>(514)343-6111 poste 1464
</BLOCKQUOTE><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29017.005CE250--
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------_=_NextPart_001_01C29017.005CE250
Content-Type: text/plain
Dear Nate (and listers)!
Thank you for a succinct, pointed and one hopes conclusive rebuttal of this
line of critique expressed by Giddens and Habermas among others. This
critique is typically among the first that one comes across when first
exploring Foucault's works, and you are right to indicate that it is
thoroughly repudiated in Foucault's later works. It certainly doesn't hurt
however, to see this neat rehearsal of Foucault's position. One hopes that
this will clarify for all on the list what is ultimately a fairly
straight-forward argument. So I thank you for taking the time to elucidate
this point with such clarity!
I'm also glad to see the list returning to some of the core themes from
Foucault's later works. Considering recent events around the world, one
can't help but hope that these works offer us a way forward.
Kind Regards,
Cameron Duff
-----Original Message-----
From: Nathaniel Roberts [mailto:npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 November 2002 4:45 AM
To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: foucault and agency
Thank you Francois. I don't know why people keep repeating the idea that
there is no possibility for "agency" in Foucault --though I do not blame the
person who asked this question since it is hard to get good information when
so much poor interpretation of Foucault is constantly being circulated by
those who we woudl expect to know better. In any case, this has to be one
of the biggest misconceptions imaginable, probably traceable to early
polemics against Foucault by people who didn't understand him.
For what is perhaps the clearest statement by Foucault on this issue, see
Foucault's "The Subject and Power" first published in Dreyfus and Rabinow's
Michel Foucault (also appearing in one of the volumes edited by Rabinow).
On pp. 220-1 (of the original version) Foucault defines power as operating
on the actions of another NEITHER by means of total compulsion (which is
based on violence, think of the slave in chains) NOR by merely securing
their free consent:
Power is not CONSENT; "power is not a function of consent. It is not a
renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights. . . . [although] the
relationship of power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent. . .
it is not by nature the manifestation of consensus," (219-20; my emphasis).
On the other hand, power is not VIOLENCE either; although violence. . .
"must have been its primitive form, its permanent secret and its last
resource. . . . what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of
action which does not act directly or immediately on others. Instead it
acts upon their actions. . . . A relationship of violence [on the other
hand] acts upon the body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on
the wheel, it destroys or closes the door on all possibilities. Its
opposite pole can only be passivity," (220).
So, to summarize, while "consensus and violence are the instruments of the
results, they do not constitute the principle or basic nature of power,"
(220). Rather, "it is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon
possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or
more difficult; . . . it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an
acting subject or acting subjects," (220; my emphasis). And again: "Power
is exercised only over free subjects, only insofar as they are free. By
this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of
possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and
diverse comportments may be realized. Where determining factors saturate
the whole there is no relation of power; slaver is not a power relation when
a man is in chains. . . . [W]ithout the possibility of recalcitrance, power
would be equivalent to a physical determination," (221; my emphasis).
And here is the CRUCIAL part: "there is no relation of power without the
means of escape or possible flight. Every power relationship implies, at
least in potentia, the strategy of struggle, in which the two forces are not
superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become
confused. Each creates for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of
possible reversal," (225).
-Nate
At 12:08 PM 11/19/2002 -0500, you wrote:
Indeed, his whole conceptualisation of power relies on the possibility for
the
"subjects" (for lack of another appropriate word) to act on the actions of
those who exercice power on them! His 'analytique' was one (it became
especially clear in his later writings) of liberal government, that is of a
mode of governement that conceives of its 'subjects' as capable and
legitimate
to participate in it through their engagement in the governing of self
and/or
others. That is not what one would call a denial of agency. Of the
subject,
probably - and it is debatable. I would say though that this does not
exlude
the impression, reading Foucault, that "it doesn't matter who act" and
therefore that his analysis are affect-less, focusing rather on impersonal
rationalities of government that somewhat lack their 'human' incorporation.
But it is not clear to me what this implies nor how one can resolve the
ambiguity.
Francois Gagnon
Selon suannschafer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx:
> >Foucault's critics as a routine confuse his rejection of subject
> >with the rejection of agency. It is not the same thing to dney
> >agency and subject. One can believe in agency without believing in
> >the notion of subject as understood in Cartesian and Enlightenment
> >tradtion.
>
> That's interesting. Can you elaborate? Thanks in advance!
