Hi, all,
In regards to the usage Foucault makes of truth, professor's Prado book
(Cambridge, 2006), "Searle and Foucault on Truth" might be useful. On pp.
81-100 he shows that Foucault provides a "multifaceted characterization" of
truth in five parts. One of them is the "tacit-realist" version of truth.
Prado concludes, "Foucault is a realist, albeit a tacit-realist, so I thing
the only option is to try to understand how truth is wholly discursive,
hence is a product of power, but without its being so entailing a denial of
objective reality (...)" Professor Béatrice Han-Pile also has a similar
interpretation.
Best,
Emmanoel
2010/3/6 Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>
> this discussion thread and the citations of interviews on it seem to prove
> this point
>
> On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 12:14 PM, Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> >wrote:
>
> > Actualy I think Foucault does distinguish between truth and justification
> > explicitly, except that these clarifications are often in the interviews
> and
> > intersections with other professors in Dits et Ecrits and perhaps in a
> few
> > lectures.
> > Its an interesting pattern. Foucault assumes the reader's ability to make
> a
> > distinction in his written work whereas in an informal interview, he's
> much
> > more refreshingly clear about his intentions, framework, etc.
> > Thus why I think anyone who wants a good understanding of Foucault needs
> to
> > read Dits et Ecrits (the translated excessively abridged version being
> > "Essential Works of Foucault, 3 vols).
> > Only by reading that will one have a clear view of Foucault's project.
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 6:11 AM, Kay Fisher <fisherk@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >> I think (philosopher and psychologist) Todd May's book "Between
> Genealogy
> >> and Epistemology: Psychology, politics and knowledge in the Thought of
> >> Michel Foucault' (1993) could be helpful here.
> >>
> >> He believes that its important to make a distinction between
> justification
> >> and truth (something he reckons so-called 'poststructuralist' French
> thought
> >> tended not to do). He says that Foucault could be ambiguous on these
> >> questions but makes the case that his position is not a relativist one
> re:
> >> truth. He claims that Foucault takes an antifoundational relation to
> truth
> >> but one that allows truth claims to be justified on the basis of
> >> 'inferential networks' of already existing knowledges (this includes
> >> justificatory practices). [May further argues that scientific knowledges
> of
> >> Western culture tend to have relatively 'tight' inferential networks].
> This,
> >> of course, does not guarantee any absolute truth. Rather it is assumed
> that
> >> while everything is open to question, not everything can be questioned
> at
> >> the one time (so there always has to be some taken-for-granteds). I
> think
> >> this is pretty much consistent with Edward's reading.
> >>
> >> May also argues (like others) that since the relativist position affords
> >> no grounds for truth claims it is self-defeating argument in logic
> terms.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Message: 11
> >> Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2010 22:08:48 -0500
> >> From: Edward Comstock<ecomst@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault and "human nature"
> >> To: Mailing-list<foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> Message-ID:
> >> <
> >> OF2850DBEE.82182B73-ON852576DE.00108388-852576DE.00114D19@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >>
> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
> >>
> >> Right. Similarly, our current physics works as a system of knowledge
> that
> >> gives us repeatable results and laws. But this does not mean that we
> could
> >> not have a competitive "non-quarky" physics that gives repeatable
> results
> >> and laws of a different order. Perhaps, with different cultural
> >> circumstances, a given non-quarky physics might even be more useful in
> the
> >> knowledge it produces. In other words, just because our physics works
> as
> >> a system of knowledge does not make it "true" in the absolute sense.
> But
> >> at the same time, who cares anymore about finding knowledge that is true
> >> in the absolute sense?
> >>
> >> Of course we also have to distinguish between sciences that have crossed
> >> the epistemological threshold (like physics and pathological anatomy)
> and
> >> those that have not...
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault and "human nature"
> >>
> >> David McInerney
> >> to:
> >> Mailing-list
> >> 03/05/2010 04:26 PM
> >>
> >>
> >> Sent by:
> >> foucault-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> Please respond to Mailing-list
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 06/03/2010, at 7:41 AM, Edward Comstock wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> > > It also seems to me that even what we call human nature or look for
> >> is
> >> > > going to change based on different knowledge practices, such that
> the
> >> > > question can only be answered within given systems of knowledge.
> >> > > Foucault,
> >> > > after all, for instance, believed that modern medicine presented
> >> valid
> >> > > abstractions against which we could gain usefull knowedges. But I
> >> > > dont'
> >> > > take this to mean that he believes modern medicine to be "true" in
> >> the
> >> > > absolute sense.
> >> > >
> >> >
> >> This seems similar to Althusser's attempts to distinguish between
> >> discourses in terms of the 'adequacy' of their 'grasp' of the
> >> material world, a rather tricky notion in that idealist discourses
> >> such as empiricism always attempt to exploit it. I'm not sure how
> >> one avoids it though, unless one accepts the extreme relativism that
> >> would assert that the phlogiston theory is equally valid way of
> >> looking at the generation of heat as thermodynamics. It is clear
> >> that one gives us a more adequate grasp of material reality, but if
> >> one attempts to 'go around' discourse to find a way to see whether it
> >> corresponds to something outside of itself then, whoops, there we are
> >> back with the 'subject of knowledge' etc etc.
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ------------------------------
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >> Foucault-L@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >>
> >> http://foucault.info/mailman/listinfo/foucault-l
> >>
> >> End of Foucault-L Digest, Vol 10, Issue 6
> >> *****************************************
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Chetan Vemuri
> > West Des Moines, IA
> > aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> > (319)-512-9318
> > "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> > world"
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Chetan Vemuri
> West Des Moines, IA
> aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> (319)-512-9318
> "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> world"
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>
In regards to the usage Foucault makes of truth, professor's Prado book
(Cambridge, 2006), "Searle and Foucault on Truth" might be useful. On pp.
