this discussion thread and the citations of interviews on it seem to prove
this point
On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 12:14 PM, Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> Actualy I think Foucault does distinguish between truth and justification
> explicitly, except that these clarifications are often in the interviews and
> intersections with other professors in Dits et Ecrits and perhaps in a few
> lectures.
> Its an interesting pattern. Foucault assumes the reader's ability to make a
> distinction in his written work whereas in an informal interview, he's much
> more refreshingly clear about his intentions, framework, etc.
> Thus why I think anyone who wants a good understanding of Foucault needs to
> read Dits et Ecrits (the translated excessively abridged version being
> "Essential Works of Foucault, 3 vols).
> Only by reading that will one have a clear view of Foucault's project.
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 6:11 AM, Kay Fisher <fisherk@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> I think (philosopher and psychologist) Todd May's book "Between Genealogy
>> and Epistemology: Psychology, politics and knowledge in the Thought of
>> Michel Foucault' (1993) could be helpful here.
>>
>> He believes that its important to make a distinction between justification
>> and truth (something he reckons so-called 'poststructuralist' French thought
>> tended not to do). He says that Foucault could be ambiguous on these
>> questions but makes the case that his position is not a relativist one re:
>> truth. He claims that Foucault takes an antifoundational relation to truth
>> but one that allows truth claims to be justified on the basis of
>> 'inferential networks' of already existing knowledges (this includes
>> justificatory practices). [May further argues that scientific knowledges of
>> Western culture tend to have relatively 'tight' inferential networks]. This,
>> of course, does not guarantee any absolute truth. Rather it is assumed that
>> while everything is open to question, not everything can be questioned at
>> the one time (so there always has to be some taken-for-granteds). I think
>> this is pretty much consistent with Edward's reading.
>>
>> May also argues (like others) that since the relativist position affords
>> no grounds for truth claims it is self-defeating argument in logic terms.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Message: 11
>> Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2010 22:08:48 -0500
>> From: Edward Comstock<ecomst@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault and "human nature"
>> To: Mailing-list<foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Message-ID:
>> <
>> OF2850DBEE.82182B73-ON852576DE.00108388-852576DE.00114D19@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
>>
>> Right. Similarly, our current physics works as a system of knowledge that
>> gives us repeatable results and laws. But this does not mean that we could
>> not have a competitive "non-quarky" physics that gives repeatable results
>> and laws of a different order. Perhaps, with different cultural
>> circumstances, a given non-quarky physics might even be more useful in the
>> knowledge it produces. In other words, just because our physics works as
>> a system of knowledge does not make it "true" in the absolute sense. But
>> at the same time, who cares anymore about finding knowledge that is true
>> in the absolute sense?
>>
>> Of course we also have to distinguish between sciences that have crossed
>> the epistemological threshold (like physics and pathological anatomy) and
>> those that have not...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault and "human nature"
>>
>> David McInerney
>> to:
>> Mailing-list
>> 03/05/2010 04:26 PM
>>
>>
>> Sent by:
>> foucault-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Please respond to Mailing-list
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 06/03/2010, at 7:41 AM, Edward Comstock wrote:
>>
>>
>> > > It also seems to me that even what we call human nature or look for
>> is
>> > > going to change based on different knowledge practices, such that the
>> > > question can only be answered within given systems of knowledge.
>> > > Foucault,
>> > > after all, for instance, believed that modern medicine presented
>> valid
>> > > abstractions against which we could gain usefull knowedges. But I
>> > > dont'
>> > > take this to mean that he believes modern medicine to be "true" in
>> the
>> > > absolute sense.
>> > >
>> >
>> This seems similar to Althusser's attempts to distinguish between
>> discourses in terms of the 'adequacy' of their 'grasp' of the
>> material world, a rather tricky notion in that idealist discourses
>> such as empiricism always attempt to exploit it. I'm not sure how
>> one avoids it though, unless one accepts the extreme relativism that
>> would assert that the phlogiston theory is equally valid way of
>> looking at the generation of heat as thermodynamics. It is clear
>> that one gives us a more adequate grasp of material reality, but if
>> one attempts to 'go around' discourse to find a way to see whether it
>> corresponds to something outside of itself then, whoops, there we are
>> back with the 'subject of knowledge' etc etc.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Foucault-L mailing list
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Foucault-L mailing list
>> Foucault-L@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>
>> http://foucault.info/mailman/listinfo/foucault-l
>>
>> End of Foucault-L Digest, Vol 10, Issue 6
>> *****************************************
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Foucault-L mailing list
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Chetan Vemuri
> West Des Moines, IA
> aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> (319)-512-9318
> "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> world"
>
--
Chetan Vemuri
West Des Moines, IA
aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
(319)-512-9318
"You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
world"
this point
On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 12:14 PM, Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> Actualy I think Foucault does distinguish between truth and justification
> explicitly, except that these clarifications are often in the interviews and
> intersections with other professors in Dits et Ecrits and perhaps in a few
> lectures.