>
Franois Gagnon
tudiant au Doctorat
Dpartement de Communication
Universit de Montral
(514)343-6111 poste 1464
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<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Dear
Nate (and listers)!</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Thank
you for a succinct, pointed and one hopes conclusive rebuttal of this line of
critique expressed by Giddens and Habermas among others. This critique
is typically among the first that one comes across when first exploring
Foucault's works, and you are right to indicate that it is thoroughly repudiated
in Foucault's later works. It certainly doesn't hurt however, to
see this neat rehearsal of Foucault's position. One hopes that this
will clarify for all on the list what is ultimately a fairly straight-forward
argument. So I thank you for taking the time to elucidate this point with such
clarity!</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>I'm
also glad to see the list returning to some of the core themes from Foucault's
later works. Considering recent events around the world, one can't help but hope
that these works offer us a way forward. </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff size=2>Kind
Regards, </FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=950515521-19112002><FONT face=Arial color=#0000ff
size=2>Cameron Duff</FONT> </SPAN></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=OutlookMessageHeader lang=en-us dir=ltr align=left><FONT
face=Tahoma size=2>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B> Nathaniel
Roberts [mailto:npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx] <BR><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, 20 November
2002 4:45 AM<BR><B>To:</B>
foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: foucault and
agency<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>Thank you Francois. I don't know why people
keep repeating the idea that there is no possibility for "agency" in Foucault
--though I do not blame the person who asked this question since it is hard to
get good information when so much poor interpretation of Foucault is
constantly being circulated by those who we woudl expect to know better.
In any case, this has to be one of the biggest misconceptions imaginable,
probably traceable to early polemics against Foucault by people who didn't
understand him. <BR><BR>For what is perhaps the clearest statement by
Foucault on this issue, see Foucault's "The Subject and Power" first published
in Dreyfus and Rabinow's Michel Foucault (also appearing in one of the volumes
edited by Rabinow). On pp. 220-1 (of the original version) Foucault
defines power as operating on the actions of another NEITHER by means of total
compulsion (which is based on violence, think of the slave in chains) NOR by
merely securing their free consent:<BR><BR>Power is not CONSENT; "power is not
a function of consent. It is not a renunciation of freedom, a
transference of rights. . . . [although] the relationship of power can be the
result of a prior or permanent consent. . . it is not by nature the
manifestation of consensus," (219-20; my emphasis).<BR><BR>On the other hand,
power is not VIOLENCE either; although violence. . . <BR><BR>"must have been
its primitive form, its permanent secret and its last resource. . . . what
defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not
act directly or immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their
actions. . . . A relationship of violence [on the other hand] acts upon the
body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys
or closes the door on all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be
passivity," (220).<BR><BR>So, to summarize, while "consensus and violence are
the instruments of the results, they do not constitute the principle or basic
nature of power," (220). Rather, "it is a total structure of actions
brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it
makes easier or more difficult; . . . it is nevertheless always a way of
acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects," (220; my emphasis).
And again: "Power is exercised only over free subjects, only insofar as they
are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are
faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several
reactions and diverse comportments may be realized. Where determining
factors saturate the whole there is no relation of power; slaver is not a
power relation when a man is in chains. . . . [W]ithout the possibility of
recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination," (221;
my emphasis).<BR><BR>And here is the CRUCIAL part: "there is no relation of
power without the means of escape or possible flight. Every power
relationship implies, at least in potentia, the strategy of struggle, in which
the two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do
not finally become confused. Each creates for the other a kind of
permanent limit, a point of possible reversal,"
(225).<BR><BR>-Nate<BR><BR><BR>At 12:08 PM 11/19/2002 -0500, you wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE class=cite cite="" type="cite">Indeed, his whole
conceptualisation of power relies on the possibility for the <BR>"subjects"
(for lack of another appropriate word) to act on the actions of <BR>those
who exercice power on them! His 'analytique' was one (it became
<BR>especially clear in his later writings) of liberal government, that is
of a <BR>mode of governement that conceives of its 'subjects' as capable and
legitimate <BR>to participate in it through their engagement in the
governing of self and/or <BR>others. That is not what one would call a
denial of agency. Of the subject, <BR>probably - and it is
debatable. I would say though that this does not exlude <BR>the
impression, reading Foucault, that "it doesn't matter who act" and
<BR>therefore that his analysis are affect-less, focusing rather on
impersonal <BR>rationalities of government that somewhat lack their 'human'
incorporation.<BR><BR>But it is not clear to me what this implies nor how
one can resolve the <BR>ambiguity.<BR><BR>Francois
Gagnon<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR>Selon suannschafer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx:<BR><BR>>
>Foucault's critics as a routine confuse his rejection of subject
<BR>> >with the rejection of agency. It is not the same thing to dney
<BR>> >agency and subject. One can believe in agency without believing
in <BR>> >the notion of subject as understood in Cartesian and
Enlightenment <BR>> >tradtion.<BR>> <BR>> That's
interesting. Can you elaborate? Thanks in advance!<BR>>
<BR><BR><BR>Franois Gagnon<BR>tudiant au Doctorat<BR>Dpartement de
Communication<BR>Universit de Montral<BR>(514)343-6111 poste 1464
</BLOCKQUOTE><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>
------_=_NextPart_001_01C29017.005CE250--