81-100 he shows that Foucault provides a "multifaceted characterization" of
truth in five parts. One of them is the "tacit-realist" version of truth.
Prado concludes, "Foucault is a realist, albeit a tacit-realist, so I thing
the only option is to try to understand how truth is wholly discursive,
hence is a product of power, but without its being so entailing a denial of
objective reality (...)" Professor Béatrice Han-Pile also has a similar
interpretation.
Best,
Emmanoel
2010/3/6 Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx>
> this discussion thread and the citations of interviews on it seem to prove
> this point
>
> On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 12:14 PM, Chetan Vemuri <aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> >wrote:
>
> > Actualy I think Foucault does distinguish between truth and justification
> > explicitly, except that these clarifications are often in the interviews
> and
> > intersections with other professors in Dits et Ecrits and perhaps in a
> few
> > lectures.
> > Its an interesting pattern. Foucault assumes the reader's ability to make
> a
> > distinction in his written work whereas in an informal interview, he's
> much
> > more refreshingly clear about his intentions, framework, etc.
> > Thus why I think anyone who wants a good understanding of Foucault needs
> to
> > read Dits et Ecrits (the translated excessively abridged version being
> > "Essential Works of Foucault, 3 vols).
> > Only by reading that will one have a clear view of Foucault's project.
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 6:11 AM, Kay Fisher <fisherk@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >> I think (philosopher and psychologist) Todd May's book "Between
> Genealogy
> >> and Epistemology: Psychology, politics and knowledge in the Thought of
> >> Michel Foucault' (1993) could be helpful here.
> >>
> >> He believes that its important to make a distinction between
> justification
> >> and truth (something he reckons so-called 'poststructuralist' French
> thought
> >> tended not to do). He says that Foucault could be ambiguous on these
> >> questions but makes the case that his position is not a relativist one
> re:
> >> truth. He claims that Foucault takes an antifoundational relation to
> truth
> >> but one that allows truth claims to be justified on the basis of
> >> 'inferential networks' of already existing knowledges (this includes
> >> justificatory practices). [May further argues that scientific knowledges
> of
> >> Western culture tend to have relatively 'tight' inferential networks].
> This,
> >> of course, does not guarantee any absolute truth. Rather it is assumed
> that
> >> while everything is open to question, not everything can be questioned
> at
> >> the one time (so there always has to be some taken-for-granteds). I
> think
> >> this is pretty much consistent with Edward's reading.
> >>
> >> May also argues (like others) that since the relativist position affords
> >> no grounds for truth claims it is self-defeating argument in logic
> terms.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Message: 11
> >> Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2010 22:08:48 -0500
> >> From: Edward Comstock<ecomst@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault and "human nature"
> >> To: Mailing-list<foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> Message-ID:
> >> <
> >> OF2850DBEE.82182B73-ON852576DE.00108388-852576DE.00114D19@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >>
> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
> >>
> >> Right. Similarly, our current physics works as a system of knowledge
> that
> >> gives us repeatable results and laws. But this does not mean that we
> could
> >> not have a competitive "non-quarky" physics that gives repeatable
> results
> >> and laws of a different order. Perhaps, with different cultural
> >> circumstances, a given non-quarky physics might even be more useful in
> the
> >> knowledge it produces. In other words, just because our physics works
> as
> >> a system of knowledge does not make it "true" in the absolute sense.
> But
> >> at the same time, who cares anymore about finding knowledge that is true
> >> in the absolute sense?
> >>
> >> Of course we also have to distinguish between sciences that have crossed
> >> the epistemological threshold (like physics and pathological anatomy)
> and
> >> those that have not...
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Re: [Foucault-L] Foucault and "human nature"
> >>
> >> David McInerney
> >> to:
> >> Mailing-list
> >> 03/05/2010 04:26 PM
> >>
> >>
> >> Sent by:
> >> foucault-l-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> Please respond to Mailing-list
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 06/03/2010, at 7:41 AM, Edward Comstock wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> > > It also seems to me that even what we call human nature or look for
> >> is
> >> > > going to change based on different knowledge practices, such that
> the
> >> > > question can only be answered within given systems of knowledge.
> >> > > Foucault,
> >> > > after all, for instance, believed that modern medicine presented
> >> valid
> >> > > abstractions against which we could gain usefull knowedges. But I
> >> > > dont'
> >> > > take this to mean that he believes modern medicine to be "true" in
> >> the
> >> > > absolute sense.
> >> > >
> >> >
> >> This seems similar to Althusser's attempts to distinguish between
> >> discourses in terms of the 'adequacy' of their 'grasp' of the
> >> material world, a rather tricky notion in that idealist discourses
> >> such as empiricism always attempt to exploit it. I'm not sure how
> >> one avoids it though, unless one accepts the extreme relativism that
> >> would assert that the phlogiston theory is equally valid way of
> >> looking at the generation of heat as thermodynamics. It is clear
> >> that one gives us a more adequate grasp of material reality, but if
> >> one attempts to 'go around' discourse to find a way to see whether it
> >> corresponds to something outside of itself then, whoops, there we are
> >> back with the 'subject of knowledge' etc etc.
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ------------------------------
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >> Foucault-L@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >>
> >> http://foucault.info/mailman/listinfo/foucault-l
> >>
> >> End of Foucault-L Digest, Vol 10, Issue 6
> >> *****************************************
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Foucault-L mailing list
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Chetan Vemuri
> > West Des Moines, IA
> > aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> > (319)-512-9318
> > "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> > world"
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Chetan Vemuri
> West Des Moines, IA
> aryavartacnsrn@xxxxxxxxx
> (319)-512-9318
> "You say you want a Revolution! Well you know, we all want to change the
> world"
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>