> Its an interesting pattern. Foucault assumes the reader's ability to make a
> distinction in his written work whereas in an informal interview, he's much
> more refreshingly clear about his intentions, framework, etc.
> Thus why I think anyone who wants a good understanding of Foucault needs to
> read Dits et Ecrits (the translated excessively abridged version being
> "Essential Works of Foucault, 3 vols).
> Only by reading that will one have a clear view of Foucault's project.
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 6:11 AM, Kay Fisher <fisherk@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> I think (philosopher and psychologist) Todd May's book "Between Genealogy
>> and Epistemology: Psychology, politics and knowledge in the Thought of
>> Michel Foucault' (1993) could be helpful here.
>>
>> He believes that its important to make a distinction between justification
>> and truth (something he reckons so-called 'poststructuralist' French thought
>> tended not to do). He says that Foucault could be ambiguous on these
>> questions but makes the case that his position is not a relativist one re:
>> truth. He claims that Foucault takes an antifoundational relation to truth
>> but one that allows truth claims to be justified on the basis of
>> 'inferential networks' of already existing knowledges (this includes
>> justificatory practices). [May further argues that scientific knowledges of
>> Western culture tend to have relatively 'tight' inferential networks]. This,
>> of course, does not guarantee any absolute truth. Rather it is assumed that
>> while everything is open to question, not everything can be questioned at
>> the one time (so there always has to be some taken-for-granteds). I think
>> this is pretty much consistent with Edward's reading.
>>
>> May also argues (like others) that since the relativist position affords
>> no grounds for truth claims it is self-defeating argument in logic terms.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Message: 11
>> Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2010 22:08:48 -0500
>> From: Edward Comstock<ecomst@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault and "human nature"
>> To: Mailing-list<foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Message-ID:
>> <
>> OF2850DBEE.82182B73-ON852576DE.00108388-852576DE.00114D19@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
>>
>> Right. Similarly, our current physics works as a system of knowledge that
>> gives us repeatable results and laws. But this does not mean that we could
>> not have a competitive "non-quarky" physics that gives repeatable results
>> and laws of a different order. Perhaps, with different cultural
>> circumstances, a given non-quarky physics might even be more useful in the
>> knowledge it produces. In other words, just because our physics works as
>> a system of knowledge does not make it "true" in the absolute sense. But
>> at the same time, who cares anymore about finding knowledge that is true
>> in the absolute sense?
>>
>> Of course we also have to distinguish between sciences that have crossed
>> the epistemological threshold (like physics and pathological anatomy) and
>> those that have not...
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault and "human nature"
>>
>> David McInerney
>> to:
>> Mailing-list
>> 03/05/2010 04:26 PM
>>
>>
>> Sent by:
>> foucault-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Please respond to Mailing-list
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 06/03/2010, at 7:41 AM, Edward Comstock wrote:
>>
>>
>> > > It also seems to me that even what we call human nature or look for
>> is
>> > > going to change based on different knowledge practices, such that the
>> > > question can only be answered within given systems of knowledge.
>> > > Foucault,
>> > > after all, for instance, believed that modern medicine presented
>> valid
>> > > abstractions against which we could gain usefull knowedges. But I
>> > > dont'
>> > > take this to mean that he believes modern medicine to be "true" in
>> the
>> > > absolute sense.
>> > >
>> >
>> This seems similar to Althusser's attempts to distinguish between
>> discourses in terms of the 'adequacy' of their 'grasp' of the
>> material world, a rather tricky notion in that idealist discourses
>> such as empiricism always attempt to exploit it. I'm not sure how
>> one avoids it though, unless one accepts the extreme relativism that
>> would assert that the phlogiston theory is equally valid way of
>> looking at the generation of heat as thermodynamics. It is clear
>> that one gives us a more adequate grasp of material reality, but if
>> one attempts to 'go around' discourse to find a way to see whether it
>> corresponds to something outside of itself then, whoops, there we are
>> back with the 'subject of knowledge' etc etc.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Foucault-L mailing list
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Foucault-L mailing list
>> Foucault-L@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>
>> http://foucault.info/mailman/listinfo/foucault-l
>>
>> End of Foucault-L Digest, Vol 10, Issue 6
>> *****************************************
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Foucault-L mailing list
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Chetan Vemuri
> West Des Moines, IA
> aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> (319)-512-9318
> "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> world"
>
--
Chetan Vemuri
West Des Moines, IA
aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
(319)-512-9318
"You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
world"