Dear Nate,
I'm not sure if it's the source you're thinking of, but I do run an
argument of this type in Chapter 6 of *The Political Philosophy of Michel
Foucault*.
Best,
Mark
Dr Mark Kelly
Senior Lecturer and ARC Future Fellow
School of Humanities and Communication Arts
University of Western Sydney
https://uws.academia.edu/Kelly
On 27 January 2015 at 21:14, Nathaniel Roberts <npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Dear List,
>
> Both Charles Taylor and J. Habermas have criticized Foucault. They allege
> that F's critical analyses of modern forms of power are flawed because he
> does not provide a positive alternative, or a normative foundation, in
> relation to which these forms of power are found wanting. Charles Taylor
> (if I am recalling his argument correctly) makes the further claim that
> Foucault *does* in fact have an unacknowledged normative framework, but
> that he does not make it explicit, and that if he did he'd find that F's
> critical analyses are contradictory, because they depend as premises on the
> very set-up he is criticizing.
>
> I have always seen these criticisms of Foucault as misplaced. One does not
> need to specify a positive alternative to say one finds something
> "intolerable," as F says of popular initiatives by prisoner and others who
> resist power (in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, p. 216). F claims his
> own analyses are guided, in part, by actually existing instances of
> resistance, but it would be equally coherent, I argue, for him simply to
> say that "I find this intolerable." (I believe he actually speaks in the
> first person like this somewhere, but I can't find the quote---I thought it
> was in D&P.)
>
> Anyway, coming to my question: does anyone know of a secondary work that
> discusses this issue, and contests Taylor's/Habermas' claim that criticism
> must be premised on some normative framework or positive conception of the
> good? I feel sure I've seen such an argument developed somewhere, but I
> can't recall where.
>
> The closest thing I've found is Raymond Geuss' essay "Must Criticism Be
> Constructive?" (in "A World without Why"). But this does not specifically
> mention the Foucault or the Taylor/Habermas criticism.
>
> Best,
> Nate
>
> --
> Dr. Nathaniel Roberts
> <
> http://www.mmg.mpg.de/departments/religious-diversity/scientific-staff/dr-nathaniel-roberts/
> >
> Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
> Herman-Föge-Weg 11
> 37073 Göttingen
> Germany
> +49 (0) 551-4956-0
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>
I'm not sure if it's the source you're thinking of, but I do run an
argument of this type in Chapter 6 of *The Political Philosophy of Michel
Foucault*.
Best,
Mark
Dr Mark Kelly
Senior Lecturer and ARC Future Fellow
School of Humanities and Communication Arts
University of Western Sydney
https://uws.academia.edu/Kelly
On 27 January 2015 at 21:14, Nathaniel Roberts <npr4@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Dear List,
>
> Both Charles Taylor and J. Habermas have criticized Foucault. They allege
> that F's critical analyses of modern forms of power are flawed because he
> does not provide a positive alternative, or a normative foundation, in
> relation to which these forms of power are found wanting. Charles Taylor
> (if I am recalling his argument correctly) makes the further claim that
> Foucault *does* in fact have an unacknowledged normative framework, but
> that he does not make it explicit, and that if he did he'd find that F's
> critical analyses are contradictory, because they depend as premises on the
> very set-up he is criticizing.
>
> I have always seen these criticisms of Foucault as misplaced. One does not
> need to specify a positive alternative to say one finds something
> "intolerable," as F says of popular initiatives by prisoner and others who
> resist power (in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, p. 216). F claims his
> own analyses are guided, in part, by actually existing instances of
> resistance, but it would be equally coherent, I argue, for him simply to
> say that "I find this intolerable." (I believe he actually speaks in the
> first person like this somewhere, but I can't find the quote---I thought it
> was in D&P.)
>
> Anyway, coming to my question: does anyone know of a secondary work that
> discusses this issue, and contests Taylor's/Habermas' claim that criticism
> must be premised on some normative framework or positive conception of the
> good? I feel sure I've seen such an argument developed somewhere, but I
> can't recall where.
>
> The closest thing I've found is Raymond Geuss' essay "Must Criticism Be
> Constructive?" (in "A World without Why"). But this does not specifically
> mention the Foucault or the Taylor/Habermas criticism.
>
> Best,
> Nate
>
> --
> Dr. Nathaniel Roberts
> <
> http://www.mmg.mpg.de/departments/religious-diversity/scientific-staff/dr-nathaniel-roberts/
> >
> Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity
> Herman-Föge-Weg 11
> 37073 Göttingen
> Germany
> +49 (0) 551-4956-0
>
> _______________________________________________
> Foucault-L mailing list
>